Sunk export costs. How they influence firms’ export decisions and international trade by Medin, Hege
  
 
Sunk export costs 
How they influence on firms’ export decisions  
and international trade  
 
Hege Medin 
September 2013 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
After 13 years, it is a great relief to be able to complete my Ph.D. thesis. Two years into my 
doctoral studies, I experienced health problems and was forced to take a break which came to 
last for several years. I was not able to start working again on a more regular basis until late 
2010, and then only part time. Now that I have finally reached my goal of completing this 
thesis, I would like to express great appreciation towards the Norwegian School of Economics 
(NHH) in Bergen and my employer, the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
in Oslo, for not giving up on me and for arranging for my special needs to be met in such an 
excellent way. I would also like to thank everyone who has supported me during this process, 
especially:   
My main supervisor, Ragnhild Balsvik of NHH. She has given me excellent support and 
guidance during the final period of my Ph.D. studies, always responding quickly and 
thoroughly to my inquiries. Her many insightful and well-founded opinions have helped to 
head me in the right direction. She has also been very accommodating in terms of practical 
issues, such as arranging for our meetings to be held in Oslo as travelling to Bergen became 
difficult for me. 
My colleague and co-supervisor, Arne Melchior at NUPI. He has followed my work from the 
initial stage of formulating research questions to the final work of communicating the results 
to the public. Our many thought-provoking conversations have been a great source of 
inspiration. Arne has been invaluable in helping me focus on my research agenda and in 
figuring out theoretical complexities. 
My colleague and co-author, Per Botolf Maurseth at NUPI/BI. He was central in getting me 
back to my Ph.D. studies in 2010. By offering collaboration on one of the papers and putting 
great faith in me, he helped me regain my academic self-confidence, which was low after 
several years outside the academic environment. He has also thoroughly commented on the 
two other papers of the thesis. We have had many fruitful academic discussions, ranging from 
specific details to the big questions.  
My main supervisor during the first years of my doctoral studies, Jan I. Haaland of NHH. 
Under his supervision, I was able to publish the first article of this thesis.  
I am also grateful to the following people for extensively commenting on parts of the thesis: 
Anthony Venables (chapters 2 and 3); Andreas Moxnes, (chapters 3 and 4); Kjell G. Salvanes 
(chapter 4); and to Susan Høivik, for excellent proof reading and valuable linguistic advice. 
Finally, I would like to express my warmest gratitude towards my dear family: my husband 
Knut and our son Simon for their marvellous support and for putting up with me when the 
only thing in my head has been this Ph.D. thesis. A special thanks to Knut for being so 
supportive when I decided to resume my Ph.D. work in 2010 and for helping me to 
understand that the task was more manageable than it seemed at the time. I have the good 
fortune to be married to an economist, and greatly appreciate our many academic 
conversations. 
This Ph.D. project has been financed by the Research Council of Norway (project 139982/510 
‘Globalization and Internationalization of the Norwegian Economy’). 
 Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction             7 
 
Chapter 2 
Firms’ export decisions – fixed trade costs and the size of the export market   23 
 
Chapter 3 
The reverse home market effect in exports:  
A cross-country study of the extensive margin of exports      41 
 
Chapter 4 
Market-specific sunk export costs:  
The impact of learning and spillovers        91 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
8 
 
Introduction 
Why do countries trade? The traditional economic explanation is the theory of comparative 
advantage. It focuses on the mutual benefit of trade in different products, such as textiles and 
machinery, between different countries, such as Bangladesh and the USA. Today, however, a 
large share of world trade consists of trade in similar products between similar countries – 
like Germany selling cars to Japan, and Japan selling cars to Germany. An explanation for 
these phenomena has been provided by the new trade theory launched inter alia through a 
seminal article by Paul Krugman (1980). Whereas the traditional focus had been on 
competitive markets and country differences in technology or factor endowments, the new 
trade theory models firm behaviour explicitly, and emphasizes imperfect competition, product 
differentiation, and consumers’ valuation of variety.  
With the emergence of the new trade theory and later the new economic geography, trade 
costs came to play a much more central role in economic models than before. According to 
traditional theory, trade costs have the effect of dampening trade flows and leading to factor 
price differences between countries. By contrast, the new trade theory sees trade costs as 
crucial in determining international trade patterns and production structure within countries. 
Increasing returns and transport costs in manufacturing industries make access to a large 
home market advantageous, which in turn makes it less profitable for manufacturing firms to 
be established in small countries. This ‘home market effect’ (HME) predicts that small 
countries will have a share of the world’s production and exports of manufactured goods that 
is less than proportional to their share of labour. When trade costs decline, it becomes less 
costly to serve small countries from abroad, and the advantage of locating in a large country 
becomes – according to some of the new models – even more evident. As a consequence, 
reductions in trade costs may lead to de-industrialisation of small countries.  
Despite the central role of trade costs in new trade theory, until recently there has been little 
focus on the different types of trade costs. Trade costs were normally modelled as 
proportional to the traded volume. This could yield a good representation of trade costs 
related to transport or tariffs, but is less suited for describing other types of trade costs. For a 
firm, entering an export market requires some previous knowledge about the market. Product 
standards, legislation, demand, language, business culture, etc., may differ from the domestic 
market; and the costs of acquiring knowledge about these differences and adjusting to them 
may be significant. There may also be costs involved in finding customers and setting up 
distribution networks. At least some elements of these costs are better described as one-time 
fixed costs that are independent of the volumes traded, and that accrue only when the firm 
starts to export: sunk export costs. Apart from a few early contributions, the modelling of sunk 
export costs was absent from the models of new trade theory until the early 2000s, when trade 
models with heterogeneous firms began to appear.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Many of the models mentioned in this introduction are static models, where there is no distinction between 
sunk and fixed export costs. Such costs are often referred to differently in different papers. In addition to ‘sunk 
export costs’, they are frequently termed ‘fixed export costs’, ‘entry costs’ or ‘beachhead cost’. For consistency, 
I will refer to these costs as sunk export costs, even if they are termed differently in the paper in question.  
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In earlier models, all firms had generally been represented as equal. This, together with the 
failure to include sunk export costs, had several implications which did not fit well with real-
life observations. Within an industry, the theory predicted that either all firms would be 
exporters, or none at all. Adjusted for real transport costs and tariffs, an exporting firm would 
export all its products to all countries. In economic analysis of trade patterns it was therefore 
not possible to distinguish effects for exporters from effects for non-exporters. 
Although anecdotal evidence clearly contradicted these predictions, few large-scale firm level 
data sets comparing exporters and non-exporters were available before the mid-1990s. In 
economics, these patterns were therefore not subjected to systematic analysis. When such data 
became available for selected countries, it became evident that firms behave very differently 
from what the models predicted. Gradually, more and more studies revealed the same facts: 
only a proportion of firms export, and most firms only export a few products to a few 
countries. (See WTO, 2008; and Bernard et al., 2011 for overviews.) Many empirical papers 
also found indications of sunk export costs. Clearly, the models would have to include 
mechanisms that could allow for the coexistence of exporters and non-exporters within the 
same industry. One way of doing this is to model sunk export costs.
 2
 
With the pioneering article by Melitz (2003) and its subsequent numerous extensions, the new 
trade theory took a new direction. Melitz included sunk export costs and firm differences in 
marginal production costs into the Krugman (1980) model. While the previous, 
homogeneous-firms models predicted that either all firms or no firms would export, the 
Melitz-type models were able to explain the coexistence of exporters and non-exporters 
within the same industry as found in firm-level data.  
The inclusion of sunk export costs in economic models opened up for analysis of several new 
questions. It became possible to predict how changes in trade conditions affect measures such 
as the number of exporters and non-exporters, their average productivity levels, and their 
average sales in each market. Moreover, various types of trade liberalisation could be 
analysed, such as reductions in tariffs (analysed by reductions in variable trade costs), versus 
harmonisation of product standards (analysed by reductions in sunk export costs). 
This thesis aims to help explain the role of sunk export costs in international trade 
transactions, theoretically as well as empirically. It consists of three papers presented in 
chapters 2, 3 and 4. The papers in chapters 2 and 3 are mainly theoretical. The paper in 
chapter 2 was published as Medin (2003). The purpose of these papers is to study the effects 
of trade liberalisation and changes in market sizes. When sunk export costs are present, such 
changes affect not only trade flows between countries but also firms’ export decision and the 
number of exporters versus non-exporters. The paper in chapter 4 aims at empirically 
investigating the importance of sunk costs related to exporting a particular product to a 
particular country. It also investigates whether firms’ learning from their own or from other 
firms’ export experience can reduce export costs. The paper is co-authored with Per Botolf 
Maurseth. The rest of the introduction offer summaries of the main findings from the three 
                                                 
2
 Another possibility is to allow for productivity differences in producing different products between countries, 
as in e.g. Bernard et al. (2003). They demonstrate that sunk export costs are not necessary for creating an 
equilibrium with the coexistence of exporters and non-exporters.  
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papers in this thesis and shows how they relate to the existing literature on sunk export costs. I 
also offer some suggestions for future research. 
The nature of sunk export costs 
Do firms consider sunk export costs important? And what are the main components of such 
costs? Firm surveys can provide some answers. Roberts and Tybout (1997b) report that 
among Colombian exporters, finding customers, gathering information about the foreign 
market and adjusting products according to foreign standards represent major costs when 
entering a foreign market. Similar costs are found among Norwegian IT exporters in Melchior 
(2003) and, although of smaller magnitude, among Norwegian seafood exporters in Medin 
and Melchior (2002).  
While survey evidence indicates that sunk costs are important, it also hints at several learning 
mechanisms through which these costs can be reduced. Firms may learn about exporting from 
their own export experience. For example, a Norwegian firm that exports to France may use 
its knowledge about the French market when entering the German market. Also, if the 
Norwegian firm exports, say, salmon to France, there may be few additional costs involved in 
starting to export white fish. Medin and Melchior (2002) find that Norwegian seafood 
exporters report that different products are often sold to the same customers, and that costs of 
introducing a new product in a country are much lower if the firm already exports other 
products to that country. Several firms also report that exporting to one customer in a country 
considerably facilitates exporting to another customer in the same country, and that exporting 
to a given country reduces the costs and time of starting to export to another country within 
the same region. These results may indicate that there are learning effects, although they may 
also reflect the presence of country specific sunk export costs. 
Learning about exporting can also occur through knowledge spillovers from other firms. If 
many Norwegian firms export salmon, knowledge about salmon export may spill over to 
potential exporters, facilitating export entry into the salmon market. Similarly, know-how 
about exporting to a specific destination country may spill over to potential exporters. 
Indications of such spillovers are found in Medin and Melchior (2002), where exporters report 
that they obtain useful market information from other exporters when they enter a new 
market, and that they consider it an advantage if there are other Norwegian exporters present 
in the new market. 
An important aim of economic trade models is to analyse effects from reductions in trade 
costs. Reductions in trade costs may be related to reductions in transport costs, or to political 
actions such as the elimination of tariffs or harmonisation of product standards. The inclusion 
of sunk export costs in economic models is crucial for properly analysing today’s trade 
policies. Tariffs have been reduced or eliminated in many sectors and together with 
improvements in transport technology this has reduced variable trade costs during the last 
decades. However, many of today’s trade policies cover more comprehensive areas than the 
traditional political tools of tariffs and quotas. Several of today’s bilateral as well as 
multilateral trade agreements include areas such as competition policy, capital movement, 
intellectual property rights, investments, product standards, environmental and labour 
standards, and public procurement. Such deep economic integration is likely to reduce sunk as 
11 
 
well as variable trade costs. This kind of policy has become increasingly prevalent in recent 
decades – early examples being the free trade agreement of the EEC and that between Canada 
and the USA. The EU and the USA have also been pioneers in advocating this policy in trade 
negotiations with other countries, and it is an important part of the ongoing negotiations 
between the two. Furthermore, in recent years such policies have become notable in trade 
agreements between other countries, especially in Asia – both within ASEAN and between 
other countries in the region. (See Orefice and Rocha, 2013; and Baldwin, 2011, for 
discussions on deep economic integration.) In analysing trade liberalisation, it will still be 
relevant to consider reduction in variable trade costs on some goods for which tariff 
reductions have been limited, like agricultural products, but trade policy that deals with deep 
economic integration is probably of more interest in most areas. This underlines the 
importance of incorporating sunk export costs in models of international trade.  
Sunk export costs in theoretical trade models 
Until the early 2000s it was common in new trade theory models to assume that firms were 
homogeneous and faced variable trade costs only. This changed radically with Melitz (2003), 
who modified the Krugman (1980) model in two important ways.
3
 Firstly, he included sunk 
export costs, thereby allowing the export decision to be separated from the decision to sell in 
the domestic market.
 
Secondly, he incorporated firm-level differences in marginal production 
costs, represented by a continuous distribution.
4
 In consequence, the model predicts that all 
operating firms will sell in their domestic market, but only the most productive firms will 
export. In other words, the model is able to explain the coexistence of exporters and non-
exporters within the same industry, as found in firm-level data.
 
Many papers have offered extensions of the Melitz (2003) model, focusing on country-
specific sunk export costs (Chaney, 2008; Akerman and Forslid, 2009); sunk costs of 
exporting a particular product to a particular country (Arkolakis and Muendler, 2010;  
Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2011); or sunk costs that vary with firm productivity 
(Arkolakis, 2010). These models typically predict that the most productive firms will be those 
that export to many countries, that export many products to the same country, and that pay the 
highest sunk export costs. 
However, it is not necessary to assume that firms have different marginal production costs in 
order to create an equilibrium where only some of them export. For example, in a model of 
initially equal firms, Venables (1994) introduces sunk export and shows that firms will 
become heterogeneous and split into exporters and non-exporters in equilibrium. All firms sell 
in the domestic market, and some also export. 
In chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, I incorporate sunk export costs into two models of 
international trade. The aim is to explain how, in the presence of sunk export costs, the 
relative size of the export market will determine the number of manufacturing firms that 
                                                 
3
 The Krugman (1980) model introduced the framework of product differentiation, monopolistic competition and 
CES demand, published in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), into a trade context. 
4 Also some earlier papers had introduced the idea of firm heterogeneity in trade models building on the Dixit-
Stiglitz-Krugman framework. Montagna (2001) and Jean (2002) let firms differ in their marginal costs, and the 
latter also includes sunk export costs. 
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export. Rather than focusing on firm differences in marginal production costs as main 
determinants for their export status, as in the Melitz-type models, these models emphasis the 
role of export market conditions. I therefore follow Venables (1994) in working with firms 
that have equal marginal production costs, but, in contrast, I analyse countries of different 
sizes.  
Many new trade theory models, whether dealing with firms with equal or with different 
marginal costs, predict that the number of manufacturing firms that export will decrease with 
the relative size of the foreign market. This may seem contra-intuitive, as access to a large 
foreign market could make exports more profitable and hence lead to an increase in the 
number of exporting firms. The source of the effect is the HME, which holds that the number 
of manufacturing firms will be disproportionally lower in small countries. A benchmark HME 
model with homogeneous firms that is used as point of departure for many other models is 
presented in Helpman and Krugman (1985, pp. 205–209), from now on referred to as HK 
1985. Since this type of model predicts that either all firms will export or no firms will, the 
HME in the number of manufacturing firms leads directly to an HME in the number of 
exporters. Consequently, the number of exporters increases with the relative size of the home 
market and decreases with the relative size of the foreign market. The result may be seen as 
an undesired side effect of the fact that homogeneous-firms models are not able to separate 
between exporting and non-exporting firms. However, the effect is also found in the much 
used Melitz-style extension of HK 1985, where only a proportion of firms export (a model 
like that is e.g. presented in and Forslid, 2010). In that model, the proportion of firms that 
export will be independent of country size. This leads to the same negative relationship 
between the number of manufacturing exporters and the size of the foreign market as found in 
its homogeneous-firms counterpart. 
In the models in chapters 2 and 3, the number of manufacturing exporters is positively related 
to the size of the foreign market, rather than the home market, thereby creating a ‘foreign 
market effect’ or a ‘reverse HME’ in the number of manufacturing exporters. In the model in 
chapter 3, the reverse HME in the number of manufacturing exporters coexists with an HME 
in the total number of manufacturing firms. Access to a relatively large foreign market is an 
advantage for the number of manufacturing exporters even though it is a disadvantage for the 
total number of manufacturing firms.  
Both models are extensions of the HK1985 model. I incorporate sunk export costs into that 
model. However, in order to make possible an equilibrium with the coexistence of exporters 
and non-exporters, more structure must be added to the model. In the model in chapter 2, I 
add more structure to the cost side of the economy by assuming that manufacturing 
production requires a fixed amount of a specific factor not used elsewhere in the economy. 
This practically restricts entry of firms and causes the total number of manufacturing firms to 
be proportional to country size. In the model in chapter 3, I add more structure to the demand 
side of the HK 1985 model. Manufacturing firms are grouped into industries that are country-
bounded, and consumers want to differentiate their consumption on different goods within an 
industry as well as on goods from different industries. Consequently, there is national product 
differentiation. As opposed to the model in chapter 2, this model allows for free entry of firms 
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within an industry. The number of industries in each country, on the other hand, is 
exogenously given. 
Both models predict that the proportion of firms that export will be larger in small countries 
than in large ones. In chapter 3, I test this prediction on a cross-country dataset, which, to my 
knowledge, no other studies have done. Among 116 countries, I find that a doubling of 
relative home market size leads to a 12.6 per cent decrease in the proportion of firms that 
export. The results suggest that being a small country is not such a great disadvantage in terms 
of manufacturing exports as predicted by the benchmark HME models. 
Trade liberalisation in models with sunk export costs. 
Do different types of trade liberalisation, such as tariff reductions versus deep economic 
integration, affect trade differently? While the first type of trade liberalisation is properly 
analysed by reductions in variable trade costs, the latter is better analysed by considering 
reductions in sunk export costs as well. This was not possible in homogeneous-firms models, 
since they considered variable trade costs only. In addition to being better suited for analysing 
trade liberalisation in the form of deep economic integration, models with sunk export costs 
have encouraged analysis of the effect of trade liberalisation along two margins: extensive 
(the number of firms that export) and intensive (average exports per firm). The models 
generally predict that reductions in sunk as well as variable trade costs will lead to an increase 
the traded volume, but the two types of liberalisation may differ on their effects along these 
two margins.  
In the models in chapters 2 and 3, reductions in sunk as well as in variable trade costs lead to 
increased profitability of exports, encouraging more firms to enter the export market. The 
extensive margin of exports therefore increases.
5
 Regarding the intensive margin, however, 
effects from the two types of trade liberalisation differ. Reductions in sunk costs facilitate 
entry into export markets. Exporting firms can survive in the export market by selling a 
smaller amount than before, so the intensive margin is reduced. By contrast, reductions in 
variable trade costs do not affect the intensive margin. These results are similar to the ones 
obtained from Melitz-type models (see Lawless, 2010).
6
 Reductions in both types of trade 
costs lead to increased profitability of exporting, and smaller, less productive firms are able to 
enter into the export market. This increases the extensive margin of exports, just as in the 
models in chapters 2 and 3. It also tends to reduce the intensive margin. Reductions in 
variable trade costs have the additional effect of increasing the sales of existing exporters in 
foreign markets at the expense of sales in the home market. This tends to increase the 
intensive margin. Consequently, reductions in sunk export costs will lead to a decline in the 
intensive margin of exports, while reductions in variable trade costs have two opposing 
effects. Under the widely used assumption of Pareto-distributed marginal production costs, 
the two effects cancel each other out. To conclude, Melitz type models as well as the models 
presented in chapters 2 and 3 predict that the intensive margin (average exports per firm) is 
unaffected by changes in variable trade costs, but declines with reductions in sunk export 
                                                 
5
 The ‘extensive margin of exports’ is defined somewhat differently in chapter 3. Instead of referring to the 
number of firms that export, it refers to the proportion of firms that export. 
6
 The same effects appear also in Venables (1994), but he discusses only the extensive margin. 
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costs. By contrast, the extensive margin (the number of firms that export) increases with 
reductions in both types of trade costs. 
How is the HME affected by trade liberalisation? In general, when sunk export costs are 
included in the model, these seem to affect the HME in a similar manner as variable trade 
costs. In the remainder of this section, I will therefore interpret ‘trade liberalisation’ as 
reductions in sunk as well as variable trade costs. Some models, like those of HK 1985 and 
and Forslid (2010), predict that the HME will be reinforced with trade liberalisation. Others 
predict that it will follow an inverse-U relationship, where the effect will be weakened for 
very low trade costs (Krugman and Venables, 1990). In the model in chapter 2, there is no 
HME, and the reverse HME is independent of trade costs. However, in the model in chapter 3, 
I find that trade liberalisation will reinforce the HME in the total number of manufacturing 
firms, as well as the reverse HME in the number of manufacturing exporters. The reason for 
the first result is the same as in other models. When trade costs decline, it will become less 
costly to serve the small country from abroad. The advantage of access to a large home 
market for domestic sales will therefore become more prominent, and more and more firms 
will find it profitable to locate in the large country. The reason for the second result is that the 
model posits that domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes, so consumers will 
want to consume some of each. When trade is liberalised, demand for imports increases in 
both countries, but the increase is greatest in the large country. Consequently, the small 
country will experience a greater increase in demand from abroad than will the large country; 
and this will induce more firms to enter into the export market in the small country than in the 
large. The effect is strong: it more than cancels out the effect of a disproportionally lower 
number of manufacturing firms in the small country. In other words, the advantage of having 
access to a large foreign market for manufacturing exports is magnified as trade is liberalised. 
Empirical evidence of sunk export costs, learning and spillovers 
New opportunities for empirically studying sunk costs as well as learning and spillover effects 
emerged with the availability of firm level data from the mid-1990s. Typically, studies of 
these issues treat as the dependent variable the probability that a firm exports; and, in some 
cases, the value of a firm’s export. Early contributions focus on firms’ exports as such; but, 
along with more detailed data, recent contributions have often concentrated on a firm’s 
exports to a particular country, a firm’s export of a particular product, or both. 
In the presence of sunk export costs, a firm that exported the previous year would be more 
likely to export this year than a firm that did not, because the former has already paid the sunk 
export costs. Firms that enter into the export action must earn enough profits in the foreign 
market to cover the sunk export costs, unlike the case for continuing exporters. The former 
therefore require higher profits in the export market than the latter. Consequently, one way to 
investigate the importance of sunk export costs is to study persistence in firms’ export 
behaviour. Many studies find evidence of such persistence, using firm-level data. Early 
examples focusing on global sunk costs (sunk costs related to export as such) include Roberts 
and Tybout (1997a) on Colombian firms; Campa (2002) on Spanish firms; and Bernard and 
Jensen (2004) on US firms. Some recent contributions have also found evidence of 
persistence in country-specific exports. This indicates the presence of country-specific as well 
15 
 
as global sunk export costs (see Moxnes, 2010, on Norwegian firms; and Gullstrand, 2011, on 
Swedish firms).  
The paper in chapter 4 is co-authored with Per Botof  Maurseth and adds to the literature by 
including the product dimension into the analysis. We study the export behaviour of 
Norwegian seafood exporters in a new firm-level data set. The data are particularly interesting 
because of the high level of detail: 11 years of panel data for all Norwegian seafood exporters, 
the countries they export to, and the products they export. Norway is one of the world’s 
largest exporters of seafood, with an annual export value of 35.7 billion NOK in 2007 
(approx. 7.28 billion USD). The industry is highly internationalized, with exports of a wide 
range of products to almost 200 countries; some 90 per cent of all Norwegian seafood 
production is exported.
7
 The sector is therefore an interesting case for the study of export 
activity. We present evidence of persistence in firms’ export of a particular product to a 
particular country, indicating that there are sunk export costs also at the firm-product-country 
level.  The probability of exporting a particular product to a particular country is found to 
increase by more than 180 per cent, from 3.9 to 11.0 percentage points, if the firm exported 
the product to the country the previous year. 
Can export costs be reduced through learning from own experience, or that of other firms? In 
chapter 4 we address this question. Theoretical models incorporating learning and spillover 
effects are still scarce, but there are a few recent contributions. Schmeiser (2012) has 
developed a model where learning about exporting from other countries reduces the sunk 
costs of exporting to a given country – a concept she terms ‘learning to export’.8 A model 
capturing knowledge spillovers from other exporters is presented in Krautheim (2012). An 
increased number of exporters from country i to country j reduces the sunk cost of a firm in 
country i exporting to country j. We investigate a wide range of learning and spillover effects 
that may occur within as well as between products and countries. 
We study learning from own experience by investigating whether the probability of exporting 
a particular product to a particular country increased if, in the previous year, the firm (i) 
exported another product to the same country; (ii) exported the same product to many other 
countries; or (iii) exported any product to many other countries. Other papers have also 
studied similar effects (see Gullstrand, 2011, on Swedish firms; Lawless, 2011, on Irish firms; 
Morales et al., 2011, on Chilean firms; and Castagnino, 2011, on Argentinian firms). 
Empirical studies of knowledge spillovers typically focus on the impact of concentrating 
export activity in the potential exporter’s home country.  Results from early contributions, 
which studied implications for whether or not a firm starts to export as such, were mixed (see 
Clerides et al., 1998; Aitken et al., 1997). Recent contributions that focus on the probability 
of exporting (a particular product) to a particular country show results more unambiguously in 
favour of the existence of spillovers. (See Requena Silvente and Castillo Giménez, 2007, on 
Spanish firms; Koenig, 2009, and Koenig et al., 2010, on French firms; Lawless, 2011, on 
                                                 
7 Based on information from the Norwegian Seafood Council. 
8 A different, but related concept is ‘learning by exporting’, discussed in Clerides et al. (1998). This concept describes 
reductions in firms’ production rather than export costs due to learning from own export experience. They find little evidence 
of such effects, and most later contributions are also discouraging, although there are exceptions. Wagner (2007) and 
Greenaway and Kneller (2008) offer good reviews. 
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Irish firms; and Fabling et al., 2012, on firms from New Zealand.) In chapter 4, spillover 
effects are studied by investigating whether the probability that a firm would export a 
particular product to a particular country increased if, during the previous year, there had been 
(i) many other Norwegian firms exporting the same product, or (ii) many other Norwegian 
firms exporting any product, to that country. 
Learning and spillover effects may be stronger if the average value of own or other firms’ 
export is higher. As opposed to most other studies on learning and spillovers, we include in 
the same regression discrete variables on firms’ lagged presence in markets, capturing the 
extensive margin, and continuous variables on firms’ lagged export value to markets, 
capturing the intensive margin.  
Most other studies of learning and spillovers in the firm-country (and possibly product) 
dimension have focused on entrants – firms that did not export (the product) to the country the 
previous year. By contrast, in our paper a dynamic model is employed, including entrants as 
well as continuing exporters (firms that exported the product to the country the previous year).
 
By including interaction variables, we also allow for effects to differ for the two types of 
firms.
9
 Whereas effects for continuing exporters may be interpreted as effects on fixed export 
costs alone, those for entrants may be interpreted as effects on the combination of fixed and 
sunk export costs.  
Our results indicate that there are learning effects from other products within the same 
country. Having exported another product to a country in the previous year increases the 
probability of entering the country with a new product this year by 11.1 per cent and the 
probability of continuing to export a particular product to the country by 49.6 per cent. 
Learning effects also seem to be present within product groups across countries. If the firm 
exported a product to an additional country in the previous year, the probability of starting to 
export the product to a country this year increases by 1.9 per cent. The probability of 
continuing to export the product to a country increases by 1.0 per cent. There is no evidence 
of learning from exporting other products to other countries. Furthermore, we find indications 
of intra-product spillovers. An additional Norwegian firm exporting a product to a country 
increases the probability of a firm exporting the same product to the same country by 
approximately 1 per cent (for entrants as well as for continuing exporters). There is also some 
evidence of inter-product spillovers, but effects are smaller. Most learning and spillover 
effects occur through the extensive and not the intensive margin. 
Summing up, empirical evidence presented in chapter 4 indicates that there are sunk costs 
related to exporting a particular product to a particular country. Evidence also suggests that 
firm-product-country specific export costs can be reduced through various learning and 
spillover effects, especially within the same product category. 
                                                 
9
 The only other papers I know of that include continuing exporters in addition to entrants are Gullstrand (2011) 
and Meinen (2012), who focus on country-specific learning, not spillovers. Moreover, these papers do not 
distinguish between entrants and continuing exporters as we do. 
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Topics for future research 
Recent developments in economic research on international trade have expanded our 
understanding of the significance of trade costs. We have seen how changes in trade costs 
may lead to dramatic changes in the composition of trade and in countries’ commercial 
structure. An important contribution from the latest theories is a more sophisticated modelling 
of trade costs. Up until only a decade ago, it was common to assume that trade costs were 
proportional to the traded volume. In other words, constant returns to scale in trade 
transactions were assumed. By contrast, nowadays many researchers aim at modelling 
increasing returns to scale and externalities in trade transactions.  
In its simplest form, increasing returns to scale in trade transactions are modelled by 
exogenous firm-level sunk export costs, as in the models in chapter 2 and 3 in this thesis. 
Indeed, this kind of modelling implies that not all firms find it profitable to export, enabling 
us to explain how changes in trade conditions may affect exporting and non-exporting firms 
differently – a considerable improvement upon earlier theories. However, several observed 
trade patterns cannot be explained by this simple representation of trade costs. Although it is 
still common to use very simplified trade cost functions in models of international trade, some 
recent papers offer studies of more complex functions. 
Empirical evidence presented in chapter 4 in this thesis and elsewhere indicates that sunk 
export costs may accrue along different dimensions: firm, country, product, the combination 
of the three, and possibly also along other dimensions. Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) 
investigate the behaviour of Brazilian firms and find that large firms selling many products, 
typically export their top products to many countries. Nevertheless, these firms sell a smaller 
amount of their lowest-selling products than do small exporters. They explain this pattern by a 
model where firms face product-country specific sunk export costs that may decline with the 
number of products the firm sells in a country. Studying combinations of different kinds of 
sunk export costs, and how these affect each other is a pertinent topic for future research.  
Evidence presented in chapter 4 in this thesis and elsewhere suggests that there are learning 
and spillover mechanisms that can affect the magnitude of trade costs. Furthermore, Eaton et 
al. (2008) show that, among Colombian firms, most new exporters are very small, export to 
only one country, and soon give up exporting. By contrast, those that continue to export often 
experience a rapid expansion in their export values as well as in the number of countries to 
which they export. Various models have been suggested for explaining these patterns. A 
possible explanation is learning. In chapter 4 we assume, like most other empirical studies, 
that learning and spillover effects are external to the firm – it does not take them into account 
when deciding upon entering an export market. This might not be an accurate representation 
of reality. Perhaps firms take into account that learning from own experience and (to a lesser 
extent) spillovers affect their export costs. In this case, a firm may want to enter an export 
market even if it expects to earn negative profits there because export experience induces 
learning and spillover effects that make entry into other markets easier (for example, by 
reducing uncertainty). In this case, firms’ entries across markets are not independent. If firms’ 
learning is particularly strong in the first market they enter, many firms would export a small 
amount in one market (perhaps without paying the full sunk export costs) in order to test the 
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market and reveal uncertainty about their exporting ability. Mechanisms similar to these are 
discussed in Albornoz et al. (2012).  
Another point is that firms may be able to choose between different combinations of trade 
costs. Let’s say firms could choose between selling in a foreign market through a trader (large 
variable and small sunk costs) instead of setting up a sales office in the export market (large 
sunk and small variable costs). Firms that are uncertain about their exporting ability would 
choose the first alternative to test the market, and then perhaps choose the last alternative at a 
later point when their exporting ability has been revealed. Issues related to this are discussed 
in Akhmetova and Mitaritonna (2013). Firms may also be able to choose their level of sunk 
export costs. Arkolakis (2010) suggest that large firms invest more in marketing, thereby 
being able to reach more consumers.  
The study of trade cost functions incorporating elements like those mentioned above (sunk 
export costs along different dimensions, endogenous sunk export costs, or internal learning 
effects) is still in its infancy. Nevertheless, the literature centred around this is growing. 
Theoretical as well as empirical studies of these issues should be an important part of future 
research. 
Inclusion of sunk export costs in trade models have enabled us to analyse how changes in 
trade costs and market size affect exporters and non-exporters differently. In chapters 2 and 3, 
I argue that an increase in the relative size of the foreign market should lead to a more than 
proportional increase in the number of exporters in a small country. This is what I refer to as 
the reverse HME in exports. A weakness about the models in chapters 2 and 3 is that the 
result hinges on strong assumptions: the assumption of restricted firm entry in chapter 2 and 
national product differentiation in chapter 3. In chapter 3, I partly relax the assumption of 
restricted firm entry by allowing for free entry of firms within an industry, but not free entry 
of industries. This allows for an HME in the number of firms to coexist with the reverse HME 
in the number of exporters. Since the results hinge on quite strong assumptions, a topic for 
future research would be to investigate these mechanisms in a more general model.  
As mentioned in the beginning of this introduction, the fact that firm-level data became 
available in the mid-1990s encouraged empirical studies of firms’ export dynamics. These 
studies, in turn, served as a source of inspiration for many new theoretical models that looked 
at firms’ entries into export markets. Still, today’s empirical evidence of the presence and 
nature of sunk costs builds mostly on data for individual countries, or a small number of 
countries. An exception is the empirical analysis in chapter 3, where I, in a large cross-
country dataset, present evidence of a negative relationship between the proportion of firms 
that export and the relative home-market size – a pattern we could observe in the presence of 
sunk export costs.  
However, the data used for this analysis have their clear limitations. The dataset includes 
developing countries only, and we are not able to compare the actual number of exporters and 
non-exporters between different countries, only the proportion of firms that export. Moreover, 
the results from the empirical analysis in chapter 3 do not necessarily imply that there is a 
reverse HME in exports, as predicted by the models. There could very well be a situation 
where there is an advantage in manufacturing exports of access to a large foreign market, but 
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this advantage is not strong enough to cancel out the HME. In that case, we would also 
observe higher proportions of manufacturing firms in small countries. Nevertheless, the 
number of firms that export would be less than proportional to country size for the small 
country, i.e. there would not be a reverse HME in manufacturing exports. With access to 
better data, we would be able to directly test the coexistence of a reverse HME in the number 
of manufacturing exporters and an HME in the number of manufacturing firms.  
Such data would also open up many new possibilities for studying the nature of sunk export 
costs. For example, we would be able to investigate the importance of home-country 
characteristics for sunk export costs as well as for the intensive and the extensive margins of 
exports. Future research should therefore focus on obtaining comparable data on the number 
of firms and exporters for a large number of countries. Studying such data would also 
hopefully inspire many new theoretical contributions that would in turn further improve our 
understanding of the role of trade costs. 
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Abstract
This article presents a model of international trade under monopolistic competition. In the
increasing returns sector firm face fixed in addition to variable, trade costs, and both
exporters and non-exporters may coexist. Exporters benefi from access to large foreign
markets, thus a small country has a higher share of exporting firm than a large one. In
contrast to standard models, the increasing returns sector will be more open in a small
country than in a large one, and a small country may be a net exporter of such commodities,
despite the disadvantage of a smaller home market.
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1 . Introduction
Standard new trade theory predicts that the profitabilit of increasing returns to
scale production depends positively on the size of the domestic market. A country
with a large domestic market for a certain good will have a share of the world’s
production of that good that is more than proportional to the size of the domestic
market. This effect was firs identifie by Krugman (1980) and is often called the
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home market effect. It is widely recognized in the new theory of international trade
and economic geography (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985; and Fujita et al., 1999
for overviews). It is common for most models belonging to these traditions to
assume that firm are symmetric so either all firm or no firm are exporters. A
firm’ decision to export is linked to its decision to produce, hence the home
market effect5 applies to export as well as production. Consequently, a country with
a large home market also has a larger than proportional share of the world’s export
of increasing returns to scale goods. In Helpman and Krugman (1985) the home
market effect increases with trade liberalization. As trade costs decline, increasing
returns to scale production becomes less profitabl in the country with the small
home market, and below a certain level of trade costs, it gets deindustrialized.
While it seems reasonable that a large home market should be beneficia for
increasing returns to scale production, it seems less obvious that it should be
beneficia also for export. Trade theory based on constant returns and comparative
advantage, predicts countries to be net importers of goods for which they have
large domestic demand, and empirical evidence on the home market effect is
ambiguous (see e.g. Head and Ries, 2001). In general we should expect a large
foreign market to create large demand for imports, and hence give large export
from relatively small markets. In the new trade theory models, however, the
opposite is true: while a country’s export of increasing returns goods is positively
related to its domestic market size it is in fact negatively related to the size of the
foreign market.
Since standard new trade theory predicts either all firm or no firm to be
exporters, changes in trade costs cannot affect the share of firm that export, but
only each firm’ export volume. In the real world, however, we observe that both
exporters and non-exporters coexist within the same industry. One reason for this
might be that there are fixe costs related to exporting, which can make it
profitabl for only a subset of firm to export. Both non-tariff trade barriers and
other costs related to market research, the establishment of foreign distribution
networks and foreign contacts, or adaption of foreign standards are examples of
export costs with a fixe element. While empiric evidence confirm the importance
of such costs (see e.g. Bernard and Wagner, 2001; or Roberts and Tybout, 1997),
they are rarely considered in theoretical contributions. One exception is Venables
(1994), who presents a model with fixe export costs, and both exporting and
non-exporting firms He shows that trade liberalization leads to an increase in the
share of exporting firms rather than an increase in each firm’ export. Trabold
(1998) find empirical evidence for these results, investigating the effects of the
southern enlargement of the EEC in 1986. Another exception is Jean (2002), who
presents a model with fixe export costs and productivity differences, and shows
that exporters will be more efficien than non-exporters. This is also supported by
empirical analyses (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999).
In this article I argue that the size of the export market should affect the share of
firm that export in increasing returns to scale sectors. The argument is twofold:
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firstly I argue that there are fixe costs related to export so only a subset of firm
fin it profitabl to export. Secondly, I argue that even if economies of scale make
the size of the home market important for production, it should be the size of the
foreign market that matters for export. I present a model that has large structural
similarities with the home market effect model (presented in Helpman and
Krugman, 1985, pp. 205–209), yet it yields very different predictions. For
example, a small country will have a higher share of exporting firm than a large
one, thus the increasing returns to scale sector in a small country should be more
open than in a large one. In most cases a small country will be a net exporter of
increasing returns to scale goods. This contrasts the new trade theory models
where increasing returns to scale sectors are predicted to be of the same openness
in a small and large countries and a large country is a net exporter of increasing
returns to scale goods.
2 . Foreign market size effects and the share of firms that export
The point of departure for the model is the standard home market effect model
of international trade under monopolistic competition with Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) preferences, iceberg trade costs, a constant returns to scale agricultural
sector and an increasing returns to scale manufacturing sector (see Helpman and
Krugman, 1985, pp. 205–209). My model differs from the home market effect
model in two ways.
Firstly, in line with Venables (1994) and Jean (2002) I assume that firm in the
manufacturing sector face fixe export costs in addition to fixe production costs.
This modelling of trade costs separates the firm’ export decision from its
production decision: the fir may choose to supply both foreign and domestic
1markets, or just the latter. Exporting yields higher fixe costs but also higher sales.
Since the firm’ decision to export is independent of its decision to produce, the
benefi of a large home market in increasing returns to scale production does not
necessarily translate over to export. Thus the dependency between the home
market size and export found in the home market effect model is broken as long as
some firm are non-exporters. If, on the other hand, all firm export, the fixe
export cost is just an increment to fixe production costs. All manufacturing firm
fin it profitabl to export, so a fir that wants to start exporting also has to start
production. Profitabilit of export will therefore be dependent on the size of the
home market insofar as production is so.
Secondly, I assume that fixe costs in manufacturing firm use a specifi factor
1This feature yields some similarity with certain models of horizontal FDI, where firm can chose
between supplying the foreign market through exporting, which involves variable trade costs, but low
fixe costs; or through establishing a subsidiary, which involves no variable trade costs, but higher
fixe costs (see Markusen and Venables, 2000).
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which is not used elsewhere in the economy. Fixed production costs thus use a
different factor than fixe export costs and this assumption yields a foreign market
effect in export. This is because the number of manufacturing firm is uniquely
determined by the supply of the specifi factor, so the number of domestically
produced varieties of the manufactured good cannot increase. Consumers can thus
not get access to new domestica lly produced varieties. The number of exporting
firms however, can vary, so consumers can get access to new varieties by
importing. The larger demand in the large country is hence directed toward the
small country’s products as well as domestic products. Small-country firm now
face larger demand from abroad than large-country firms and, as we shall see, this
2results in a higher number of exporting firm in the small country.
As pointed out by Venables (1994), fixe export costs alone are not sufficien to
generate an equilibrium where exporting and non-exporting firm coexist within
the standard home market effect model. The reason for this is that entry conditions
of foreign and domestic firm depend on each other. Firstly the number of firm
selling in a given market affects the demand curve faced by foreign and domestic
firm in the same way via the price index and, secondly, costs are independent of
the number of firms The entry conditions of foreign and domestic firm are
therefore symmetric and we cannot determine both the number of firm in each
market and the share of these that export. There are different ways of breaking this
dependency and Venables (1994) chooses to modify the demand side by
introducing an Armington assumption. In this article, on the other hand, I modify
the cost side. The assumption of a specifi factor used in manufacturing production
assures that costs of entry of domestic firm are affected by the number of
domestic firm via the price of the specifi factor. If more domestic firm try to
establish, demand for the specifi factor and hence its price will increase. This
leads to an increase in the fixe production costs, and the profitabilit of entry of
domestic firm declines. Foreign firms however, do not use the specifi factor
when entering the domestic market, thus their entry cost is exogenous. Hence the
number of domestic firm affects entry conditions of foreign and domestic firm
differently. Since these entry conditions are no longer symmetric, we can use them
to determine both the price of the specifi factor and the share of firm that export
3in each country.
Summing up, the assumption of fixe export costs disconnects each firm’
export decision from its production decision. The assumption of a specifi factor
2The assumption of a specifi factor used in fixe production costs is also applied by Forslid (1999)
and Ottaviano (2001) in agglomeration models, and it is indirectly used in Smith and Venables (1991)
in a model of regional integration. However, these models do not differ between fixe production and
export costs and there is no foreign market size effect in export.
3Note that in contrast to the standard home market effect model we do not need the entry conditions
to determine the number of manufacturing firms as this is given by the endowment of the specifi
factor. Instead we use them to determine the price of the specifi factor.
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used in a fixe amount in manufacturing production serves two purposes. Firstly, it
makes a country’s imports sensitive to its market size and hence links each firm’
profitabilit of export to the size of the foreign market. Secondly, it assures that
the number of firm selling in a given market affects entry of domestic and foreign
firm differently. Together with the fixe export costs assumption, this permits an
equilibrium with both exporting and non-exporting firms removes the home
market effect in export, and creates a foreign market effect instead. Both
assumptions are thus necessary in order to analyze how the foreign market size
affects the share of exporting firms
Unlike the present article, the focus in the Venables (1994) article is not market
size effects in export. The countries are of equal sizes, and there is only one factor
of production. It turns out, however, that the Armington assumption applied in that
article, also creates a foreign market effect in export when used in a model with
asymmetric countries. In Appendix A sketch a model where different country sizes
are considered within the Venables (1994) framework and which yields similar
predictions to those in the present article.
3 . The model
There are two countries: home (h) and foreign ( f ), endowed with two factors of
production: labor (L ) and capital (K ), i5 h, f.i i
Labor is used in a homogeneous, constant returns to scale agricultural sector.
Constant labor supply and free trade in agricultures assures that the wages are
equalized between the two countries, and we choose units so that the wage and
price of agricultures equal 1.
Labor is also used in constant marginal costs in manufacturing production (c)
and fixe cost in export of manufactures (G; G$ 0). We may think of G as a fixe
amount of working hours needed in order to acquire necessary information about
exporting conditions or to establish a foreign customer relationship. In addition,
exporters of manufactures face iceberg trading costs, which implies that only 1/t
unit of an exported good arrives to its destination; t$ 1 and t5 1 implies no
variable trade costs. The manufacturing sector consists of many symmetric firm
each producing a unique variety of the differentiated manufactured good. Each
fir need a fixe amount of capital (F; F . 0) which can be thought of as physical
or human capital. Capital is not used elsewhere in the economy, and this may
reflec the idea that manufacturing production needs special production equipment,
R&D or management services. Fixed production costs are thus given by v F,i
where v is the price of capital in country i.i
Preferences in both countries are equal and of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type.
Utility is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate of the agricultural good and the aggregate of
manufactures. The budget share for manufactures equals m. Further, sub-utility of
manufactures is a CES aggregate of all manufactured varieties. The elasticity of
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substitution equals the elasticity of demand and is denoted ´. In country i, demand
for a domestic and foreign product variety respectively is now given by (see
Helpman and Krugman, 1985, pp. 117–119):
2´ 2´my p tmy tps di i
]]]]]] ]]]]]]d 5 d 5 (1)ii 12´ ji 12´12´ 12´p n 1 pt s n p n 1 pt s ns d s ds d s di j j i j j
where p is the price of a manufactured variety, n , n is the number ofi j
manufacturing firms s , s is the share of these that export, and y , y is income ini j i j
country i and j respectively.
p is equal across firm and countries because the manufacturing sector consists
of monopolistically competitive firm that produce symmetric varieties and face
the same technology and demand. Equalization of marginal revenue and marginal
cost gives:
c
]]p2 c5 (2)
´ 2 1
There are four possible kinds of firms exporters (e) and non-exporters (ne) in
both countries. The sales volume in market j of a fir from country i is z . Usingij
(2), the profit (p) corresponding to the four kinds of firm are given by:
cne ]]p 5 z 2 v F (3)h hh h(´ 2 1)
ce ]]p 5 z 1 z 2 (v F 1G) (4)s dh hh hf h(´ 2 1)
cne ]]p 5 z 2 v F (5)f ff f(´ 2 1)
ce ]]p 5 z 1 z 2 (v F 1G) (6)s df ff fh f(´ 2 1)
All firm in a given country face the same domestic demand independently of
whether or not they export (since products are symmetric), but exporters also face
demand from abroad. This tends to give a high number of exporters. On the other
hand, exporters face higher overall fixe costs because they have to pay a fixe
export cost in addition to the fixe production cost, and this tends to give a low
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number of exporters. Whether all firms some firm or no firm export depends on
4the relative importance of these two mechanisms.
There is free entry and exit, so firm will enter the different markets until their
profit equal zero. This determines the equilibrium sales of each kind of firm The
endogenous variables are then determined by setting sales equal to demand.
If there are non-exporters and exporters in both countries the model consists of
Eqs. (3)–(6) and the endogenous variables s , s , v , v are determined by settingh f h f
these equations equal to zero and insert for demand. In this case both types of
trade costs must be high enough to assure that not all firm fin it profitabl to
export. As we shall see from Eq. (17) below, we can derive a lower limit of G that
gives non-exporters and exporters in both countries:
L Fgm h
]]]]]]]]]G*5 (7)´21 Kt ´ 2ms d hS D]]]]11g ´
´
where g is the ratio of the size of the foreign to the home country in terms of
factor endowments (see Eq. (13) below). If G is smaller than G*, all firm can sell
5enough in the foreign market to cover G. Further, G*. 0, thus fixe trade costs
must be strictly positive if there shall be non-exporters. However, there may be
non-exporters even if there are no variable trade costs (since G* is define even if
t5 1). Variable and fixe trade costs have similar effects on the export decision, so
if all firm export and t increases, G must decrease in order to assure that all firm
still fin it profitabl to export (thus G* decreases with t). If all firm export, not
all Eqs. (3)–(5) are valid. A short presentation of this case is given in Section 3.2.
The main focus, however, will be on the case where there are non-exporters in
both countries.
3 .1. Non-exporting f rms in both countries
By setting (3) and (5) equal to zero, we fin equilibrium domestic sales in
country i:
(´ 2 1)v Fi
]]]z 5 (8)ii c
4In the case where both exporters and non-exporters coexist, we cannot say anything about which
firm will become exporters, since all varieties are symmetric. Some firm simply do not fin it
profitabl to export because foreign demand is not sufficientl high to assure that all firm can export
enough to cover the fixe export costs. Note, however, that this indeterminacy of which firm become
exporters is not conceptually different from the indeterminacy in the home market effect model of
which goods are produced in which country.
5As shown below, this is the case for the small country. For the large country, G must be even lower
in order to assure that all firm fin it profitabl to export.
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Setting (4) and (6) equal to zero and using (8) we fin equilibrium export from
country j to country i:
(´ 2 1)G
]]]z 5 (9)ji c
Eqs. (8) and (9) show that sales in the home market are determined by fixe
production costs, while export is determined by fixe trade costs. We can use the
two to derive the ratio of sales of an imported variety to a domestically produced
variety in country i:
z Gji
] ]5 (10)z v Fii i
Correspondingly, we can derive the ratio of demand for an imported variety to a
domestically produced variety in country i from (1):
dji 12´]5 t (11)dii
Now, setting sales equal to demand we can derive the capital price in each
country:
G´21]v 5 t (12)i F
which is equalized in the two countries as long as there are both non-exporters and
6exporters both places. This is because the decision to export is independent of the
decision to produce, and capital is only used in production. Differences in foreign
demand will thus not give a different capital price in the two countries. We also see
that increased trade costs increase the price of capital. This is because increased
trade costs increase demand for domestic manufactures relative to demand for
imports. Demand for capital, which is used intensively in manufacturing pro-
duction for the domestic market, must then increase and so must its price.
The above result is independent of how we model the supply of capital to the
manufacturing sector. In order to determine the number of exporting firms
however, we must look at factor endowments. The easiest way to model this is to
assume that the endowment of capital in country i is given exogenously, and that
relative factor endowments are equal, so that
K Lf f
] ]5 5g (13)K Lh h
The foreign country is assumed to be the largest, thus g . 1. The number of
6Remember that when there are exporters and non-exporters in both countries, G is strictly positive,
thus there is a lower limit to the capital price.
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manufacturing firm will now be uniquely determined by the endowment of capital
and the fixe requirement of this factor in the manufacturing production:
Ki
]n 5 (14)i F
7The relative number of firm must be equal to the relative country size:
nf
]5g (15)nh
Total income in country i consists of returns to capital and labor.
y 5 v K 1 L (16)i i i i
Using (12), we can see from (8) that each firm’ domestic sales will be equal in
the two countries. Since sales equal demand in equilibrium, by using (8) and (1),
we get:
2´2´ my p(´ 2 1)v F my p fh h
]]] ]]]]]] ]]]]]]5 512´ 12´12´ 12´c p n 1 pt s n p n 1 pt s ns d s ds d s dh f f f h h
To fin the share of firm that export, we insert for (12), (13), (14) and (16) in
the above equations. After some rearrangement, this yields:
´21Lm F t ´ 2ms dh
]]] ]]]]s 5g 2 (17)S Dh ´ G K ´h
´21L1 m F t ´ 2ms dh
] ]]] ]]]]s 5 2 (18)S Df g ´ G K ´h
ds dsi i
] ], 0 , 0dt dG
From (17) and (18) we see that the relative share of firm that export must be:
s 1f
] ]5 , 1 (19)2s gh
From (19) we see that the share of firm that export is much higher in the small
country than in the large one, thus the manufacturing sector here is more open.
As an indicator of net trade in manufactures we shall use the relative export
share (E), which shows total export of manufactures in the foreign country divided
7This follows directly from the assumption of exogenous capital supply to the manufacturing sector.
However, the same result may arise with an endogenous capital supply to the manufacturing sector. A
note that illustrates one such case is available from the author upon request.
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by total export of manufactures in the home country. Using (19) together with (9)
and (15), we get:
ps n z 1f f fh
]]] ]E5 5 , 1 (20)ps n z gh h hf
Note that E is the ratio of the value of export of manufactures in the foreign
versus the home country, thus we have not corrected for country sizes. From (20)
we see that the small country is a net exporter of manufactured goods. In fact,
export of manufactures is proportional to the size of the foreign market, while the
domestic market size plays no role. There is a foreign market size effect in export.
The high share of firm that export in the small country more than cancels out the
effect of a lower number of manufacturing firm (see Eqs. (15) and (19)). Larger
demand in the large country is directed towards small-country products as well as
domestic products because increased demand for manufactures cannot result in an
increase in the number of domestically produced varieties (since n is giveni
directly by factor endowments). Consumers value variety and prefer access to new
varieties instead of consuming more of the domestic ones, and the only way of
achieving this is by importing. Small-country firm thus face larger demand from
abroad than large-country firms Since the decision to export is independent of the
decision to produce, this assures that more small-country firm can export enough
to cover the fixe trade costs.
We see that while the standard home market effect model predicts the large
country to be a net exporter of manufactures, this model predicts the small country
to be so. Further, the standard model predicts the manufacturing sector in each
country to be of the same openness (because the export volume of each fir is
equal, and all firm export), while this model predicts the manufacturing sector in
the small country to be more open than in the large one.
Eq. (20) also shows that the net trade ratio in manufactures is independent of
the level of trading costs. The reason for this is again that the export decision is
separated from the production decision, so changes in trade costs affect demand
for imports proportionally in the two countries. Looking at (17) and (18), we can
also see that the share of exporting firm decreases with fixe and variable trade
costs. This is consistent with Venables (1994) and the model thus offers an
alternative explanation for the predictions from that model, and for the finding of
Trabold (1998).
3 .2. All f rms export in either one or both countries
We know that the share of firm that export will be highest in the small country,
thus s will equal 1 at higher trade costs in the small country than in the largei
country. Setting s 5 1 in (17) we can derive (7), which shows the maximum levelh
of trade costs allowed if all firm shall export in the small country. Eq. (3) must
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now be dropped from the model, and s 5 1 must be inserted in demand. Inh
Appendix A it is shown that the relative export share now equals:
1 ´ 2m 1´21] ]] ]E*5 1 t 1 m
g ´ ´
´21 ´21K1 G ft ´ 2m 1mgft g ´2m 1´gs d s dh
]]]]]]]]]]]]]2 (21)
g F L ´mh
dE*
]], 0dG
If trade costs are further reduced, all firm may start to export also in the large
country. In this case we must drop both (3) and (5) and insert s 5 s 5 1 inh f
demand. In Appendix A it is shown that the relative export share now equals:
m m 1´21 ] ] ]t S12 D1 11 ´ ´ g
]]]]]]]]E**5 (22)m mg ´21 ] ]t S12 D1 1g
´ ´
dE** dE**
]] ]]g $E**$ 1 . 0 5 0dt dG
In contrast to the case where there are exporters and non-exporters in both
countries (21) and (22) show that the relative export share now depends on trade
costs. G only affects E*, where a higher G results in a decline in the large
**country’s market share. t affects both E* and E**. While E 9 is always positive,t
*E 9 may be both positive and negative. However, since E is smaller than E**, wet
*know that E 9 must be negative for at least for some ranges of t. In mostt
*numerical examples E 9 is negative for all ranges of variable trade costs where E*t
is valid.
In Figs. 1 and 2 I have assumed that the foreign country is twice the size of the
home country, thus for relatively high variable trade costs, when there are
non-exporters in both countries, E5 1/2. For intermediate variable trade costs, all
firm in the small country export and the production decision and the export
decision become dependent. Increased foreign demand due to trade liberalization
can no longer result in an increase in the number of exporters only increased
export volume in each firm Thus large-country consumers cannot get access to
new varieties by importing. However, in the large country there are still some
non-exporting firms so small-country consumers can get access to new varieties if
trade is liberalized. Consequently, in the small country trade liberalization leads to
an increase in each firm’ export, z , while the number of exporters, n , ishf h
constant, but in the large country each firm’ export, z , is constant while thefh
number of exporters s n increases. Because consumers value variety, growth inf f
large-country consumers’ demand for small-country products is now dampened.
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Fig. 1. Trade liberalization and the net trade pattern.
The small country face the disadvantage of a small home market, and we
experience an increase in the large country’s share of the world’s export of
manufactures.
From (22) we see that when all firm export in both countries, the large country
benefi from a relatively large home market and is a net exporter of manufactures.
Note, however, that the export share will always be lower than proportional to the
relative country sizes. We also see that E declines as t is reduced. This is because
neither country can now provide new varieties, and the advantage for large-country
firm disappears. Consumers switch their demand towards imports as trade is
liberalized, and this has a larger impact on each fir in the small country because
overall demand is higher in the large country. When variable trade costs equal zero
(t5 1), both countries will have an equal share of the world’s export of
manufactures, but the export volume of each fir is twice as high in the small as
in the large country.
Increased fixe trade costs only affect the case where s 5 1 and s , 1.h f
Increased G implies lower profitabilit from exporting, thus a lower t is required
Fig. 2. Higher entry costs: the large country never becomes a net exporter.
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in order for both s and s to reach 1. If variable trade costs are sufficientl high, sh f f
never equals 1 and the large country may never become a net exporter of
manufactures. This case is shown in Fig. 2.
The analysis above has concentrated on the case where no country specializes in
manufacturing production, thus factor prices are equalized. This is likely to be the
case if m is not too high or countries are not too different in size. If this is not the
case, the small country might specialize in the production of manufactures, and
this may lead to increased wages and prices in that country. However, in contrast
to the standard model, both countries will always have some manufacturing
production, so the small country will never get deindustrialized.
Some may argue that this foreign market size in export is too strong in the
model presented above. The role of the domestic market size in export should not
be completely ignored, and very small countries should not be net exporters of
manufactures. There are several ways of modifying this result, and one possibility
is to let fixe export costs increase with the size of the foreign market (Medin and
Melchior, 2002 fin empirical evidence for this assumption). However, I prefer to
present the simple model here in order to concentrate on the main point, namely
that exporting firm benefi from a large export market and that increasing returns
to scale sectors in small countries are more open than in large ones.
4 . Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to give a theoretical background for explaining
how the size of export markets affects the share of exporting firm in increasing
returns to scale sectors.
I have argued that, in contrast to what is predicted in the standard new trade
theory, the size of the foreign market should matter for profitabilit of export.
Further, I have argued that there are fixe costs of exporting. This is supported by
empirical analysis yet poorly analyzed in theoretical models. Such costs may make
it profitabl for only a share of firm to export, and both each firm’ export and the
share of firm that export can vary with trade costs.
The model presented in this article has large structural similarities with standard
new trade models, yet it yields predictions that differ sharply: small countries are
predicted to have a higher share of exporting firm in the increasing returns to
scale sector than large ones, hence this sector is more open in small countries.
Further, as long as there are non-exporting firm in both countries, small countries
are predicted to be net exporters of increasing returns to scale goods, because
export of these goods then only depends on the foreign market size. In contrast to
the standard theory, small countries can never get deindustrialized thus they have
no reason to fear trade liberalization.
The model shows that reduced fixe export costs have similar effects to reduced
variable costs. Trade policy has traditionally concentrated on reducing variable
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trade costs such as tariffs, and as a consequence these have declined considerably
in many areas. There may therefore be little additional gains from further tariff
reductions. In contrast, informal barriers to trade such as costs of gathering market
information, establishing contact with customers or adjustment to national
standards and legislation may still be considerable. Reducing these barriers
however, will require a policy that explicitly aims at overcoming entry barriers in
foreign markets. An example is the establishment of export promotion agencies
that provide information about foreign markets and potential customers. Another
example is international harmonization of standards.
A cknowledgements
I am grateful to Jan I. Haaland, Arne Melchior, Anthony J. Venables, Per Botolf
¨Maurseth, Leo Andreas Grunfeld and an anonymous referee for valuable com-
ments. Research funding was provided by the Research Council of Norway
(project 139982/510 ‘‘Globalization and Internationalization of the Norwegian
Economy’’).
A ppendix A
 All f rms export in the small country
The price of capital is no longer equalized in the two countries. In order to solve
for the endogenous variables, we must insert for s 5 1 in (1), and further inserth
(1) in (4), (5) and (6). Setting these equations equal to zero and rearranging, we
now get:
L 1h´21 ]]]]]]v 5 t gmf ´21K ft g ´2m 1´gh s d
´21L 1 Gst 2 1dh
]]]]]] ]]]]v 5gm 1h ´21K Fft g ´2m 1´gh s d
´21 ´21L1 F m fg ´2m t 1´1mg t ´ 2m 1ms d s dh
] ]]]]]]]]]] ]]]]]s 5 2S Df ´21g G ´ K ´ft g ´2m 1´gh s d
z is still equal to (8), but in order to fin z , we must set sales equal to demand inff hf
(11) and then insert for (8):
(´ 2 1)v Ff12´ 12´]]]z 5 t z 5 thf ff c
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The relative export share can then be expressed as:
ps n z s Gf f fh f´21]] ]]E*5 5gtpn z v Fh hf f
Inserting for v and s gives:f f
1 ´ 2m 1´21] ]] ]E*5 1 t 1 m
g ´ ´
´21 ´21K1 G ft ´ 2m 1mgft g ´2m 1´gs d s dh
]]]]]]]]]]]]]2
g F L ´mh
dE*
]], 0dG
 All f rms export in both countries
Now we have that s 5 s 5 1. Inserting for this and (13), (14) and (16) in (1),h f
demand for imports in the home and foreign country respectively is now given by:
12´12´ v K 1 L tv K 1 L ts d s df h hh h h
]]]]] ]]]]]d 5 and d 5gfh hfK K K Kh h h h12´ 12´] ] ] ]1g t g 1 tF F F F
Setting demand equal to sales and using (15), the relative export share can now
be expressed as:
12´pn z v K 1 L sg 1 t ds df fh h h h
]] ]]]]]]]E**5 5 12´pn z v K 1 Ls d s11gt dh hf f h h
Further, inserting for demand in (4) and (6) and setting these two equations
equal to zero we can derive the following expression
12´m 12 t
]]]]12gS D12´´v K 1 L g 1 ts dh h h
]]]] ]]]]]]5 12´v K 1 Ls d m 12 tf h h
]]]]12S D12´´ 11gt
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which can be inserted in the expression for E**. The relative export share will
then be given by:
m m 1´21 ] ] ]t S12 D1 11 ´ ´ g
]]]]]]]]E**5 m mg ´21 ] ]t S12 D1 1g
´ ´
dE** dE**
]] ]]g $E**$ 1 . 0 5 0dt dG
 An alternative model: the armington approach
In Venables (1994) there is only one factor of production, but sub-utility for
manufactures is a two-level CES aggregate of: (1) foreign and domestically
produced manufactures, and (2) different varieties of the manufactured good.
Extending the Venables model to countries of different sizes, we will get a foreign
market effect in export, just as in the model presented in this article. However, this
is a result of the fact that foreign and domestically produced manufactures are
imperfect substitutes. Since consumers want to consume some of each, large
absolute demand in the large country must be directed towards imports as well as
domestic varieties. This links profitabilit of export to the size of the foreign
market. Further, there are fixe export costs, which separate the decision to export
from the decision to produce and assure that non-exporters and exporters may
coexist.
The predictions about the share of firm that export and the relative export share
are identical to the predictions from the model presented here when there are both
exporters and non-exporters in the two countries. When all firm export in either
one or both countries, predictions are somewhat different. The number of
manufacturing firm is endogenous, and when all firm export in the small country
a new exporter can be established by establishing a new firm Increased foreign
demand due to reduced variable trade costs now makes the number of manufactur-
ing firm grow in the small country, and we get a smaller decline in the
manufacturing sector than in the present model. When all firm export in both
1
]countries, we approach a situation where E**5 when variable trade costs2
decline. This is because of constant elasticity of substitution between the
aggregates of foreign and domestically produced manufactures, so for equal prices
on foreign and domestic products, consumers want to consume an equal amount of
the two aggregates. Hence the number of manufacturing firm is equal in the two
countries. However, twice as many consumers in the large country makes export
of each fir twice as high in the small than in the large country.
A note with the full model and discussion is available from the author upon
request.
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Abstract 
This paper presents a simple trade model with results that contradict those from home market 
effect models in two ways. Firstly, a home market effect in manufacturing domestic sales is 
found to co-exist with a reversed home market effect in manufacturing exports. While small 
countries have a disadvantage in manufacturing domestic sales given their access to small 
domestic markets, they have an advantage in manufacturing exports given their access to 
large export markets. Secondly, initially equal firms split into exporters and non-exporters in 
equilibrium; and market conditions, rather than firm-level differences in marginal costs, are 
the main determinants of the number of manufacturing firms that export. In consequence of 
these two results, for a small country the number of manufacturing of firms that export is 
higher than proportional to country size. The extensive margin of exports, defined as the 
proportion of firms that export, decreases with relative size of the home market. Empirical 
support for the latter prediction is found in a cross-sectional dataset on firm level exports for 
116 countries.  
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1 Introduction 
Will trade liberalisation lead to deindustrialisation of small countries? A well-known result 
from new trade theory models is the home market effect (HME), first introduced formally by 
Krugman (1980). The argument is as follows: Increasing returns and transport costs in 
manufacturing industries make access to a large home market advantageous. It is therefore 
less profitable for manufacturing firms to be established in small countries. In consequence, 
small countries may offer lower wages, or have a share of the world’s production and exports 
of manufactured goods that is less than proportional to their share of labour. Some authors 
predict that the effect will be reinforced by trade liberalisation (Helpman and Krugman 1985, 
pp. 205–209, henceforth: HK 1985), while others predict that the effect will follow an inverse 
U relationship, where it is weakened for very low trade costs (Krugman and Venables, 1990). 
This has led to concern as to whether small countries are likely to have lower income per 
capita or become deindustrialised. 
However, several studies show that small countries in general do not have lower GDP per 
capita than large ones. (See e.g. Easterly and Kraay, 2000; Rose, 2006.)
10
 Moreover, in 
several small countries, manufactured goods account for a large proportion of their total 
exports. Examples include many prosperous countries, among them Singapore, Finland and 
Luxembourg, but also less developed countries. Eastern European countries, like the Slovak 
Republic and Estonia, and other emerging markets, like Mauritius and Namibia, have 
experienced growth in GDP per capita,  and the proportion of manufactured goods in their 
total exports is relatively high. This may indicate that being a small country is not as great a 
disadvantage as indicated by the literature on the HME. 
A weakness of HME models is that lower profitability of manufacturing domestic sales in 
small countries often induces lower profitability of manufacturing exports. In other words, the 
                                                 
10
 Furthermore, Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) and Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare and Saborío-Rodríguez 
(2012) discuss the issue of small countries being much richer than predicted by models of idea-based growth. 
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HME applies to manufacturing exports as well as to manufacturing domestic sales. However, 
relatively small countries may have access to relatively large export markets, and this could 
make exports more profitable in small countries than in large ones. Generally, this mechanism 
is present in models with constant returns to scale, but in the HME models it is normally 
completely dominated by the benefit of access to a large home market. This might not be a 
good description of real life. Even if a relatively small home market is a disadvantage for 
manufacturing domestic sales, it can be an advantage for manufacturing exports. This could 
yield a reverse HME in exports, where small countries have a more than proportional share of 
the world’s export of manufactured goods. The first aim of this paper is to show how an HME 
in manufacturing domestic sales may coexist with a reverse HME in manufacturing exports in 
a simple model of international trade. To my knowledge, no other authors have discussed this 
dichotomy. 
Why do some firms become exporters while others do not? What factors determine the 
number of firms that export? The literature has generally focused on firm differences in 
answering these questions. After the pioneering article of Melitz (2003) it has become 
common to include fixed export costs and firm differences in marginal production costs in 
trade models. This ensures that only the most productive firms will find it profitable to export. 
However, not only firm differences, but also the relative size of the foreign market may be 
important for firms’ export decisions. If the home market is small and the foreign market is 
large, many firms may find it profitable to export, whereas a relatively small foreign market 
may have room for only a few exporters. A weakness of HME models, whether dealing with 
homogeneous or heterogeneous firms, is that they often predict that the number of 
manufacturing exporters will increase with relative size of the home market due to the HME. 
In other words, it decreases with the relative size of the foreign market. The HK 1985 model 
is a benchmark HME model which is used as point of departure for many other models. There 
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are no fixed export costs and firms are homogeneous, thus the model predicts that either all 
firms will export or no firms will. Consequently, the HME in the total number of 
manufacturing firms leads directly to an HME in the number of exporters. The result may be 
seen as an undesired side effect of the fact that homogeneous-firms models are not able to 
separate between exporting and non-exporting firms. However, the effect is also found in the 
much used Melitz-style extension of HK 1985, where only a proportion of firms export (a 
model like that is e.g. presented in Baldwin and Forslid, 2010). In that model, the extensive 
margin of exports, defined as the proportion of firms that export, will be independent of 
country size.
11
 This leads to the same negative relationship between the number of 
manufacturing exporters and the size of the foreign market as found in its homogeneous-firms 
counterpart. 
The second aim of this paper is to show how export market conditions, rather than firm 
differences in marginal costs, can be the main determinants of the number of exporters. It is 
not surprising that different firms behave differently as in Melitz-type models. In the model 
presented here, however, I show that even firms that are initially equal may behave differently 
in equilibrium and become heterogeneous with respect to export status.
 
The model yields an 
equilibrium where the total number of manufacturing firms in a small country relative to that 
in a large country is less than proportional to relative country size, due to the HME. At the 
same time, the relative number of manufacturing exporters is more than proportional, due to 
the reverse HME.
 
As a consequence, the extensive margin of exports, defined as the 
proportion of firms that export, will be higher in small countries than in large ones.  
The third aim of this paper is to present empirical evidence of larger extensive margins of 
exports in small countries than in large countries – which we would observe in the presence of 
a reverse HME in exports. Very little evidence exists on this point. To my knowledge only 
                                                 
11
 Note that this definition of the extensive margin of export differs somewhat from other papers. Normally, it 
refers to the number of firms that export, but in this paper it refers to the proportion of firms that export. 
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one study has dealt with this issue, and then only briefly, without econometric testing. The 
International Study Group on Exports and Productivity (2008) compares firm level data on 
exporters and non-exporters between 14 countries, and finds that the extensive margin of 
exports is ‘loosely decreasing in the size of the domestic markets’ (p. 5). In this paper, I use 
firm level data for manufacturing exports for 116 developing countries from the Enterprise 
Surveys dataset. Results show that, for the average country, a doubling of relative home 
market size is associated with a 12.3% decrease in the extensive margin of exports.  
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of related literature, Section 3 
presents the theoretical model, Section 4 presents the empirical evidence, and Section 5 offers 
some conclusions. 
2 Related literature 
Traditional trade models, characterized by constant returns to scale (CRS) and comparative 
advantage, generally predict that countries are net exporters of goods for which they have low 
domestic demand (Davis and Weinstein, 1999). Krugman (1980), on the other hand, showed 
that under increasing returns to scale (IRS) and trade costs there will be an HME, which 
manifests itself in two ways.  In a country with relatively low domestic demand for an IRS 
good, it will result in a lower-than-proportional share of the world’s production as well as 
exports of this good. Consequently, in contrast to the case for CRS goods, countries will be 
net importers of IRS goods for which they have low domestic demand. The HME has been 
shown to be robust to several different model specifications (for an overview, see Felbermayr 
and Jung, 2012).  
The benchmark model of two countries, two sectors, and one factor, presented in HK 1985, 
will serve as the basis for the discussion in the present paper. This model posits one traditional 
good CRS sector with perfect competition and no trade costs, and one IRS manufacturing 
sector with monopolistic competition and trade costs. As long as there is some production of 
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the traditional good in both countries, wages will equalise. In this case, the HME will result in 
the relative number of manufacturing firms in the small country being less than proportional 
to relative country size. Whereas firms are homogeneous and face variable export costs only 
in the HK 1985 model, the effect also arises in the corresponding Melitz-type model with 
fixed export costs and firm-level differences in marginal costs (see e.g. Baldwin and Forslid, 
2010 for a model like that). These models are frequently used as point of departures for other 
models. A weakness of both models is that the less-than-proportional number of 
manufacturing firms in the small country induces a less-than-proportional number of 
manufacturing exporters. Consequently, the relative number of manufacturing exporters 
increases with relative size of the home market and hence decreases with the relative size of 
the export market. The reason is that, in the case of the homogeneous firms model, either all 
firms or no firms export; and, in the case of the Melitz-type model, that the extensive margin 
of exports (defined as the proportion of firms that export) is independent of country size. In 
both models, average sales per firm in the domestic market are equal in the two countries, as 
are average exports. Consequently, the HME applies to a country’s production and exports as 
well as to its number of firms and exporters. 
Several empirical studies have attempted to find evidence of the HME. Some has focused on 
the production side, others on the export side, of the HME hypothesis. Some studies also take 
into account that there may be ‘home-bias’ in demand (consumers may have stronger 
preferences for domestically produced goods than for foreign produced goods). In a survey of 
early contributions, Head and Mayer (2004) conclude that the evidence is mixed: ‘One can 
see some support for HMEs in some industries in some specifications. However reverse 
HMEs (coefficients on demand of less than one or on home biased demand of less than zero) 
are more frequent.’ (p. 2642). Conclusions from more recent contributions are also 
ambiguous. For example, Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) study the relationship between 
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production shares and demand shares. They find some evidence of HMEs, but the economic 
significance is small. On average, the HME influences specialization in only about 12.5% of 
the 25 countries under study, and in these countries it influences specialization in 62% of the 
manufacturing activity. Hanson and Xiang (2004) focus on the relationship between export 
shares and GDP. They present a model of multiple countries and industries and show that 
industries with high transport costs and more differentiated products will concentrate in large 
countries due to the HME. They find strong empirical support for this pattern. However, their 
results have been questioned by Pham, Lovely and Mitra (2009), who apply different 
methodological procedures on the same data and find little evidence of a HME.  
Also several theoretical contributions have shown that the HME does not necessarily arise in 
models where production is characterized by IRS. A reverse HME in exports typically occurs 
if entry is restricted. For example, Medin (2003) introduces a specific factor in fixed 
production costs, into the HK 1985 model (together with fixed export costs). In practice this 
means that entry is restricted by the endowment of the specific factor and that the relative 
number of manufacturing firms becomes proportional to relative country size. The number of 
exporters, however, becomes negatively related to relative home market size. Similarly, a 
reverse HME in export values arises when there is only one firm in each country. This is 
shown in the model with Cournot competition and homogeneous goods in Feenstra, Markusen 
and Rose (2001). 
Modifications of the cost side of the HK 1985 model can affect the HME. Davis (1998) shows 
that the HME may disappear if the CRS sector is subject to sufficiently high transport costs. 
Further, Okubo and Rebeyrol (2006) show that higher fixed production costs in the large 
country can produce a reverse HME with respect to the number of manufacturing firms and 
exporters. 
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Also demand-side modifications of the HK 1985 model may cause a reverse HME. In Yu 
(2005) manufactured and traditional goods enter the utility function as CES aggregates rather 
than Cobb-Douglas aggregates. If the elasticity of substitution between manufactured and 
traditional goods is lower than one, consumers’ expenditure share for manufactured goods in 
the small country is higher than in the large country. This makes it more profitable to establish 
a manufacturing firm in the small country, and a reverse HME in the number of 
manufacturing firms and exporters will arise.
 
In a Cournot competition model with linear 
demand, Head, Mayer and Rise (2002) show that a reverse HME in the number of 
manufacturing firms and exporters may emerge when products are differentiated by nations 
rather than firms, as long as products are sufficiently differentiated. 
3 Theory 
None of the above-mentioned models distinguishes the HME in the number of manufacturing 
firms from the reverse HME in the number of manufacturing exporters.
 
By contrast, the model 
presented here allows for these two effects to coexist. For analysis of exports of manufacturing 
goods in a small country, it merges the notion of disadvantage of a small home market, 
predicted by the HME literature, with the notion of benefit of a large foreign market, 
predicted by traditional trade models. To my knowledge no other articles have discussed this 
dichotomy.  
I follow Venables (1994) in introducing fixed export costs, national product differentiation, 
and a two-level nested CES subutility function for manufactured goods into the HK 1985 
model. This allows a firm’s export decision to be separated from its decision to sell on the 
domestic market. As a consequence, initially equal firms divide into exporters and non-
exporters in equilibrium and hence become heterogeneous with respect to export status.
12
 As 
                                                 
12
 Medin (2003) presents another model with the same feature. Both models introduce fixed export costs into the 
HK 1985 model. However, in order to render possible an equilibrium with the coexistence of exporters and non-
exporters, more structure has to be added to the HK 1985 model. In Medin (2003) more structure is added to the 
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opposed to Venables (1994), the present model considers countries of different sizes, with 
multiple manufacturing industries within each country. As in HK 1985, trade costs and IRS in 
production of manufactured goods lead to a lower than proportional number of manufacturing 
firms in the small country. However, this HME in the number of firms does not induce an 
HME in the number of exporters. Due to national product differentiation, large demand in the 
large country is directed towards foreign as well as domestic manufactured goods. Since the 
export decision is separated from the decision to sell in the domestic market, this allows a 
larger-than-proportional number of manufacturing exporters in the small country. The model 
serves as an illustration of the highly polar case where demand-side conditions create a 
reverse HME in the number of exporters, but, at the same time, IRS create an HME in the 
total number of firms. As a consequence of the reverse HME in exports, the extensive margin 
of exports (defined as the proportion of firms that exports) is larger in small countries. 
3.1 Setup of the model 
There are two countries, home and foreign, indexed by i, j = h, f, where h is smaller than f. 
Labour l, is the only input, and it is supplied inelastically. There are two economic sectors in 
each country. The first sector produces a traditional good with CRS and zero export costs, and 
this ensures that wages are equalised between the two countries. As is customary, I normalise 
the wage to 1. The only income is wage; thus total income, y, equals l. The other sector 
consists of many manufacturing firms, each producing a unique variety, indexed by .
 , where Ω is the set of all potentially available goods. Firms have constant marginal 
                                                                                                                                                        
cost side, while in the present model more structure is added to the demand side. In an appendix in Medin (2003) 
a model similar to the present model (albeit with only one manufacturing industry in each country) is outlined, 
but the full model is not written out. Also Yeaple (2005) presents a model of initially equal firms where 
exporters and non-exporters coexist. In that model, labour is heterogeneous, and firms become different with 
respect to choice of production technology, type of labour employed and export status. None of these models 
describe the coexistence of a home market effect in the number of manufacturing firms and a reverse home 
market effect in the number of manufacturing exporters. In Medin (2003) the number of manufacturing firms is 
proportional to country size; the two other models consider countries of equal size. 
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production costs φ. In addition, they have to pay a fixed cost to enter the domestic market, F, 
and a fixed export costs, G.13 There are also variable iceberg export costs ( 1 ). As the 
present article studies market size asymmetries rather than firm asymmetries, I disregard the 
modelling of firm differences in marginal production costs that is now common in trade 
models (see Melitz, 2003). Consequently, I assume that φ, as well as F and G are equal for 
all firms, independently of country of origin, so that all firms are symmetric. Manufacturing 
firms are grouped into industries that are country-bounded, and there is an exogenous number 
of m symmetric industries within a country.14  
Preferences are represented by a three-level utility function. The first level is a Cobb-Douglas 
aggregate of traditional and manufactured goods, with expenditure share of manufactured 
goods equal to μ. In the following analysis, I assume that μ is sufficiently small to ensure that 
both countries produce the traditional good, so that wages will be equalised (see Appendix 3 
for details). Subutility for manufactured goods is a two-level nested CES aggregate. The 
lower level is a CES aggregate over varieties belonging to the same industry, with elasticity of 
substitution equal to ε. This approach allows us to treat all varieties from the same industry as 
an aggregated composite industry good. The upper level is a CES aggregate over composite 
industry goods for which the elasticity of substitution is equal to η. Since industries are 
country-bounded, this implies that consumers will want to differentiate their consumption 
between foreign and domestically produced goods, as well as between varieties from the same 
                                                 
13
 Note that F is interpreted as a domestic market entry cost, not a fixed production cost. This is in line with 
interpretation in several recent contributions, including Baldwin and Forslid (2010) and Felbermayr and Jung 
(2012). Mathematically, the model would look the same if F were interpreted as fixed production costs, as long 
as the proportion of firms that export is lower than 1 in both countries (see below).  
14
 Such national product differentiation could reflect Ricardian comparative advantages, or comparative 
institutional advantages. It could also reflect the existence of immobile country-specific factors. The model does 
not have enough structure to let both the number of industries and the number of firms be endogenous. 
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country.
 
It is reasonable to expect varieties within the same industry to be more substitutable 
than varieties between industries, thus I assume that ε>η>1.15 
I assume that m is lower in the small country. This seems reasonable, as large countries may 
have access to a wider range of inputs (e.g. natural resources) or may have a greater variety of 
preferences. There may also be economies of scale and the industry level which make room 
for more industries in large countries. The assumption is supported by empirical evidence. For 
example, Parteka and Tamberi (2013) investigate several measures of export diversification in 
manufacturing industries for 60 countries over 20 years. They find a positive relationship 
between country size (measured in either population size or GDP) and export diversification 
indices. In particular, I assume that the relative number of industries is proportional to the 
relative country size, i.e. Y=M<1, where
fh mmM  and fh yyY  . For the sake of 
comparison, I will also consider the case where M=1. Nevertheless, this case appears less 
realistic, as it contradicts the empirical evidence mentioned above; and it makes the demand 
effect from the large country towards small-country products unreasonably large.
16
 The results 
from the preceding analysis will hold also when Y<M<1. However, the size of M may affect 
the range of expenditure share of manufactured goods (μ) that renders possible an equilibrium 
with non-specialisation in both countries (see Appendix 3 for details). Further, it may affect 
the ranges of Y, G and τ that render possible an equilibrium with proportions of firms that 
export below 1 in both countries (see Appendix 4 for details). Since all industries within a 
country are symmetric, the number of firms in an industry in country i ( in ) and the proportion 
                                                 
15
 Similar nested CES functions are frequently used in multiproduct firm models to distinguish varieties 
produced by the same firm from varieties produced by different firms. See Allanson and Montagna (2005), 
Arkolakis and Muendler (2010), and Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011). Venables (1994) and Jorgensen and 
Schroder (2006) use it to separate domestically-produced varieties from foreign-produced ones, as here. 
16
 For M =1, an equal number of foreign and domestic composite industry goods would enter the utility function, 
regardless of how small the smallest country were. If the large country were 100 times larger than the small and 
there were no export costs, foreign demand towards small-country manufactured goods would be 100 times 
higher than foreign demand towards large-country manufactured goods.  
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of these that sell in country j, ( ijs ) will be equal across all industries within the country. Firms 
are monopolistically competitive, so the producer price for a single variety is a constant mark-
up over marginal costs and is equal for all firms, independent of country and industry of 
origin: 
(1)  
1



p  
Using (1), we can characterise demand by the following expressions (see Appendix 1 for 
deduction).
17
 
For a firm from country j, demand from country i is given by:  
(2) 
  
 pPQYc
jijiiiji
11
 
Price index for manufactured goods in country i: 
(3)      1
1
11
jijiiii PmPmQ   
Price index in country i for a composite industry good produced in country j: 
(4) pnsP jijjiji 


1
1
)(   
Since there are four possible combinations of h and f, (2) and (4) represent four equations 
each, while (3) represents two equations, one for each country. 
I assume symmetric variable export costs, thus   jiij , i ≠ j. There are no domestic 
trade cost, thus 1 jjii  . The ijs denote proportion of firms from country i that sell in 
country j. Either all firms sell in their domestic market and only some of them export (i.e. 
                                                 
17
 Since firms and industries are symmetric, we can disregard indexing them. It is sufficient to characterize a firm 
and an industry by country of origin. 
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1
ii
s  and 1ijs ); or all firms export and only some sell in their domestic markets (i.e. 
1
ii
s  and 1ijs ).
18
 The relationship between export costs and market size determines which 
of the ijs will equal one, and in the following I assume that these are related in a way that 
ensures that 1
ii
s and 1ijs .
19
 This is reasonable, as empirical evidence generally shows 
that only a fraction of firms export, and very few firms that export do not sell also in their 
domestic markets. For example, in a representative sample of firms from developing countries 
from the Enterprise Survey dataset, some 21.5% of them exported some of their output, 
whereas only 1.5% exported all their output (see section 4.1. in the present paper for details 
about the dataset). WTO (2008) and Bernard et al. (2011) present surveys of empirical 
evidence on firm level exports.  
In equilibrium there are two types of firms in each country: non-exporters and exporters (the 
latter also sell in their domestic market). Since there are constant marginal production costs 
and separate fixed costs of entry in the domestic market and the export market, a firm’s profits 
in the two markets can be analysed separately. These are given by:  
(5)   Fzp iiii    
(6)   Gzp ijij     
iiz  and ijz  represent the sales of a firm from country i in the domestic market and export 
market respectively; together, they amount to the firm’s total output, iz . There is free entry of 
firms in both markets; thus, profits in each market must equal zero. Inserting (1) in (5) and (6) 
and setting profits equal to 0 yields two separate free entry conditions, one for firms selling in 
                                                 
18
 Also possible is a situation where all firms export in h, while only a fraction exports in f: i.e. sij = sjj =1 and 
sii<1, sji<1. See Appendix 4 for details. 
19
 Criteria for this to happen are discussed in Appendix 4. Also see Felbermayr and Jung (2012) for a similar 
discussion in a model with firms with different marginal costs. 
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the domestic market only, and one additional condition for firms that also export.
 
In 
equilibrium there will be a total number of 
in  firms, but only a subset iijns of these will 
export.  Hence, 
iiz  is positive for all firms, while ijz is positive only for exporters.
20
 By 
rearranging, we can solve for a firm’s sales in its domestic and foreign market respectively:  
(7) Fzii

 1
  
 (8) Gzij

 1
  
(7) shows that all firms sell the same amount in their domestic market, independent of country 
of origin. Similarly, (8) shows that all exporters sell the same amount in their export market. 
(1), (3) and (4) in (2) yield four demand functions (for domestically and foreign produced 
varieties in the two countries); and (7) and (8) represent four supply functions (for domestic 
sales and exports in the two countries). By setting supply equal to demand, we can solve for 
the four endogenous variables: ijs and in . See Appendix 2 for deduction of the equilibrium.  
The present model differs from Melitz-type models in the mechanisms that create coexistence 
of exporters and non-exporters. In Melitz-type models some firms start exporting because 
they are different from others.  The main determinant of whether or not a firm exports is its 
productivity. By contrast, in the present model, all firms are initially equal, but we get an 
equilibrium where firms become different with respect to export status. It is not possible a 
priori to tell which firms will become exporters and which will not.
21
 The export market is 
simply not large enough to include all firms.
 
 It is not my intention to claim that firms do not 
                                                 
20
 Note that the definition of a ‘firm’ is that it produces a unique variety ω. An alternative interpretation of the 
model is that exporters and non-exporters are different firms that produce different unique varieties.  
21
 Examples of other models that have the same feature are Venables (1994), Medin (2003) and Yeaple (2005). 
Conceptually this is not different from the fact that in the Dixit-Stiglitz model there is a potential number of Ω 
firms in the economy, but the market is not big enough for all of them; thus, in equilibrium, only a subset 
actually produce. 
56 
 
differ in their marginal production costs, but in this paper I have chosen to work with initially 
equal firms because I wish to focus on export market conditions, rather than firm differences 
in marginal production costs, as determinants of firms' export status. All firms face demand 
from the domestic market, but exporters face demand from abroad as well. This tends to 
increase the number of exporters. On the other hand, exporters face fixed and variable export 
costs, and this tends to reduce the number of exporters. The extensive margin of exports, ijs , 
depends on the relative importance of these mechanisms.  
3.2 The HME in the number of firms 
The number of firms within an industry located in the home country relative to the number of 
firms within an industry located in the foreign country is given by: 
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Tt  is an aggregate of variable export costs and domestic market entry costs relative to 
fixed export costs. It is a measure of openness. It is reasonable to assume that firms face 
higher fixed export costs than domestic market entry costs, as costs related to conducting 
market analyses, setting up distribution networks, acquiring information about laws, rules and 
business cultures, etc. are likely to be higher in a less familiar market. I therefore focus on the 
case where fixed export costs are higher than domestic market entry costs (G>F). This 
ensures that 1Tt .22 1Tt  implies no variable export costs ( 1t ) and fixed export 
                                                 
22
 See Melitz (2003), Baldwin and Forslid (2010) or Felbermayr and Jung (2012) for a similar measure. Note that
1Tt  is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of non-exporters in both countries. See 
Appendix 4 for details.  
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costs equal to entry costs in the domestic markets ( 1T ). The expression is equal to 0 if 
either variable or fixed export costs are infinitely high.  
N lies between Y and 1, so the number of firms within an industry will be lower in the small 
country. For the small country, the relative number of all firms is given by MN. For M=Y, 
this is less than proportional to Y. In other words, the small country has a less-than-
proportional share of manufacturing firms, and the model therefore produces an HME.
 
Since 
all firms sell the same amount in their domestic markets, independent of country of origin (see 
Equation 7), the HME applies to the number of manufacturing firms as well as to total 
domestic sales. For M=1, MN=Y, and there is no HME.  
The results for M=Y are in line with the HK 1985 model and its Melitz-style extension 
(Baldwin and Forslid, 2010). The mechanism behind the HME is similar as in those models: 
A firm in the small country faces relatively lower demand from the home market than a firm 
in the large country. If the number of firms were proportional to country size, a firm in the 
small country would therefore have to export more and hence pay transport costs on a larger 
share of its total sales than would a firm in the large country. In other words, locating in the 
small country is less profitable. In equilibrium, the number of firms in the small country 
therefore becomes less-than-proportional to country size. Trade liberalisation magnifies the 
HME.  When export costs decline, it becomes less costly to serve the small country from 
abroad. The advantage of access to a large home market for domestic sales therefore becomes 
more prominent, and more and more firms will find it profitable to locate in the large country.  
In contrast to the above-mentioned models, however, the present model always yields some 
manufacturing production in the small country, because consumers will want to diversify their 
consumption between foreign and domestic composite industry goods. Hence, in the present 
model, the HME is dampened as compared to those models for high degree of openness. 
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3.3 The reverse HME in the number of exporters  
The relative extensive margin of exports, defined as the relative proportion of firms that 
export, in h versus f is given by:  
(10) 
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S lies between 1 and 2Y , thus the extensive margin of exports is larger in the small country. 
The reason is that demand for any composite industry good will be higher in the large 
country, since there are more consumers there. Consequently, manufacturing firms within an 
industry in the small country face higher demand from abroad than the case in the large 
country, and manufacturing exports becomes more profitable in the small country.  
From (10) we see that the relative number of exporters within an industry in h versus f, SN, is 
equal to 
1N , thus the  relative number of all exporters is given by: 
(11) 


TMt
TtM
MYMNMSN





1
1 1211
  
1 YMSNY  0


t
MSN
 0


T
MSN
 
For the small country, the relative number of all exporters is more than proportional to 
relative country size (both for M=Y and for M=1), even though the relative number of firms 
is less than proportional to country size (due to the HME). The reason is that the larger 
relative extensive margin of exports in the small country more than outweighs the less than 
proportional relative number of firms. I will call this result the ‘reverse HME’ in exports. The 
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result contradicts the HK 1985 model and its Melitz-style extension (Baldwin and Forslid, 
2010). A higher M reinforces the reverse HME in exports, and is strongest for M=1. 
The extensive margin of exports in the home country is given by:  
(12) 
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Both for M=Y and M=1, the derivative with respect to relative home market size is negative. 
In other words, an increase in relative home market size leads to a decrease in the extensive 
margin of exports. This would also hold true if h were the largest country (then Y would be 
larger than 1, and the sign of the derivative would be the same). This is a key result from the 
model and will be tested empirically in Section 4.
23
 
3.3.1 Export shares and specialisation 
Since all firms export the same amount, independent of country of origin (see Equation 8), the 
reverse HME applies to the number of exporters as well as to the country’s total export value. 
If M=Y, MSN< 1, the large country will be a net exporter of manufactured goods. If M 
increases, the reverse HME in exports is reinforced, and the small country will gain a growing 
share of the world trade in manufactured goods. This is because a greater number of 
manufacturing industries in the small country will mean greater demand from abroad for 
small-country manufactured goods. On the other extreme where M=1, MSN= Y
-1
. There is 
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 Some other models may produce similar results. For example, Felbermayr and Jung (2012) have developed a 
Melitz-type model with asymmetric countries and no CRS sector. For the small country, the relative mass of 
firms is less than proportional to relative country size, so there is a home market effect with respect to the 
number of firms. As in the present model, the proportion of firms that export is larger in the small country. 
Nevertheless, the size of the relative mass of exporting firms is uncertain; thus, we cannot know whether there is 
a reverse home market effect in the number of exporters. Also Medin (2003) predicts that the extensive margin 
of exports will be larger in small countries, but there is no HME in that model. 
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no HME in domestic sales (MN=Y) and the small country will be a net exporter of 
manufactured goods.
 
For intermediate values of M, trade in manufactured goods may be 
balanced.  
Since industries are country-bounded, there is no direct competition with foreign firms within 
an industry. Competition is only indirect and via the demand share for the whole industry. 
Further, within an industry there is only one-way trade. There is, however two-way trade in 
manufactured goods, across industries. 
Unlike in the HK 1985 model, the small country will never become deindustrialised, as 
consumers in both countries want to consume domestic as well as foreign manufactured 
goods. Nevertheless, if consumers’ expenditure share for manufactured goods exceeds a 
critical value, μ*, one of the countries may specialise in manufacturing production. In that 
case, wages will no longer be equalised, but will increase in the country that specialises. If 
M=Y, the large country may specialise; and if M=1, it is the small country that may 
specialise. Specialisation is most likely to occur when the countries differ considerably in 
size. Furthermore, in the case where M=1, specialisation is most likely to occur for low 
export costs; but in the case where M=Y, specialisation is most likely to occur for 
intermediate values of export costs (see Appendix 3 for details).  
3.3.2 Effects of trade liberalization 
The number of firms that export in country i equals (see Appendix 2 for derivation): 
(13) 
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, the derivatives with respect to T and t are positive. Hence 
increased openness, whether through reduced variable or fixed export cost, increases the 
number of firms that export. As compared to increased t, trade liberalisation through increased 
T has an additional positive effect. The reason is that increased T also leads to a reduction of 
the intensive margin of exports (each firm’s export volume), given by ijz  in (8). With lower 
fixed export costs, an exporting firm will break even in the export market selling a smaller 
amount than before. This allows for more exporters. Reduced variable export costs, on the 
other hand does not affect the intensive margin of exports. Empirical evidence in Lawless 
(2010) suggest that the intensive margin of exports is negatively related to fixed export costs 
and independent of variable export costs, just as predicted in the present model. She shows 
that this result will arise in a Melitz-type model under the assumption of Pareto distributed 
marginal production costs. Nevertheless, the present model shows that the result will also 
arise in models where firms have equal marginal production costs.
24
 
From (11) we know that there will be a reverse HME in exports. Examining the derivatives of 
MSN with respect to t and T shows that effect is magnified by trade liberalisation when 
M=Y.25 As trade is liberalised (whether through reductions in t or T), both countries 
experience a decrease in the expenditure share for a domestic composite industry good and an 
increase in the expenditure share for a foreign composite industry good (since imports become 
relatively cheaper). However, the changes are not symmetric. The number of domestic 
industries is lower in the small country, so the decrease in the expenditure shares for the few 
domestic composite industry goods must be spread over the increase in the expenditure shares 
for the many foreign composite industry goods. Therefore, the expenditure share for a given 
                                                 
24
 The result also arises in other models with fixed export costs and initially equal firms, such as Medin (2003) 
and Venables (1994), but it is not discussed in those articles. 
25
 For M=1 there is no effect on MSN from trade liberalization. 
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foreign composite industry good increases less in the small country than in the large. 
Consequently, the increased demand from abroad will be larger for a small-country industry 
than for a large-country industry. This yields a greater increase in the number of exporters in 
the small country than in the large one.  
4 Empirical evidence 
Equation (12) shows that the extensive margin of exports, defined as the proportion of firms 
that export, hfs , is a function of the relative home market size, Y. In the presence of a reverse 
HME in exports, we should expect the extensive margin of exports to decrease with relative 
home market size.
26
 Let us now test this prediction. 
4.1 Data and regression variables 
4.1.1 The extensive margin of exports and the relative home market size  
Empirical analysis on firm level export data has been a fast-growing field in international 
economics.
27
 Unfortunately, firm level data that compare exporters and non-exporters are 
available only for selected countries, and studies are often not comparable between countries 
– with a few exceptions. The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity (2008) 
has compared firm level data on exporters and non-exporters for 14 countries. It finds that the 
extensive margin of exports is ‘loosely decreasing in the size of the domestic markets’ (p. 5). 
To my knowledge this is the only empirical study to deal with the relationship between the 
extensive margin of exports and country size. As this was not a major issue for the Study 
Group, it is done very briefly without econometrically testing the relationship.
28
 There are no 
good datasets that include comparable data for most countries in the world, and this is 
therefore a difficult task. Even so, in this section I attempt to present first evidence on the 
                                                 
26
 Note that this is true both when the home market is small (Y<1) and when it is large (Y>1). 
27
 Examples include Roberts and Tybout (1997) on Colombian firms; Bernard and Jensen (2004) on US firms; 
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) on French firms; Lawless (2009) on Irish firms; Wagner (2001) on German 
firms; Moxnes (2010) on Norwegian firms; and several others. 
28
 As the dataset covers only 14 countries, it is difficult to use it for drawing inferences. 
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importance of relative country size for the extensive margin of exports, using firm level data 
from the Enterprise Surveys dataset. This dataset is currently the best available, but has its 
limitations, as it covers only developing countries. Thus, ‘Asia/Oceania’ does not include 
developed countries such as Japan and South Korea, or indeed China and India; and ‘Europe’ 
does not include any Western European countries. However, most countries in Africa and 
Latin America are included. Moreover, the data cover a large number of countries – 119 in 
total – and can be used to construct comparable unbiased estimates of the extensive margins 
of exports in these countries.  
The data are based on surveys among a representative sample of all firms in the non-
agricultural formal private economy in each country, and were collected between 2006 and 
2011. The data are mainly cross-sectional, but some countries appear in different years than 
others. In addition, a few countries appear in more than one year, in which case I use the most 
recent observations. Most observations are from 2009 and 2010. The survey is stratified by 
business sector, location and firm size; and the population of firms that form the basis of the 
sample is consistently defined in all countries. The same methodology and the same core 
questionnaire are applied in all countries, making data comparable across countries. See 
Enterprise Surveys (2012) for further details.  
In the present study, I include manufacturing firms only, which are drawn from the entire 
manufacturing sector in the countries in question. The data contain firm level information 
about the proportion of output exported.
29
 I define a firm as being an exporter if it exports at 
least 20% of its output. The reason for this is that firms that export a very small amount may 
be testing the export market for the first time or may be exporting by coincidence, and most of 
them will probably not survive in the market (see Eaton et al., 2008). It is not likely that these 
firms have paid the full fixed export cost, G. In Appendix 5, I show that results are robust 
                                                 
29
 If this information is missing, the observation is deleted from the sample 
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against defining as ‘exporters’ firms that export any amount. Using this information, I 
construct an estimate of the proportion of manufacturing firms that export in each country, i.e. 
the extensive margin of exports. The estimate is calculated using sampling weights and is 
hence unbiased. This is the dependent variable. It corresponds to hfs in Equation (12) and is 
called extensive margin of exports. The main explanatory variable of interest here is the home 
country’s GDP in per cent of the rest of the world's GDP (including countries not in the 
sample). It corresponds to Y in Equation (12) and is called relative home market size.30 
Table 1 presents these two variables for the whole sample, as well as for four regional 
subsamples. Due to missing explanatory variables for three countries, the table and the 
regression analyses include only 116 countries.
31 
As shown in the first column of Table 1, the 
extensive margin of exports is small, with an average of 0.14. For three countries in the 
sample (Iraq, Liberia and Vanuatu) the estimated extensive margin of exports indicates no 
exporting firms in the manufacturing sector. Also the relative home market size is small: on 
average, home market GDP constitutes only 0.12 per cent of the rest of the world's GDP. The 
median is much smaller than the mean (only 0.02), indicating that there are many small 
countries in the sample. Investigating the variables at the regional level shows that Europe has 
a much higher average extensive margin of exports (0.27) than the other regions.  
  
                                                 
30
 GDP is measured in constant (year 2000) US dollars and the data are taken from the World Development 
Indicators. I lack data for Barbados for 2010, and use figures for 2009 instead. 
31
 I lack GDP data for Afghanistan, and distance for Kosovo and Montenegro. 
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Group of 
countries 
All Europe Asia/Oceania America Africa 
Variable Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Extensive 
margin of 
exports 
Relative 
home 
market 
size 
Min 0.000 0.001 0.085 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Median 0.116 0.018 0.248 0.063 0.083 0.014 0.139 0.030 0.073 0.011 
Mean 0.137 0.120 0.267 0.187 0.121 0.081 0.125 0.224 0.092 0.029 
Max 0.543 2.231 0.543 1.027 0.435 0.665 0.296 2.231 0.260 0.454 
No of 
observations 
116 116 20 20 25 25 31 31 40 40 
Note: Extensive margin of exports = estimate of the proportion of manufacturing firms that export in each 
country. An exporter is defined as a firm that exports at least 20% of its total output. Relative home market size= 
home country GDP in per cent of the rest of the world's GDP in constant year 2000 US dollars. 
4.1.2 Export costs  
According to Equation (12), not only relative home market size, but also export costs, can 
affect the extensive margin of exports. Reductions in either fixed or variable export costs are 
predicted to increase the extensive margin of exports. Distance is commonly used as a proxy 
for export costs. Variable export costs may increase with distance due to higher transportation 
costs, while fixed export costs may increase with distance due to factors such as greater legal 
and cultural disparities. In addition, Krautheim (2012) shows that in the presence of exporting 
spillovers, fixed export costs increase with distance. Consequently, I expect more remote 
countries to have a lower extensive margin of exports. While the model in Section 3 is a two-
country model, the data used for regression analyses include many countries, so a variable 
that corresponds to τ and G (which are embedded in t and T respectively in Equation 12) 
should reflect a country's distance to the rest of the world. I therefore calculate the variable 
remoteness, which is an output-weighted average of country i’s distance to the rest of the 
world, where weights are equal to the proportion of country j’s GDP to the rest of the world’s 
GDP. This is a commonly used measure of average distance (Melitz, 2006).  
Table 1. Extensive margin of exports and relative home market size in 116 countries 
from the Enterprise Surveys dataset  
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ijd is distance from country i to country j, where 0iid , and GDPw equals world GDP. In 
the regression analysis I use remoteness to control for both fixed and variable export costs.  
Data for distance between pairs of countries is provided by the CEPII database dist_cepii 
(Mayer and Zignago, 2011). I use the great circle distance measured in kilometres between 
largest cities (the dist variable).  
4.1.3 Other control variables  
Equation (12) predicts that only the relative home market size and export costs will affect the 
extensive margin of export (recall that M is equal to either Y or unity). However, a 
simplifying, albeit unrealistic, assumption behind the model presented in Section 3 is that cost 
functions are equal across all firms independent of country of origin: hence, all firms are 
equally productive. However, exporters are known to be more productive than non-exporters, 
and evidence indicates that more productive firms self-select into exporting (see Wagner, 
2007). If technology levels differ between firms or countries and are correlated with GDP, we 
may therefore get biased estimates for the coefficient for relative home market size. To 
correct for differences in technology levels, I include GDP per capita, GDP per capita 
squared, and average firm size. 
Less developed countries often have access to a generally lower level of technology than 
more developed ones. This may reduce the competitiveness of manufacturing firms and lead 
to a lower extensive margin of exports. For highly developed countries, on the other hand, the 
relationship may be reversed. These countries are characterised by a shift in employment from 
manufacturing to service industries (Syrquin, 1988). There are many possible explanations for 
this (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999). One is that the high cost of labour reduces 
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competitiveness in manufacturing industries, leading them to relocate to less-developed 
countries. In this case we could expect an inverse U relationship between level of 
development and the extensive margin of exports. Alternatively, the relationship might be 
unambiguously positive. For example, higher productivity growth in manufacturing industries 
than in services or declining income elasticity of demand for manufactured goods can lead to 
reduction in manufacturing employment, but not as a consequence of lower competitiveness. 
To correct for level of development, I include GDP per capita in the analysis. I also include 
GDP per capita squared to test for a possible inverse U relationship. Data are taken from the 
World Development Indicators and are measured in constant (year 2000) 1000 US dollars.
 32
 
Even if countries have access to the same overall level of technology, firms within the same 
country may differ in productivity. Differences in economic conditions between countries 
may then lead to differences in average productivity levels. For example, Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008) predict that firms in large countries will have higher average productivity 
levels because tougher competition will force the least productive firms out of the market. 
Felbermayr and Jung (2012), on the other hand, predict the opposite, on the grounds that high 
demand in large countries makes room for less productive firms. I do not have data for firm 
productivity, but firm size can be used as a proxy. The Enterprise Survey data contains 
information about whether a firm is small (<20 employees), medium-sized (20 - 99 
employees), or large (> 100 employees). Assigning to these categories values of 1, 2 and 3, I 
construct the variable average firm size, which indicates the average firm size in the country 
(I include only firms for which I have information about export status). Since the variable 
does not measure the actual average number of employees, we should not pay attention to the 
size of its coefficient, on the sign. 
                                                 
32
 The World Development Indicators database lacks GDP and GDP/cap data for Barbados for 2010, so I use 
figures for 2009 instead. 
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4.2 Results  
In the empirical analyses I estimate a reduced form of (12), namely the following equation: 
(14)  extensive margin of exports =α+β1 relative home market size + β2 GDP per capita 
+β3 GDP per capita squared +β4 remoteness +β5 average firm size +εi 
The main variable interest is β1. According to Equation (12), we should expect a negative 
sign.  
Since the dependent variable is a proportion that lies between zero and one (including three 
0’s), it is not appropriate to estimate the model using OLS. Instead I use an estimator 
developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), later known as fractional logit.
33
 Wagner (2001) 
discusses various econometric methods for dealing with proportions, and in the context of 
microeconometrics of exporting he applies the same estimator. In Appendix 5, I show that 
results are robust to applying OLS instead of fractional logit.  
Since some countries are observed in different years, I include year dummies, as well as 
dummies for the regions that appear in Table 1. I also perform separate analyses for each 
region to see whether results are driven by a particular region.  
                                                 
33
 Also see Wooldridge (2012), pp. 748 -753 for a textbook discussion on fractional dependent variables and 
Ramalho, Ramalho and Murieta (2011) for a recent discussion. Computations were done by using the Stata 
command glm, proposed by Baum (2008). 
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  All All Europe Asia/Oceania Latin America Africa 
  
Coeff. Marg. 
effects 
Coeff. Marg. 
effects 
Coeff. Marg. 
effects 
Coeff. Marg. 
effects 
Coeff. Marg. 
effects 
Coeff. Marg. 
effects 
Relative home 
market size 
–0.2731 –0.0323 –1.1605*** –0.1226*** –1.2997*** –0.2494*** –3.5453** –0.2860** –0.7518*** –0.0793*** –2.2500* –0.1768* 
(0.2230) (0.0265) (0.3120) (0.0319) (0.3932) (0.0786) (1.4433) (0.1192) (0.2045) (0.0215) (1.1971) (0.0958) 
GDP per capita   0.1644*** 0.0174*** 0.2638*** 0.0506*** 1.6533 0.1334 0.1521** 0.0160** –0.2907 –0.0228 
  (0.0430) (0.0047) (0.0829) (0.0167) (1.1132) (0.0915) (0.0726) (0.0079) (0.4087) (0.0321) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
  –0.0058** –0.0006** –0.0081 –0.0016 –0.5935 –0.0479 –0.0065* –0.0007* 0.0831 0.0065 
  (0.0025) (0.0003) (0.0054) (0.0011) (0.4662) (0.0379) (0.0035) (0.0004) (0.0800) (0.0062) 
Remoteness   0.0000 0.0000 0.0010 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Average firm size   1.4494*** 0.1531*** 0.5039 0.0967 2.5858*** 0.2086*** 1.0200 0.1075 1.9897*** 0.1563*** 
  (0.3001) (0.0303) (0.6647) (0.1279) (0.5201) (0.0405) (0.8616) (0.0909) (0.4783) (0.0348) 
Constant –1.8085***  –4.8437***  –8.8817  –7.4478***  –3.4645***  –4.2797***  
(0.0873)  (0.7510)  (5.4562)  (1.5783)  (1.2177)  (1.1400)  
Log pseudo–
likelihood 
–34.14 –34.14 –31.36 –31.36 –7.622 –7.622 –6.082 –6.082 –8.328 –8.328 –8.841 –8.841 
            
No  of Observations 
116 116 116 116 20 20 25 25 31 31 40 40 
                        
Predicted extensive 
margin  
0.1369 
 
0.1201 
 
0.2590 
 
0.0885 
 
0.1208 
 
0.0900 
            Doubling the relative 
home market size  
–2.8309 
 
–12.2536 
 
–18.0051 
 
–26.1787 
 
–14.7041 
 
–5.6948 
                        
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects and predicted extensive margins are 
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables. Year dummies are included in all regressions; regional dummies are included in the regressions for the whole sample.
Table 2. Determinants of the extensive margin on exports– results from fractional logit models based on the Enterprise Surveys dataset. 
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Table 2 presents results from the regression analyses. Coefficients as well as marginal effects 
(evaluated at the mean of the other independent variables) are reported.
34
 The first four 
columns present results based on the whole sample, where the first two show results without 
control variables. The other columns present results based on the regional subsamples.  
The coefficient for the main variable of interest, relative home market size, is positive but not 
significant in the regression without controls. However, when control variables are included, 
it becomes significant and of the expected sign in the whole sample, as well as in all 
subsamples (albeit only at 10% level for Africa).
35
 Hence, results support the hypothesis of a 
higher extensive margin of exports in small countries. What about the economic significance 
of the effect? The second last row of Table 2 shows the predicted extensive margin of exports 
(evaluated at the mean of the other independent variables), while the last row shows the 
predicted effects from doubling the relative home market size. For the average country in the 
whole sample this would lead to a reduction in the extensive margin of exports by 12.3%.
36
 
Are these results robust to alternative specifications? Table 1 shows that median relative home 
market size is much lower than the mean: thus, the sample consists of many relatively small 
countries and a few large ones. A concern is therefore whether the results are driven by a few 
large countries. This is not the case. Omitting the 5% or the 10% largest countries from the 
sample does not alter the significance of the coefficient for relative home market size. In fact, 
the marginal effect becomes even higher in these reduced samples (about twice that in the full 
                                                 
34
 Coefficients for dummies for years and regions are not reported, but are available upon request. 
35
 The number of observations is somewhat low for the regional subsamples, and results for Asia/Oceania and 
Africa are not robust to alternative specifications (see Appendix 5). Therefore, results for the regional 
subsamples should be interpreted with care. 
36
 For the whole sample, the marginal effect is equal to 0.123. The predicted extensive margin of exports is 
0.120; thus an increase in relative home market size by one percentage point is predicted to lead to a decrease in 
the extensive margin of exports by 103% (i.e. below 0, which is not possible). We should, however, bear in mind 
that average relative home market size for the sample countries is only 0.120% (see Table 1), thus an increase of 
one percentage point is a very large increase. If, instead, we double the relative home market size, the predicted 
reduction in the extensive margin of exports is 103%*0.120= 12.3%. It can be argued that this reasoning is 
imprecise, since doubling of the relative home market size cannot be considered a marginal change, and this is a 
non-linear model. However, results from the linear model in Appendix 5 are close to the ones presented here 
(except for Asia/Oceania), so the approximations seem fairly good. 
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sample).
37
 In Appendix 5, I present results from two other sensitivity analyses. First, I 
estimate Equation (14) using OLS. The marginal effects of relative home market size are 
similar to those from the main analysis and are reported in Table A1. Secondly, I perform an 
analysis redefining the extensive margin of exports. Instead of defining a firm as an exporter 
if it exports at least 20% of its output, I now define a firm as an exporter if it exports any 
amount. Obviously, this increases the extensive margin of exports – new summary statistics    
are shown in Table A2. Results from the regression analyses are reported in Table A3; they 
show that, also in this case, the marginal effects are similar to those in the main analyses.
38
  
The coefficient for average firm size is positive and significant in the whole sample as well as 
for Asia/Oceania and Africa, and the results are robust to alternative specifications (see 
Appendix 5). Thus, larger average firm size is generally associated with a higher extensive 
margin of exports. The coefficient for GDP per capita is significant and of the expected sign 
for the whole sample, as well as for Europe and Latin America. Further, the coefficient for 
GDP per capita squared is negative and significant for the whole sample, as well as for Latin 
America. Consequently, there is some evidence of an inverse U relationship between the 
extensive margin of exports and welfare level, but the results are not robust to alternative 
specifications (see Appendix 5). Surprisingly, the coefficient for remoteness is not significant 
– in the whole sample, or in any of the subsamples. I tried replacing remoteness with 
alternative measures of average distance to the rest of the world such as an unweighted 
average. None of the alternative measures produced significant results for average distance. I 
also tried replacing GDP per capita and remoteness with their logs, and GDP per capita 
                                                 
37
 Moreover, omitting the 5% or 10% smallest countries does not alter the results for relative home market size in 
terms of significance or size of the marginal effect. 
38
 I also experimented with calculating the relative home market size using population size rather than GDP. 
Results regarding the coefficient for relative home market size were not altered in terms of significance, but the 
marginal effects were somewhat lower. Since it is income level, rather than population size, that determines 
demand, I chose to present results with GDP as a measure of country size. 
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squared with (log of GDP per capita)
 
squared. There was little change in the results regarding 
relative home market size. 
To conclude, the empirical analyses support the hypothesis of larger extensive margins of 
exports within manufacturing industries in small countries than in large countries. Doubling 
the relative home market size is associated with a decrease in the extensive margin of exports 
by 12.3% for the average country.  
5 Conclusions 
In this paper I have presented a model of trade in manufactured goods where the well-known 
HME in the number of manufacturing firms coexists with a reverse HME in the number of 
manufacturing exporters. While small countries have lower profitability in manufacturing 
domestic sales due to increasing returns to scale and access to a small home market, they have 
higher profitability in manufacturing exports, due to access to a large foreign market. For the 
small country, this leads to the relative number of manufacturing firms being less than 
proportional and the relative number of manufacturing exporters being more than proportional 
to the relative country size. One consequence of this is that the extensive margin of 
manufacturing exports, defined as the proportion of firms that export, becomes higher in 
relatively small countries. These results contradict those from benchmark HME models, 
whether dealing with homogeneous or heterogeneous firms, which predict that the extensive 
margin of exports is independent of country size.  
The prediction of larger extensive margins of exports in small countries is tested using data on 
firm level exports from 116 developing countries from the Enterprise Surveys dataset. Using a 
fractional logit analysis, I find that, for the average country, a doubling of home country GDP 
relative to the rest of the world's GDP is associated with a decrease in the extensive margin of 
manufacturing exports by 12.3%. 
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The dataset used in the present study has obvious limitations, as it covers only developing 
countries. A topic for future research is to obtain comparable firm level data for more 
developed countries, so that we would be able to test the relationship for these countries as 
well. Another topic for future research is to test more directly the hypothesis of the co-
existence of an HME in domestic sales and a reverse HME in exports. As obtaining 
comparable data on the number of firms and exporters for a large set of countries would be 
very difficult, this could be done by using values of domestic sales and exports instead.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Derivation of demand functions 
The upper level of the subutility function for manufactured goods in country i is given by:  
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The price index in country i for manufactured goods produced within an industry located in 
country j is given by:    
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reduces to Equation (4) in the text. The price index for manufactured goods in country i is 
given by: 
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kPkPQ . Since industries are symmetric, this 
reduces to Equation (3) in the text. As pointed out by Helpman and Krugman (1985, p. 120), 
consumer expenditure shares on each product in a separable utility function of this kind 
depend on prices and the number of varieties only. By utility maximization of the upper level 
of the CES function, we get the following expression for demand in country i for a composite 
industry good produced in country j: 


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P
YC .  
The share of expenditure for manufactured goods allocated to 
ji
C is hence equal to  
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Now, for a firm from country j, demand from country i is given by: 
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Since firms are symmetric and industries only differ by country of origin, I have omitted   
and k  from the above expressions and let the first subscript denote the country where the 
good is produced, and the second subscript denote the country where the good is sold. 
Inserting from (A1) in (A2) gives equations (2) in the text. Inserting for (4) in (3) we can 
express 
i
Q as: 
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the equilibrium 
The equilibrium conditions for domestically produced goods and imports respectively in 
country i are given by: 
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Dividing (A5) by (A4) and rearranging yields the following expression for the number of 
imported varieties relative to the number of domestic varieties in country i. 
(A6) 
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Trade liberalization, whether through increased T or in t, increases the number of imported 
varieties relative to domestic varieties. (A4), (A5) and (A6) represent two equations each: one 
for h and one for f. The first part of Equation (12) in the text follows directly from (A6) for f. 
Dividing (A4) for home by (A4) for foreign, using (A6) for both home and foreign, and 
rearranging yields Equation (9) in the text. Inserting (A6) for country i in (A5) for country i 
and rearranging gives the number of firms within an industry located in country i: 
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Note that trade liberalisation leads to a decline in the number of firms,
i
n , in both countries. 
This is because trade liberalisation leads to substitution away from domestic varieties and 
over to foreign varieties. By combining (A6) and (A7) we get equation (13) in the text.  
Inserting from (9) in (A6) for f yields the second part of Equation (12) in the text. Equation 
(10) in the text follows from Equation (12) and the corresponding equation for f.  
  
77 
 
Appendix 3. Criteria for specialisation in production of manufactured goods 
Labour used in the manufacturing sector in country i is equal to:  
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The last equality follows from (7), (8) and (A6) for country j. By inserting from (A7) for both 
countries, we can express relative labour used in the manufacturing sector in country i versus 
country j as: 
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For specialisation to occur in a country, the total labour force in that country must be 
employed in the manufacturing sector, i.e. i
I
i
yl  , where we use the fact that 
ii
yl  . This 
will happen if consumers’ expenditure share for manufactured goods,  , is higher than a 
critical value,
* . Define
I
f
I
hI
l
l
L  , which denote relative labour used in the manufacturing 
sector in h versus f. From (A9) we see that for M=Y, IL  is lower than relative country size (
YLI  ), thus specialisation may occur in the large country. For M=1, IL is larger than Y, 
thus specialisation may occur in the small country. For intermediate values of M, the 
probability of specialisation is lower, but for sufficiently high , specialisation may occur in 
either country, depending on the size of M.  
For M=Y, we find 
* by setting f
I
f yl   and inserting from (A7) in the second part of (A8):  
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For M=1, we find 
* by setting h
I
h yl   and inserting from (A7)  in the second part of (A8) 
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In both cases, specialisation is most likely to occur when the countries differ greatly in size. 
The effect of trade liberalisation is somewhat different in the two cases. Trade liberalisation 
has two opposite effects on labour used in the manufacturing sector: i) it reduces labour used 
in manufacturing domestic sales, and ii) it increases labour used in manufacturing exports. For 
the case where M=1, the derivatives of 
*  with respect to t and T are negative.  In the small 
country, ii) dominates over i), and trade liberalisation leads to increased use of labour in the 
manufacturing sector. This increases the probability of specialisation.  For M = Y, the 
derivatives of 
*  with respect to t and T are ambiguous. But 1*   for 10  Tt  and 
1*   for either prohibitive export costs or for completely liberalised trade. Thus, in the two 
limit cases where 0Tt  and 1Tt , specialisation will not occur. Further, 
* declines 
when 
Tt  is near 0 and increases when Tt  is near 1. This is because ii) dominates in the 
large country when export costs are high, and i) dominates when export costs are low. This 
could indicate that specialisation is most likely to occur for intermediate values of export 
costs. 
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Appendix 4. Criteria for non-exporters in both countries 
Equation (10) shows that the extensive margin of exports is larger in the small country, and 
Equation (12) shows that trade liberalisation increases the extensive margin of exports in both 
countries. Therefore, if export costs decrease, the extensive margin of exports will reach 1 in 
the small country first. Consequently, there will be non-exporters in both countries as long as 
Y is not too small relative to openness. From (12), we can write the proportion of firms that 
export in h as: 
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Note that  Ttbhf ,  here equals the relative number of firms in h versus f, N. Criterion for the 
existence of non-exporters in h:  
   TtbTtas hfhf ,,1 
        
 
Let us focus on the case where t=1 and T<1, i.e. there are only fixed costs of exporting.39 
The derivatives of the functions a  and hfb  with respect to T are given by: 
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In addition, for M=Y, we have: 
0)0( a  and 1)1( a  
                                                 
39
 The case for t<1 and T=1 is almost analogous. 
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1)0( hfb  and Ybhf )1(  
Consequently, )(Tbhf  is a downward sloping curve, while )(Ta is an upward sloping curve 
that cuts the )(Tbhf   curve from below for a value of )(Ta   between Y and 1. This 
corresponds to values of T between 1
1
Y  and 1. Thus 1
1
 YT  is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for 1hfs , while 1T  is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
1hfs . The two points will be close when β is large, i.e. when η is large. In other words, if 
composite industry goods from different countries are good substitutes, the proportion of 
firms that export will reach 1 in the small country only when trade is highly liberalised and/or 
countries differ greatly in size. If they are poor substitutes, on the other hand, this will happen 
for intermediate values of trade costs and/or country size differences. This is reasonable, as a 
high η means that a domestic composite industry goods can easily substitute a foreign 
composite industry goods in the large country; thus, demand for small-country products from 
abroad is lower.  
It can be shown that if T increases further beyond the intersection of )(Ta and )(Tbhf , all 
firms will export in the small country, while only a fraction will sell in the domestic market. 
In the large country, on the other hand, only a fraction will export while all firms sell in the 
domestic market. If T increases even further so that fixed export costs become lower than the 
domestic market entry costs i.e. 1T , all firms may export in both countries, whereas only a 
fraction may sell in their domestic markets. The value of T for this to happen is given by the 
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intersection between )(Tbhf  and
)(
1
Ta
.
40
 A necessary but not sufficient condition for this to 
happen is
1
1
 


 YT , whereas a sufficient but not necessary condition is 1
2
 


 YT .  
For M=1, 1
1
 YT is a sufficient and necessary condition for 1ijs . Consequently, in this 
case the range of Y and T that makes possible an equilibrium with non-exporting firms in both 
countries is narrowed as compared to the case where M=Y. For values of 
1
1
 
1
1


   YTY , all firms will export in the small country, whereas only a fraction export 
in the large country. For
1
1
 


 YT , all firms will export in both countries, while only a 
fraction will sell in their domestic markets. 
  
                                                 
40
 Note that )(Tbhf  is now equal to hf nn , which denotes the number of exporters in the large country 
divided by the number of exporters in the small country (since all firms export). 
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Appendix 5. Results of sensitivity analyses 
 
  All All Europe  Asia/Oceania Latin America Africa 
  Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
Relative home market 
size 
–0.0281 –0.1000*** –0.2215** –0.1701 –0.0613*** –0.1901* 
(0.0195) (0.0263) (0.0902) (0.1362) (0.0139) (0.0995) 
GDP per capita  0.0195*** 0.0415* 0.1301 0.0159* –0.0325 
 (0.0066) (0.0193) (0.1905) (0.0089) (0.0346) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
 –0.0006 –0.0007 –0.0504 –0.0007 0.0086 
 (0.0004) (0.0013) (0.0810) (0.0004) (0.0070) 
Remoteness  –0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Average firm size  0.1421*** 0.1105 0.2441*** 0.1062 0.1835*** 
 (0.0344) (0.1521) (0.0614) (0.1084) (0.0502) 
Constant 0.1406*** –0.1293* –1.1498 –0.3950* –0.0131 –0.0882 
(0.0105) (0.0759) (1.2913) (0.2019) (0.1453) (0.1027) 
Observations 
116 116 20 25 31 40 
  
    
  
R–squared 0.0070 0.5376 0.7232 0.4933 0.1969 0.3596 
            
Predicted extensive 
margin 
0.1372 0.1372 0.2674 0.1206 0.1246 0.0923 
  
    
  
Doubling the relative 
home market size 
–2.4577 –8.7464 –15.4901 –11.4246 –11.0202 –5.9728 
            
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors in 
parenthesis. The regressions for the whole sample include regional dummies, and all regressions include year 
dummies.  
 
 
Group of 
Countries 
All Europe Asia/ 
Oceania 
Latin America Africa 
Variable Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Extensive margin of 
exports 
Min 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.026 0.000 
Median 0.178 0.381 0.103 0.194 0.109 
Mean 0.198 0.388 0.156 0.201 0.128 
Max 0.775 0.775 0.477 0.516 0.394 
No of obs. 116 20 25 31 40 
Note: Extensive margin of exports = estimate of the proportion of manufacturing firms that export in each 
country. An exporter is defined as a firm that exports any amount. 
Table A1. Determinants of the extensive margin on exports – results from OLS 
regression based on the Enterprise Surveys dataset 
Table A2. Extensive margin of exports in the Enterprise Surveys dataset, all firms that 
export any amount 
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  All All Europe  Asia/Oceania Latin America Africa 
  Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects Coeff. Marg. effects 
Relative home market 
size 
0.0864 0.0137 –0.8160*** –0.1179*** –0.9854** –0.2335** –3.7905*** –0.4002*** –0.4087** –0.0643** –1.1529 –0.1185 
(0.1923) (0.0305) (0.2455) (0.0350) (0.4664) (0.1103) (1.3535) (0.1464) (0.1609) (0.0258) (0.8808) (0.0902) 
GDP per capita    0.1808*** 0.0261*** 0.1406 0.0333 2.4766** 0.2615** 0.2184*** 0.0344*** –0.4552 –0.0468 
   (0.0499) (0.0072) (0.1714) (0.0404) (1.0478) (0.1107) (0.0733) (0.0123) (0.3094) (0.0318) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
   –0.0071** –0.0010** 0.0033 0.0008 –0.8715** –0.0920** –0.0105*** –0.0016*** 0.1154* 0.0119* 
   (0.0032) (0.0005) (0.0105) (0.0025) (0.4279) (0.0446) (0.0037) (0.0006) (0.0622) (0.0063) 
Remoteness    0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0000 
   (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
Average firm size    1.7259*** 0.2494*** 0.5832 0.1382 2.3708*** 0.2503*** 2.0473** 0.3223** 2.2563*** 0.2319*** 
   (0.3063) (0.0443) (0.6549) (0.1548) (0.5579) (0.0513) (0.8462) (0.1375) (0.4398) (0.0392) 
Constant –1.4064***  –4.8938***  –5.2163  –6.4631***  –5.0194***  –4.6379***   
(0.0906)   (0.5709)   (6.8756)   (1.5625)   (1.3227)   (0.8657)   
Log pseudo–likelihood 
–42.18 –42.18 –37.64 –37.64 –8.595 –8.595 –7.051 –7.051 –10.73 –10.73 –10.49 –10.49 
           
  
No of Observations 
116 116 116 116 20 20 25 25 31 31 40 40 
                        
Predicted extensive 
margin 
  0.1369   0.1369   0.3857   0.12   0.1957   0.1163 
           
  
Doubling the relative 
home market size 
  –1.2009   –10.3346   –11.3208   –27.0135   –3.9603   –4.2889 
                        
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Marginal effects and predicted extensive margins are 
evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.  Year dummies are included in all regressions, and regional dummies are included in the regressions for the whole sample. 
 
Table A3. Determinants of the extensive margin on exports– results from fractional logit models based on the Enterprise Surveys 
dataset. All firms that export 
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1 Introduction 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a literature which incorporates sunk export costs in 
models of international trade. This literature shows that, in the presence of such costs, not all 
firms export (see Melitz, 2003 or also Medin, 2003 for a model with firms with equal 
marginal production costs). Several empirical studies use firm-level data to study persistence 
in export behaviour and find evidence of sunk export costs (see e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 
1997 and Bernard and Jensen, 2004). These studies focus on a firm's decision of whether or 
not to export as such. In this paper we analyse exporting firms’ choice of export markets, i.e. 
their exports to individual markets (defining ‘market’ as the market for a particular product in 
a particular country.  Analysing only the export decision as such misrepresents export costs 
when such costs are market specific.
 41
  
Some recent contributions focus on how firm-level export develops in different markets along 
extensive and intensive margins (see Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008; Bernard et al., 2011a). But 
only a few studies have investigated the importance of country-specific sunk export costs,
42
 
and, to our knowledge, no studies have investigated the importance of market-specific sunk 
export cost.  
Models of global sunk export costs can explain how temporary export-promotion policies or 
macro-shocks (such as exchange-rate fluctuations) may have persistent effects on aggregated 
trade flows (see Baldwin, 1988; Baldwin and Krugman 1989; Dixit, 1989). If market specific 
sunk costs are important, temporary shocks may have persistent effects also on the number of 
trading partners or traded products. Further, persistence will be higher in markets with large 
                                                 
41
 See Helpman et al. 2008; Chaney, 2008 for theoretical models of country-specific sunk export costs and 
Bernard et al., 2011b for a model of country- and product- specific sunk export costs. In the presence of such 
costs, only the large and most productive firms find it profitable to export many products to many countries. 
42 Meinen (2012) estimates the importance of country-specific sunk costs. Moxnes (2010) demonstrates that both 
country-specific and global sunk export costs should be taken into account, otherwise, estimates of the effect of 
the latter will be biased. Evidence in Gullstrand (2011) suggests that country-specific sunk export costs vary with 
firm characteristics. Morales et al. (2011) estimate the magnitude of country-specific sunk export costs. 
Ottaviano and Martincus (2011) and Blanes et al. (2008) investigate the importance of region-specific sunk 
export costs in two and three regions, respectively. 
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sunk costs. Thus, knowledge about market-specific sunk export costs may have consequences 
for various types of export-promotion policies.
43
 
The first aim of this article is to study the importance of market-specific sunk export costs. 
This is done in a new dataset that is particularly interesting due to its high level of detail: we 
have 11 years of panel data for all Norwegian seafood exporters, the countries they export to, 
and the products they export. Norway is one of the world’s largest exporters of seafood, with 
an annual export value of 35.7 billion NOK in 2007 (approx. 7.28 billion USD). The industry 
is highly internationalized, with exports of a wide range of products to almost 200 countries; 
approximately 90 per cent of all Norwegian seafood production is exported.
44
 The sector is 
therefore an interesting case for the study of international sales activity. Unlike earlier studies 
of sunk export costs, which focus on firms that produce what they export, our data include 
trading companies that buy all the seafood they export from other producers. Such firms 
constitute a significant part of all exporters, so including them is important for studying 
market-specific export.  
Our second aim is to study whether learning and spillovers effects lead to reductions in export 
costs.  Schmeiser (2012) develops a theoretical model where learning about exporting from 
other countries reduces firms’ entry costs to a given country, denoting it ‘learning to export’. 
In this article we allow for a range of effects like this: intra- and inter-country as well as intra- 
and inter-product. We hypothesise that a firm’s export costs to a particular market can be reduced 
due to export experience, whether from that same country or from other countries (both within 
and between products). 
45
 
                                                 
43
 Generally there is evidence of positive effects from export promotion policies. See Hiller (2012) for a good 
overview of the literature. 
44
 Figure based on information from the Norwegian Seafood Council. 
45 Some studies have used aggregated trade flows to investigate the impact of experience acquired in other export markets. 
See e.g.  Nicita and Olarreanga (2000) or Evenett and Venables (2002). Some studies also examine how learning affects the 
probability of export to a particular country or market using firm-level data. See e.g.  Fabling et al. (2011); Alvarez et al. 
(2010); Lawless (2011); Morales et al. (2011); Castagnino (2011); Gullstrand (2011) and Meinen (2012). These employ 
different learning variables from ours, and do not include such a rich variety of different effects. None of these distinguish 
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Concerning spillovers, we hypothesise that knowledge acquired by other exporters may spill 
over to potential exporters and reduce their market-specific export costs. Such spillover 
effects can have important policy implications. Earlier empirical evidence is mixed regarding 
spillovers that reduce global sunk export costs.
46
 If, on the other hand, market-specific 
spillovers are more important than global spillovers, then policies aimed at exploiting 
spillovers could benefit from focus on encouraging export to certain markets rather than 
exports in general. Furthermore, firms targeting the same market would benefit from 
organizing themselves in ‘exporting societies’.  Some recent studies have found support for 
the hypothesis that spillovers reduce country- or market-specific export costs.
47
 Most of these 
hypothesise that spillovers occur in the home country, from other exporters.
48
 In line with a 
recent theoretical model presented in Krautheim (2012), we investigate spillovers from other 
exporting firms in the destination markets and not the home country, assuming there to be 
‘exporting societies’ in the former. As for learning, we distinguish between inter- and intra-
product spillovers, and find evidence of several effects. 
Most other studies have focused on either learning or spillovers: but we include both in the 
same regression, as it is conceivable that both effects could influence sunk export costs at the 
same time. We also include in the same regression discrete variables on firms’ lagged 
presence in markets, capturing the extensive margin, and continuous variables on firms’ 
lagged export value to markets, capturing the intensive margin. We show that it is important 
to include both margins in the same regression, because the extensive margin induces more 
learning and spillover effects than the intensive margin. Furthermore, most other studies of 
                                                                                                                                                        
between entering and continuing exporters within the same regression as we do, and all but Gullstrand (2011) and Meinen 
(2012) focus on entering firms only. Most of them also differ from ours in the econometric methods applied. 
46
 See e.g. Clerides et al. (1998) and Bernard and Jensen (2004) for dynamic frameworks; and Aitken et al. 
(1997); Greenaway et al. (2004); and Barrios et al. (2003) for static frameworks. 
47 Requena Silvente and Castillo Giménez (2007), Koenig (2009) and Lawless (2011) find that spillovers affect country-
specific export costs; while Alvarez et al. (2010), Koenig et al. (2010) and Fabling (2011) find that spillovers affect market-
specific sunk export costs. 
48
An exception is Lawless (2011), who finds that if there is a high number of national firms exporting to a country, 
this increases the probability that a firm will enter that country. 
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learning and spillovers at the country (and possibly product) level focus on entrants, i.e. firms 
that did not export the product to the country the previous year. Nevertheless, in our paper we 
apply a dynamic model including entrants as well as continuing exporters (firms that exported 
the product to the country the previous year).
 
By including interaction variables, we also allow 
for effects to be different for the two types of firms.
 49
 Whereas effects for continuing 
exporters may be interpreted as effects on fixed export costs alone, those for entrants may be 
interpreted as effects on the combination of fixed and sunk export costs. We know of no other 
paper that distinguishes between entrants and continuing exporters like this. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: the next section presents the theoretical 
background for the estimation equation. Section 3 gives a more detailed presentation of the 
dataset we use, and other data used in the analysis. Results are presented in section 4, with 
concluding remarks offered in section 5.  
2 Theoretical background 
2.1 Profits from exporting  
We follow Roberts and Tybout (1997) in modelling firms’ export decisions in the presence of 
sunk export costs. They construct a multi-period model of firms’ export participation 
decisions.  
There are many firms that export one or more products to one or more countries. Consider 
market-specific export: i.e. firm i’s export of product v to country j. For each firm i in period 
t, the term π*ivjt(pvjt, vivjt ) denotes extra profits from exporting product v to country j. These 
are operating profits not adjusted for sunk cost of entering markets or for fixed costs of 
operating in a market. The vector pvjt consists of variables that are exogenous for firms. It 
                                                 
49
 The only other papers we know of that include continuing exporters in addition to entrants are Gullstrand 
(2011) and Meinen (2012), who both focus on country-specific learning, not spillovers.  
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reflects product-, country- and time-specific factors. vivjt is a vector of factors that are firm-
specific. It includes firm size, experience and market position.  
We assume constant marginal costs. This allows us to treat each firm’s export volumes in 
each market independently. We also assume that the price received by firm i for product v in 
country j is independent of export activities in other markets (v’≠v and/or j’≠j). We assume 
that any effects of other firms’ export on the price received by firm i are external. In 
Appendix 1 we describe how a profit function can be constructed on the basis of standard 
CES preferences, monopolistic competition, and constant marginal costs. In that case, the 
firm’s operating profit is proportional to sales values in each market. Without sunk and fixed 
export costs, firm i will export product v to country j if *ivjt>0.  
Each firm faces fixed costs of exporting any product v to any country j, Mivjt, and sunk costs 
of entering the market, Givjt. These are assumed to depend on a set of learning and spillover 
effects described in detail below. If there are no sunk costs, firm i will export product v to 
country j in period t if *ivjt>Mivjt. Sunk costs, Givjt, occur only when the firm enters the 
market, not if it is already present there.  
2.2 Market-specific sunk export costs 
Profits in any future period, t+s, π*ivjt+s, are uncertain to the firm. If there are market-specific 
sunk export costs, the decision to export to the market today hinges on expected future profits. 
If the firm exits the market one year and then re-enters later, the full sunk cost recurs.
50
 We 
define the variable yivjt as taking on the value of 1 if firm i exports product v to a country j in 
period t and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
50
 This assumption is made for simplicity. Other authors, such as Roberts and Tybout (1997), Bernard and Jensen 
(2004), Gullstrand (2011) and Meinen (2011), discuss the possibility that only part of the sunk costs recurs if the 
firm re-enters the market. Some authors also include exit costs in the theoretical formulation. Roberts and 
Tybout (1997) find that that most of the sunk cost must be repaid after one period of exit. 
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With market-specific sunk export costs, the single-period profit from exporting product v to 
county j becomes: 
1       ivjtivjtivjtivjtivjtivjtivjt yMGyy  1* 1  
Equation 1 shows that in the presence of market-specific sunk export costs, previous export 
status will affect today’s profit from exporting.51  Since future profits are uncertain, at time t 
the firm chooses the infinite sequence of values y
+
ivjt={yivjt+s|s≥ 0} that maximizes the 
expected present value of current and future profits. Firm i’s optimal export strategy is the 
y
+
ivjt that satisfies the Bellman equation:  
2    ivjtitivjttivjt
y
ivjt yVEV
ivjt
|max 1     
Et is an expectations operator conditioned on firm i’s information set at time t, Ωit, and   is 
the discount rate in each period. Consequently Vivjt is the value of the optimal strategy for firm 
i’s export strategy for product v in country j in period t. A firm chooses to export in period t if 
the expected value of exporting exceeds the expected value of not exporting. Using eq. 1, we 
see that export in this period will be positive (yivjt>0) if:   
3          ivjtivjtivjtivjtitivjttivjtitivjttivjt MGyyVEyVE
n
ivjt
  111
* 10|1|
  

  
Equation 3 shows that, in the presence of market-specific sunk export costs, the decision to 
export in period t depends on export status in period t-1. In the regression analysis, the effect 
of lagged export status on today’s export decision is interpreted to indicate the importance of 
market-specific sunk export costs. The left-hand side of eq. 3 describes expected profits net of 
sunk and fixed export costs; this we denote πnivjt.  
Firm i therefore exports product v to country j in period t if: 
                                                 
51
 See Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) for further discussion. 
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 



 

otherwise   0
 1 if   1 1 ivjtivjtivjt-
n
ivjt
ivjt
MG-yπ
y  
2.3 Learning and spillovers 
Several other studies have hypothesised that learning and/or spillovers affect sunk export 
costs.  Our model includes several learning and spillover effects that may influence firm i’s 
decision to export product v country j.
 52
 See Section 4 and Appendix 2 for detailed 
descriptions of all learning and spillovers effects investigated in the regression analysis.  
We distinguish between effects on sunk costs and on fixed costs. Effects on sunk costs are 
present only for entrants, when past export experience is 0. (If yivjt-1 =1, then Givjt=0, so no 
variables can reduce Givjt further.) Effects on fixed costs are present for both entrants and 
firms that exported to the market in the previous period, so that reduced Mivjt has 
consequences also for already-exporting firms. In other words, sunk costs are important for 
the decision to enter markets, whereas fixed costs also influence the decision to stay in a 
market. Consequently, we attempt to distinguish between the combined effect on fixed and 
sunk costs and on fixed costs alone by interacting learning and spillover variables with a 
categorical variable for the firm’s presence in the market the year before (i.e. lagged export 
status).  
We allow G and M to depend on firm i’s own experience from other markets and on other 
firms’ experience from the same country. The firm’s decision is therefore to export if:  
       '   ,11 * 1'* 10* 1'* 1011 iiyMyMMyGyGG-yMG-yπ tiSitLtiSitLivjt-ivjtivjtivjt-nivjt  
 
This can be reformulated as  
                                                 
52 Other articles deal with similar issues. See e.g. Clerides et al. (1998), Koenig (2009), Koenig et al. (2010), Lawless (2011) 
and Fabling et al. (2011), on spillovers; and Lawless (2011) and Morales et al. (2011), on learning. 
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Above, G
0
 and M
0
 denote market-specific sunk and fixed costs that are independent of 
learning and spillovers from other markets. G
L
 and M
L
 denote the reductions in sunk and fixed 
costs due to firm i’s experience from other markets (learning effects). These are specified to 
occur if firm i exported to any other market in the previous period. Firm i’s activities in other 
markets are indicated by the vector y
*
it-1. This vector consists of an indicator for presence with 
other products in the same country: 1' jtivy , v’≠v; and a vector indicating  presence in other 
countries (with the same product or with any product): * tijy 1'  , j’≠j. Consequently, G
L
 and M
L
 
are coefficient vectors.
 53
 Other firms’ activities are denoted with the vector 
*
jtiy 1'  , i’≠i.   G
S
 
and M
S
 are therefore coefficient vectors for reductions in sunk and fixed costs because of 
spillovers.   
2.4 The regression equation 
In line with several other studies (e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1997) we specify a reduced form 
of the latent variable πnivjt-G
0
-M
0
. Therefore we do not specify the profit function but 
approximate it with an expression in exogenous firm, product, country, and time variables and 
combinations of the four dimensions. Thus, we write  
ivjtivjt
n
ivjt eMGπ  ηz
00  
The vector z consists of variables that are specific to the firm, the product or country, or any 
combination of the three. These are captured by dummy variables and by other variables as 
                                                 
53
 If the firm learns through own export activities in the same market, also yivjt-1 is part of the vector y
*
it-1 when 
multiplied by M
L
. This effect cannot be separated from the effect of market-specific sunk costs. Effectively, 
these reductions in fixed costs due to learning are sunk costs. Both effects are captured by yivjt-1 in the regression 
analysis. 
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described in section 4. evijt denotes noise. Based on eq. 4 we therefore specify the binary 
choice equation as: 
5 
   
 



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



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
otherwise   0
 1
110 if   1
1161151'14
1'131'121'1110
ivjtivjt
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tijivjt
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tijivjtjtivivjtjtivivjtivjt
ivjt eyyyyyy
yyyyyyyα
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We hence have a model where the dependent variable lagged one period is among the 
explanatory variables. Its coefficient is α0. A positive α0 implies that having exported to the 
market in the previous year increases the probability of exporting there this year, and it is 
interpreted as the sunk cost parameter of serving that single market (but again – it may also 
capture learning from own experience in the market in question ).  
In eq. 5 we include several other variables interacted with a categorical variable for whether 
the firm is an entrant, (1-yivjt), or a continuing exporter, yivjt. Effects for entrants may be 
interpreted as combined effects on fixed costs and sunk costs. These are captured by α1, α3 
and α5. Effects for continuing exporters may be interpreted as effects on fixed costs and are 
correspondingly captured by α2, α4 and α6.  
We pay particular attention to α1, which denotes the effects of experience from exporting 
other products to a country on the fixed or sunk costs of introducing a new product in the 
same country (note the interaction with 1-yivjt-1). We expect a positive effect. One 
interpretation of this variable is that it captures country-specific learning.
 54
 Another is that it 
reflects country-specific sunk export costs, which may accrue in addition to pure market-
specific sunk export costs. For example, costs related to establishing a sales office may be 
specific to the country, not to the market. In this case, having exported another product to the 
                                                 
54
 Arkolakis and Muendler (2010) find that among Brazilian firms, large firms selling many products, typically 
export their top products to many countries. Furthermore, they sell a smaller amount of their lowest-selling 
products than do small exporters. To explain this they develop a model where firms face market-specific sunk 
export costs that may decline with the number of products the firm sells in a country. They do not discuss 
learning effects as such, but an obvious explanation for the mechanism described in the paper is learning to 
export from other products in the same country, as described above.  
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country the year before reduces sunk costs of starting to export a new product to the same 
country, because the country-specific part of the entry cost is already paid for. Not taking this 
effect into account will give upward biased estimates of the effect of market-specific sunk 
export costs.
55
As was the case for market-specific sunk export costs and learning, it is not 
possible to separate the effect of country-specific sunk export costs from country-specific 
learning. Also in this case the reduction in fixed costs due to learning can be interpreted as 
sunk costs. α1 denotes the effect of both, and in the regression analysis yiv’jt-1 will capture both 
effects. 
α2 is the equivalent to α1 for continuing exporters and we interpret it as country-specific 
learning. It will increase the probability that the firm will continue to export to a given market 
(note the interaction with yivjt-1).  
α3 and α4 denote the reduction in market-specific sunk and fixed costs from experiences from 
other countries, and we interpret them as learning effects. As indicated above, y*ij’t-1 is a 
vector of varying indicators of experience from other countries. Together with yiv’jt-1 it 
constitute the vector y*it-1 in equation 4; it captures the number of countries to which the firm 
exports product v and the number of countries to which the firm exports all products as well.  
y*i’jt-1 is a vector of indicators of the number of other firms exporting the same or different 
products to the country, and we interpret the coefficients α5 and α6 as capturing spillover 
effects.  
We include the learning and spillover variables both along the extensive and the intensive 
margins. Learning and spillover variables along the extensive margin are in accordance with 
two recent theoretical models. In Schmeiser (2012), learning to export to a particular country 
is a function of the number of countries the firms has previously exported to, while in 
                                                 
55
 Moxnes (2010) studies country-specific versus global sunk export costs. He argues that not including country-specific 
export participants in the analysis will overestimate the effect of global sunk export costs. Further, Meinen (2011) argues that 
export experience from another country may reduce country-specific sunk export costs if these have a global component. 
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Krautheim (2012) spillovers in the destination markets are a function of the number of other 
exporters present there.  Nevertheless, contrary to these studies we also model learning and 
spillovers as functions of export intensity, and include variables of export value that 
correspond to the learning and spillover variables described above. For simplicity, these 
variables are not included in the equations above, but are described in detail in section 4 and 
in Appendix 2.  
The probability that firm i exports product v to country j in period t is now given by the 
probability regression equation:  
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2.5 Econometric issues  
Unobserved heterogeneity is likely to create persistence in the dependent variable. If it is not 
corrected for, α0 will be overestimated. To handle this problem, we estimate 6 using a random 
effects probit model. This is in accordance with several other studies on sunk export costs (see 
Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Clerides et al., 1998; Bugiamelli and Infante, 2002; Bernard and 
Jensen, 2004; and Gullstrand, 2011). Unobserved heterogeneity is modelled at the firm-
product-country level, and the method implies assuming that the error term consists of two 
terms: 
ivjtivjivjt ue    
where ivj captures elements that are time-invariant and specific to firm-product-country. 
Remaining noise is captured by uivjt. There may also be unobserved heterogeneity at other 
levels. To correct for this, we include firm, year, product, and year-product dummies.
56
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 We also experimented with running a regression including country dummies, but the results were qualitatively 
almost identical to results presented here. 
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An important problem is the initial conditions problem (see Heckman, 1981). This concerns 
how to treat the first observation of the lagged dependent variable. Export experience is likely 
to be correlated with unobservable characteristics. However, simply including yivj0 as an 
explanatory variable for yivj1, implies treating yivj0 as exogenous and hence uncorrelated with 
the unobservable characteristics – which is not likely to be true.  
Several solutions have been proposed in the literature. Wooldridge (2005) suggests capturing 
the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and yivj0 by including, as auxiliary 
explanatory variables for every year in the regression, all observations for all years of the 
time-variant exogenous variables together with yivj0, and then running a standard random 
effects probit regression. We use this methodology but choose to include the within means of 
the time-variant exogenous variables instead of all observations, in order to make the 
computational task manageable.
57
 The Wooldridge method then consists in considering the 
unobserved heterogeneity, εivj, as the expression: 
ivjivjivj y   ivj2xλ010  
Above ivjx  now denotes the vector of the within mean of all time-variant right-hand variables 
in eq. 7. λi is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and μivj is the remaining unobserved 
individual effect which is assumed iid N[0,σ2μ] . Our learning and spillover variables are 
constructed with interactions with dummy variables for non-presence (1-yivjt-1) or presence 
(yivjt-1) in markets. The regression equation becomes: 
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57 An advantage of the Wooldridge method is that it also corrects for potential serial correlation in uivjt caused by εivj being 
correlated with the explanatory variables (see Chamberlain, 1984, and Mundlak, 1978). Furthermore, it reduces the variance 
of the unobserved heterogeneity, 2ε. As pointed out by Heckman (1981), a large 
2
ε may overestimate the effect of the 
lagged dependent variable. 
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which is estimated using a random effects probit estimation. 
We use this Wooldridge-modified random effects probit regression as our baseline regression 
(referred to as WREP), but we compare the results with the standard random effects probit 
regression (referred to as REP). The Wooldridge methodology implies that several of our 
variables are included together with their within means. This is important when interpreting 
the results.  
3 Data and descriptive statistics 
We use a panel dataset of all seafood exporters in Norway for the years 1996 to 2007, 
provided by Statistics Norway. Export is disaggregated on firms, products and countries. For 
the whole period, the most important export destinations in terms of export value are 
Denmark, Japan, France, the UK and Russia; the most important exported products are Fresh 
Whole Salmon/Trout, Stockfish/Clipfish/Salted Whitefish and Frozen Whole Pelagic Fish.  
Unlike earlier studies of sunk export costs, which focus on firms that export their own 
production, our data also include trading companies that buy all the seafood they export from 
other producers.
58
 It is a great advantage that our data include these firms. However, they 
make it difficult to merge our data with data on firm characteristics, such as production or 
total factor productivity. Other empirical studies of sunk export costs often find such 
characteristics important for entry into the export activity.  Nevertheless, such characteristics 
are probably less important for our study because, as explained below, we concentrate on 
market-specific export entry, not global export entry. We also proxy for differences in the 
ability to export by using information about firm exports. For example, total export value is a 
proxy for firm size and may capture time-variant productivity differences. We further account 
                                                 
58
 We cannot identify these trading companies, but they probably constitute around 30 per cent of all seafood 
exporters (see Melchior and Medin, 2002). These firms are thus important for the study of market-specific 
export. 
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for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by including random effects at the firm-product-
country level, as well as firm, product, and product-year dummies.  
Most other studies have focused on manufacturing firms, and an important question is 
whether the results from our study can be generalised to other sectors. Admittedly, seafood 
has some specific characteristics. For one thing, some seafood product groups are necessarily 
quantity-restricted, as fishing rights for caught fish are distributed by quotas. However, in 
Appendix 1 we show that that our analysis is also relevant for the distribution of a given 
export volume across countries. In addition, important product groups in our data are farmed 
fish, and these are not quantity-restricted to the same extent as caught fish. Furthermore, many 
manufacturing sectors are also characterised by varying degrees of quantity restrictions. 
Much seafood constitutes more homogeneous product groups than manufactured products. 
Some findings indicate that sunk and fixed export costs are more important for heterogeneous 
products than for homogeneous ones (Rauch, 1999). We expect sunk costs, e.g. related to 
adjustment to different product and veterinary standards, to be present also for seafood 
exporters. Nevertheless, Melchior (2003) shows that the sunk costs of exporting are far higher 
among Norwegian IT exporters than among seafood exporters. If anything, then, our results 
underestimate the general impact of market-specific sunk and fixed costs.  
3.1 Full dataset versus the sample used for regression analysis 
Firms in our data export in total 376 product groups at eight-digit HS-level to 196 countries. 
On average 496 (out of 1242) firms are active each year during the sample period, yielding an 
average of 376 x 196 x 496 = 37,112,704 firm-product-country observations each year: 
prohibitively large for data computation purposes. Nevertheless, it is not adequate to include 
all firms in the regression analyses, and we aggregate products into 18 groups.  
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3.1.1 Firms  
We do not include temporary exporters in the regression analysis as our purpose is to study 
firms’ exports to specific markets, not firms’ global exports. There are several different kinds 
of potential sunk costs of entering into the export activity: global as well as product-specific 
sunk costs may accrue, in addition to market- and country-specific sunk costs. We wish to 
focus on the two latter. Therefore, we include only firms that export all years throughout the 
sample period (in total 146) and only those firm-product combinations that that are positive 
all years. This reduces the number of firms to 116.
59
  This allows us to analyse market- or 
country-specific sunk export costs separately, without running the risk of incorrectly 
interpreting them as global or product-specific sunk export costs. 
There are three additional advantages of reducing the sample in this way. Firstly, we do not 
risk incorrectly interpreting sunk production costs as sunk export costs. If a firm enters into 
export activity or starts exporting a new product, we cannot know whether this is due to 
production start-up or to export entry, since we do not have information about firms’ 
production. Secondly, we get a more homogeneous sample and reduce bias from omitted 
firm-level and firm-product-level variables that are not captured by the proxies for firm 
characteristics or random effects/dummies. Thirdly, it allows us to deal with acquisitions. If 
one firm acquires another firm it is reasonable that the price includes, and therefore reflects, 
already-paid sunk costs. Thus, these costs are reflected in an observation of increasing market 
coverage due to acquisitions. Firms that are acquired by other firms represent exits in the 
dataset and are not included in our sample.  
                                                 
59
 An alternative to including only firm-product combinations that are positive all years could be to include those 
that are positive at least one year during the sample period. Results from the regression analysis are robust to 
which of the two methods we apply. 
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Even though we focus solely on entry into new countries by existing firms-product channels, 
our sample shows considerable variation. Average entry and exit rates are both around 25 per 
cent.  
3.1.2. Products 
Many of the 8-digit HS-level products are similar. We therefore aggregate them into 25 
groups, of which 22 are fairly homogeneous in terms of production and exporting 
conditions.
60
 Further, we merge export data with data for country- and product-level import 
from the COMTRADE database, where products are on 6-digit HS-level.
61
 After these 
operations we are left with 18 product groups in our regression analysis. 
3.1.3 Countries 
Export data are merged with data for countries from several databases. Data for GDP and 
GDP per capita (in current NOK), and GDP growth (in fixed US dollars, three-year moving 
average) are provided by the World Bank, from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
62 
Three indicators of good governance (regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption) are provided by the World Bank, from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI).
63
 Geographical distances are great-circle distances (in kilometres) based on 
coordinates for the capitals as found in Gyldendal (1970). Data for country-specific exchange 
                                                 
60
 These groups are Conserved Fish, Whitefish (fresh whole, fresh fillet, frozen whole and frozen fillet), Farmed 
Fresh Whitefish (whole and fillet), Farmed Salmon/Trout (fresh whole, fresh fillet, frozen whole and frozen 
fillet), Caught Whole Salmon/Trout (fresh and frozen), Clipfish/Stockfish/Salted Whitefish, Meal/Oil/Industry, 
Pelagic (fresh whole, fresh fillet, frozen whole and frozen fillet), Salted Herring, Shellfish and similar (fresh, 
frozen and conserved), Smoked Salmon, and Miscellaneous. Products are particularly heterogeneous in 
Meal/Oil/Industry and Miscellaneous, while Conserved Fish consists of products with a much higher level of 
manufacturing than the others. Sunk costs for these three products group may therefore differ considerably from 
the others, and we omit them from the sample used for regression analysis. 
61
Aggregations of 6- and 8-digit HS-level products do not fully correspond. For four of our groups, the deviation 
is severe, so we exclude them from the sample used for regression analysis. Export of these product groups is 
marginal. These groups are: Caught Salmon/Trout (fresh and frozen) and Farmed Whitefish (whole and filet).  
62
 WDIs for the Faroe Islands lack GDP growth figures for the whole period and GDP for 1997, so our figures 
for the Faroes come from the Statistics Faroe Islands. Growth figures are in current USD. WDIs for Brunei lack 
GDP for the year 2007, so we have estimated that figure. WDIs for Qatar lack growth figures for the years 1996–
2000, so we have supplemented with growth figures from the IMF. 
63 Data for the Faroe Islands and Greenland are lacking in the WGIs, so we have set figures for these countries equal to those 
s for Denmark. 
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rates come from the CIA World Factbook, and data for country- and product-level import 
from the COMTRADE database.
64
 Compared to our export data, 52 countries are missing 
from the above-mentioned databases.  
3.1.4 The sample  
The first year of the period (1996) is used to construct lagged variables, and the sample 
therefore spans the period 1997 to 2007. Following the methods described above, the sample 
now contains 116 firms, 18 products, 268 firm-product combinations, and 144 countries. This 
gives 38,592 observations each year. One observation represents export of one product from 
one firm to one country: this we refer to as an export market channel. On average, only 5.5 
per cent of these are positive each year.  
Compared to the whole dataset, the sample is biased towards larger firms that export more 
products to more countries. Although the number of firms is highly reduced in the sample, it 
still covers 49 per cent of total Norwegian seafood export value during the period and 66 per 
cent of all markets with positive import. Obviously, this is not a representative sample of all 
exporting firms, but, since our focus is on market- or country-specific entry, our aim is to 
study the behaviour of permanent exporters and not that of all firms. In the present study, the 
entire population of permanent exporters, small as well as large, are included, as are most 
countries in the world. In addition, unlike other studies, our data include pure trading 
companies. Many studies of sunk costs apply samples that are biased towards more successful 
firms or markets. Often, only firms that are operational during the whole sample period are 
included, and several studies do not include small firms (e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1997; 
                                                 
64 A problem with the COMTRADE data is that some countries fail to report import of certain products in certain years, even 
if import was positive. It is not possible to distinguish these missing observations from observations that are in fact zero. In 
the case where import of product v to country j was positive at least one year during the sample period, we replace the zero 
observations with the mean of the positive observations from the years these were reported. If import of product v to country j 
was zero all years, these remain zero. Nevertheless, results from the regression analysis are robust to alternative methods, 
such as treating all missing observations as zero.  
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Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Further, some studies of country-specific export include only the 
most important importing countries (Moxnes, 2010).  
3.2 Preliminary evidence 
In the presence of market-specific sunk export costs, we should expect firms to export to a 
limited number of markets. On average, only 5.5 per cent of all export market channels are 
positive each year, thus if firm-product combinations chose countries randomly we would see 
entry and exit rates of 94.5 per cent. Both these rates amount to approximately 25 per cent, 
thus there is persistence. This could indicate sunk export costs, because such costs make entry 
and exit costly. In section 3.2.1 we present evidence of persistence in country-product specific 
export as well as in country specific export. 
Our analysis is closely related to the analyses of extensive and intensive margins of trade 
frequently found in recent literature (e.g., Bernard et al., 2007; Chaney, 2008; Mayer and 
Ottaviano, 2008; Bernard et al., 2011a). The extensive margin of trade refers to the number of 
exporters (and potentially their number of export products and destinations), while the 
intensive margin of trade refers to the value of one firm’s export (potentially distributed 
across products and countries). In section 3.2.1 we present characteristics of our sample along 
the different extensive and intensive margins, with special focus on variables related to sunk 
costs, learning and spillovers.  
3.2.1 Survival function of firms 
One way of analysing persistence is to calculate the Kaplan-Meier survival function. Figure 1 
graphs the Kaplan-Meier survival functions for market-specific export (firm-product-country 
dimension) and for country-specific export (firm-country dimension). The survival function 
shows the share of export channels that were positive in year 1 that continued to be positive in 
subsequent years. Note that year 1 in Figure 1 refers to the year when the firm enters. Since a 
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firm may enter and exit a market (country) several times in the course of the sample years, we 
have treated each period of positive market- (country-) specific export from a given firm as 
one observation. The case of a firm that enters, exits, and then re-enters is hence treated as 
two different observations in calculating the survival functions. Also note that our sample 
suffers from left-censoring: we do not observe the year of entry for export channels that are 
positive in the year 1996. When calculating the survival functions, we therefore include only 
observations that enter in 1997 or later. As a consequence, the persistence evidenced in Figure 
1 underestimates persistence in our sample: all firms that exported in 1996 are excluded from 
the analysis in order to avoid problems with left-censoring. This includes firms that exported 
to a market in all the years covered. The share of positive export market channels is now 
reduced from 5.5 to 3.9 per cent, whereas the share of positive export country channels is 
reduced from 8.2 to 4.5 per cent. 
Graph 1 shows that, despite the low probability of exporting to a particular market, as much 
as 52 per cent of positive firm-market combinations that start exporting one year continue to 
be positive the subsequent year. The corresponding figure for firm-country combinations is 57 
per cent.
65
 After 11 years, 10 per cent of the export market channels survived, while 16 per 
cent of the export country channels survived. 
The survival functions show that firm-country persistence is higher than firm-product-country 
persistence. This is not surprising, as the latter is part of the former. Nevertheless, it indicates 
that both market- and country-specific sunk export costs may accrue. In the regression 
analysis we attempt to distinguish between the two, and show how the former may be 
overestimated if the latter is omitted. 
  
                                                 
65 Eaton et al. (2008) find that, among Colombian exporters, only about one third of firms as well as firm-country 
combinations are still exporting the year after entry. 
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3.2.2 Learning and spillovers 
Table 1 presents characteristics of firms that are related to the learning variables included in 
the regression analysis.
66
  
 
 Intensive margins Extensive margins 
  
Firm export 
value (NOK 
mill.)* 
Export value of a 
firm to a market 
(NOK mill.)* 
No. of markets a 
firm exports to* 
No. of countries 
a firm exports 
to* 
No. of products 
a firm exports* 
Average no. of 
countries a firm 
exports a 
product to** 
5 percentile 1.5 0.005 1 1 1 1 
Median 40 0.36 20 9 6 6 
Mean 143 4.7 31 13 6.7 7.1 
95 percentile 623 21 93 38 15 18.2 
Correlation with 
firm export value 
1 0.08*** 0.81*** 0.72*** 0.50*** 0.57*** 
Note: *Figures are based on the 116 firms, but include all 25 products and 196 countries. ** Figures are based on the 268 
sample firm-product combinations, but include all 196 countries. The variable is calculated by taking the average number of 
countries per product for each firm. The column shows how this variable varies across firms in the sample. ***Significant at 
the 1% level. 
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 Figures are for the year 2000, which was an ‘average’ year in terms of the number of export markets per firm 
and the average value of an export market channel. We construct learning variables based on all countries to 
which a firm exports and all products a firm exports, since learning might occur from a firm’s temporary as well 
as permanent export. Therefore, except for the last column, figures in Table 1 include all 25 products and 196 
countries, but only the 116 firms in our sample. Figures in the last column include all 196 countries, but only the 
268 firm-product combinations in the sample. 
0
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Graph 1 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, firms in markets and in countries 
Table 1 Characteristics of firms in the sample, year 2000 
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Table 1 shows that the distribution of firms is highly skewed: there are many small firms and 
a few large ones. In fact, the 5 per cent largest firms in terms of export value accounted for 41 
per cent of exports and 30 per cent of all positive export market channels in the sample. The 
number of markets per firm (column 3) may be high either because the firm exports to many 
countries (column 4), or because it exports many products (column 5). Again, the distribution 
is skewed: most firms sell few products in few countries.  
The last row in Table 1 presents correlation coefficients between the different variables and 
firm export value, which we use as a proxy for firm size. All coefficients are positive and 
highly significant. Hence, it is the small firms that tend to export few products to few 
countries. There is also a positive, albeit much smaller, correlation between sales in each 
market and firm size. This lends support to our hypothesis of sunk and fixed costs: Many 
firms concentrate their exports in a limited number of markets.
67
 
Table 2 presents characteristics of countries and markets that are related to the spillover 
variables included in the regression analysis. It shows that the distribution of exporters per 
country or market is skewed: most countries and markets have few Norwegian exporters 
present. In fact, there was only one Norwegian exporting firm present in as much as 15 per 
cent of the countries and 33 per cent of the markets. In the regression analysis we distinguish 
between intra-product spillovers (firms that export the same product to the same country), and 
inter-product spillovers (firms that export any product to the same country). The average 
number of Norwegian firms in each market is only 7.7, which is less than one quarter of the 
average number of firms in a country (31).  
In the presence of spillovers, we should expect firms to cluster in the same countries or 
markets. A high share of the export value is concentrated in a few large countries. The 5% top 
                                                 
67 Other empirical studies find patterns similar to those described above (see Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008, for a survey of 
European firms; Bernard et al., 2009 for US firms). Most exporters tend to be small and export to a few markets. Some few, 
very large exporters which also export to numerous markets account for a large share of total export value.  
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countries imports 53 % of total export of Norwegian seafood. As expected, these countries 
also have a high number of Norwegian exporters present (164 on average). Furthermore, there 
are on average 132 other Norwegian exporters present in an average firm’s portfolio of 
destination countries. The same is true for markets: as much as 67 per cent of total Norwegian 
seafood export is concentrated in the top 5 per cent markets, and on average there are 34 
Norwegian exporters present in these markets. In the regression analysis we include variables 
that control for market attractiveness. Still, clustering in a limited number of markets seems to 
characterise the data. 
68
  
 
 Country characteristics Market characteristics 
 Intensive margin Extensive margins Intensive margin Extensive margin 
  Norwegian export 
value to a country 
(NOK mill.)* 
No. of products a 
country imports* 
No. of firms that 
export to a 
country* 
Norwegian export 
value to a market 
(NOK mill.)** 
No. of firms that 
export to a 
market** 
Min 0.002 1 1 0.001 1 
Median 11 6 8 0.9 3 
Mean 263 8.8 31 35 7.7 
Max 4224 23 247 2209 75 
 
Note: *Figures include those of the 144 sample countries that had positive import of Norwegian seafood in the year 2000 
(total 118), but include all firms that exported Norwegian seafood in the year 2000 (total 484) and all 25 products. ** Figures 
include those sample markets with positive import of Norwegian seafood in the year 2000 (total 837), but include all firms 
that exported Norwegian seafood in the year 2000 (total 484). 
 
4 Results 
We estimate eq. 7 using a random effects probit model where the Wooldridge method is used 
for correcting for initial conditions as described in section 2.5. We refer to this model as 
WREP. For comparison purposes we also report results from a random effects probit model 
where we do not correct for initial conditions (referred to as REP). The regression equations 
include lagged export status and several learning and spillover terms. The learning and 
spillover effects are interacted with indicators for lagged export status (yivjt-1) to capture 
                                                 
68
 Spillover variables in the regression analysis include all firms and firm-product combinations, as do country 
characteristics in Table 2. The reason is that spillovers might come from temporary exports as well as permanent 
ones. Figures include those sample markets with positive import in the year 2000 (in total 837), and all firms. 
Table 2 Characteristics of countries and markets in the sample, year 2000 
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effects on the probability of staying in a market and indicators for lagged absence in a market 
(1-yivjt-1) to capture effects on the probability of entering a market. Consequently, we 
distinguish between effects for continuing exporters and entrants in a market. In addition, the 
vector z contains a range of firm-specific, product-specific and country-specific variables (and 
combinations of the three), both time-independent and time-varying.  
Main results are presented in Table 3. The table only reports results on variables that reflect 
market-specific sunk and fixed costs, learning and spillovers. Results for other explanatory 
variables (and for their time-independent averages in the Wooldridge model) are reported and 
discussed in Appendix 3. It should be noted that in comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficients of the Wooldridge random effects probit model (the WREP model) with those of 
the random effects probit model (the REP model), the coefficients should be scaled with the 
models’ estimate of √1-ρ.69 Also the estimated ρs are reported in Table 3. It is evident that the 
WREP approach is important for dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. By applying the 
WREP model, ρ is substantially reduced from 0.278 in the REP model to 0.047. This 
demonstrates that the Wooldridge model reduces possible bias of α0 due to large σε (see 
section 2.5 for discussion). 
In addition to the coefficients and their standard errors, we report average partial effects 
(APEs). The APEs for the WREP model are calculated using coefficients scaled with √1-ρ, as 
described in Wooldridge (2012,  p. 628).
70
 
71
 In our data, the probability of serving an export 
market is on average very low - the average predicted probability is 5.40 per cent. The APEs 
should therefore be evaluated relative to that. 
                                                 
69
 ρ is the proportion of total variance contributed by the constant cross-period variance due to unobserved 
heterogeneity, which is given by σ2ε in the REP model and σ
2
μ in the WREP model. ρ=σ
2/(σ2+1) (see 
Wooldridge, 2005; Arulampalam and Stewart, 2009). 
70
 The APEs should be interpreted with some care. We have not been able to calculate their standard errors 
because bootstrapping is too time consuming - running one regression takes more than 50 hours. Still, even 
though the significance of the APEs may differ from the significance of the coefficient, it is the latter that 
indicate whether an independent variable has a significant effect on the dependent variable.  
71
 The APEs for dummy variables indicate the average of the difference in the predicted probability as the 
dummy changes from 0 to 1. 
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   WREP   REP   
   Coeff.  APE Coeff.  APE 
 market export status  1.124 
(0.053) 
*** 0.07064 
 
1.802 
(0.053) 
*** 0.14471 
 
 market export value  0.017 
(0.003) 
*** 0.00056 
 
0.024 
(0.004) 
*** 0.00081 
 
Learning country export status, other products.  (1-y) 0.173 
(0.024) 
*** 0.00584 
 
0.735 
(0.021) 
*** 0.02813 
 
 country export status, other products.  y 0.543 
(0.035) 
*** 0.02404 
 
0.35 
(0.031) 
*** 0.01370 
 
 export intensity, same country, other products.  (1-y) -0.001 
(0.001) 
* -0.00004 -0.001 
(0.000) 
 -0.00002 
 
 export intensity, same country, other products.  y -0.002 
(0.001) 
*** -0.00006 -0.002 
(0.001) 
*** -0.00007 
 
 number of other countries, same product.  (1-y) 0.03 
(0.002) 
*** 0.00100 
 
0.044 
(0.002) 
*** 0.00146 
 
 number of other countries, same product.  y. 0.016 
(0.003) 
*** 0.00053 
 
0.031 
(0.002) 
*** 0.00105 
 
 average export intensity, other countries, same product.  
(1-y) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
* -0.00011 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.00003 
 
 average export intensity, other countries, same product.  y -0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.00008 
 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.00002 
 
 number of other countries, all products.   (1-y) 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.00005 
 
-0.014 
(0.002) 
*** -0.00045 
 
 number of other countries, all products .  y 0.002 
(0.002) 
 0.00007 
 
-0.017 
(0.002) 
*** -0.00057 
 
 average export intensity, other countries, all products.   
(1-y) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.00004 
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
 0.00001 
 
 average export intensity, other countries, all products.  y 0.001 
(0.002) 
 0.00002 
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 -0.00004 
 
Spillover number of other firms, same product.  (1-y) 0.022 
(0.002) 
*** 0.00072 
 
0.044 
(0.001) 
*** 0.00147 
 
 number of other firms, same product.  y 0.017 
(0.002) 
*** 0.00055 
 
0.034 
(0.002) 
*** 0.00114 
 
 average export intensity, other firms, same product.  (1-y) 0.025 ) 
(0.005) 
*** 0.00081 
 
0.057 
(0.004) 
*** 0.00193 
 
 average export intensity, other firms, same product.  y 0.03 
(0.007) 
*** 0.00099 
 
0.065 
(0.006) 
*** 0.00219 
 
 number of other firms, all products. (1-y) 0.004 
(0.001) 
*** 0.00014 
 
0.003 
(0.000) 
*** 0.00009 
 
 number of other firms, all products.  y 0.002 
(0.001) 
* 0.00006 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 0.00002 
 
 average export intensity, other firms, all products.  (1-y) 0.006 
(0.005) 
 0.00019 
 
0.010 
(0.003) 
*** 0.00033 
 
 average export intensity, other firms, all products.  y -0.011 
(0.006) 
** -0.00037 
 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.00014 
 
 country value, other firms, same product.  (1-y) -0.001 
(0.000) 
*** -0.00003 
 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
*** -0.00006 
 
 country value, other firms, same product.  y -0.001 
(0.000) 
*** -0.00003 
 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
*** -0.00005 
 
 country value, other firms, all products.  (1-y) -0.000 
(0.000) 
*** -0.00001 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
*** 0.00001 
 
 country value, other firms, all products.  y -0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.00000 
 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
 -0.00000 
 
 rho 0.047 
(0.007) 
***  0.278 
(0.009) 
***  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. (1-y) and y denote interacted with entrance and continuance, respectively. *, ** and 
*** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Number of observations is 424,512. Value variables are in 
NOK million. Year dummies, product dummies, firm dummies, regional dummies and product-year dummies were included 
in the regressions but are not reported. Random effects are for firm-product-country. The number of firm-product-country 
observations is 38,592. Log-likelihood and σ for WREP are -27 294 and 0.221. Log-likelihood and σ for REP are -31,670 and 
0.620  
Table 3 Regression results – learning and spillovers 
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4.1 Sunk costs, learning and spillovers  
4.1.1 Market-specific sunk costs  
The effect of sunk export costs is captured by the variable market export status, which is 
equal to yivjt-1. The coefficient is positive and significant in both regression models, which 
gives support to the hypothesis of market-specific sunk costs. This holds true for our baseline 
regression, WREP, as well as for the REP regression. As expected, the coefficient is 
considerably higher for the REP model than it is for the WREP model. The scaled coefficient 
is 1.53 for the former and 1.10 for the latter. This underlines the importance of adequately 
correcting for unobserved heterogeneity. Both results imply that the probability of serving a 
market increases with lagged export status in that market.  According to the APE from the 
WREP model, the probability of exporting to a market increases by more than 180% (from 
3.9 to 11.0 percentage points) if the firm exported to the market the previous year as 
compared to if it didn’t. Our results seem quite robust. We experimented with running 
regressions excluding the largest firm from the regressions, which account for 13.2 per cent of 
total exports and 13.3 per cent of the total number of positive export market channels. This 
did not alter the results much. Neither did excluding the 5% smallest or largest firms.
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4.1.2 Market-specific learning 
As discussed in section 2.3, it is not possible to distinguish the effect of market-specific sunk 
export costs from the effect of market-specific learning. Thus the positive coefficient for 
market export status may also indicate the firms’ export costs have been reduced through 
learning. 
Additional learning effects from export intensity in the market are analysed separately by 
including the variable market export value in addition to market export status. The effect of 
                                                 
72
 We also ran separate regressions for various product categories. Lagged export status was significant for most 
categories. An exception is Fresh White Fish. It was highest for Clipfish/Stockfish/Salted Whitefish – not 
surprising, as this is a more heterogeneous product group where quality differences are important.   
118 
 
export value on a given market is also positive and significant, but small compared to export 
status. Export value is given in NOK million (corresponding to about USD 0.11 million in the 
year 2000).  Comparing APEs, for the two variables show that in order for market export 
value to match the effect from the mere presence in the market, a firm must increase its 
market-specific exports by about NOK 125 million. As a comparison, median export value 
from a firm to a market is only NOK 0.36 million (see Table 1).  
4.1.3 Country- versus market-specific sunk costs. 
The variable country export status, other products equals 1 if firm i exported other products to 
country j last period and 0 otherwise. When interacted with (1-yivjt-1) this variable may capture 
the effect of country-specific sunk costs that come in addition to market-specific sunk costs. 
For example, costs related to acquiring information about a country’s business culture and 
legislation are specific to that country rather than to the market.
73
 If the firm exported other 
products, but not product v, to country j in the last period, then part of G is already paid, 
making it less costly to start exporting product v. 
The results on country-specific export status are important. If these effects are not taken into 
account, they will be captured as market-specific effects. Comparable regressions where we 
excluded the country export status, other products (interacted with dummy for entry as well 
as continuance) resulted in coefficients for lagged export status which were greater than those 
reported in Table 3. Exclusion of country-specific effects is therefore an important 
misspecification that results in overestimation of market-specific sunk costs.  
The importance of country-specific sunk costs also becomes evident when we run regressions 
on the country dimension only. Such regressions yield larger coefficients for the lagged 
dependent variable as compared to our baseline firm-product-country regressions.  
                                                 
73 Information gathering is believed to be an important part of sunk export costs (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997). 
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4.1.4 Country-specific learning 
Firms may learn about exporting a given product to a given country from their export 
experience with other products in the same country (see section 2.4), and country export 
status, other products may also reflect country-specific learning.  Finding customers is one 
example of how experience with exporting a product can reduce the costs of exporting 
another product. A firm that exported product v to country j in the last period may have 
established contacts with several customers in that country. Those same customers may be 
interested in another product, v', and so the costs related to finding customers for v' will be 
lower for a firm entering the market for v’ in j this period. For a continuing exporter, it may 
also be easier to keep existing customers for v’ in j if the firm exported other products there 
the previous period. 
Its coefficient is positive and significant. This is the case both when the firm was not in the 
market in the previous year (interact 1-yivjt-1) and when it was (interacted with yivjt-1). Having 
exported another product to a country in the past year increases the probability of entering the 
country with a new product this year by 11.1 per cent (from 5.2 to 5.8 percentage points) and 
the probability of continuing to export a particular product to the country by 49.6 per cent 
(from 4.9 to 7.34 percentage points). Since in this case the effect is higher for continuing 
exporters than for entrants, this may indicate that the former are better at exploiting learning 
effects than the latter. Medin and Melchior (2002) also present qualitative evidence on such 
intra-country learning: From interviews with Norwegian seafood exporters, they found that 
different products were often sold to the same customers, and that costs of introducing a new 
product in a country were significantly lower if the firm exported other products to the 
country.
74
 
                                                 
74
 Note  that these results can also reflect the presence of country specific sunk export costs 
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Also for market experience, there may be an additional learning effect from export intensity. 
In this case, firm i’s export value of other products to country j should reduce its costs of 
exporting product v to country j. The effect is captured by the variable export intensity, same 
country, other products. Our results indicate no additional learning effects from export 
intensity, as the coefficients are negative and partly significant. These effects may indicate 
that firms tend to remain specialised in their export markets, given high export values. One 
reason for such specialisation effects may come from the supply side: firms may have limited 
production capacity, so that the export value of other products does not increase the 
probabilities of starting or continuing to export a given product.  
4.1.5 Learning from export experience in other countries 
Firms may also learn about exporting to a specific market from their own experience in other 
countries. Demand patterns, customs procedures and competition legislation may be similar 
across countries, so export experience in other countries may make it easier to export to a 
given country. The effect is likely to increase with the number of other countries to which the 
firm exports. Some effects, like learning about demand patterns, may be product-specific, 
while others, like learning about business culture, may be more general. We therefore 
distinguish between intra-product effects, captured by the variable number of other countries, 
same product, and inter-product effects captured by the variable number of other countries, 
all products. Again, there may be additional learning effects from export intensity in other 
countries.  
The results show positive effects of having product-specific experience from other countries: 
the variable number of other countries, same product, is positive and significant for both 
entrants and continuing exporters. However, the effect is smaller than for intra-country 
learning. If the firm exported a product to an additional country in the past year, the 
probability of entering a given country with the product this year increases by 1.9% and the 
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probability of continuing to export the product to a given country by 1.0%.
75
 There is no 
evidence of learning across product groups from other countries. Furthermore, there seem to 
be no additional learning effects along the intensive margins, neither within product groups 
(captured by average export intensity, other countries, same product), nor between product 
groups (captured by average export intensity, other countries, all products).  
4.1.6 Comparison with other studies 
Summing up, the results on learning from own export experience seem to indicate that such 
effects are strongest within one and the same country. A firm’s presence with a product in a 
given country seems to induce learning about exporting another product to that country. There 
are also learning effects within product groups across countries, but no effects between 
countries and products. Learning from own export experience in other countries takes place 
through the extensive margin (number of other countries to which the firm exports), and not 
the intensive margin (average export value to other countries).There is some evidence of 
learning from own export intensity in the same market, but effects are small. 
Also other studies have documented learning effects from exporting. Some, among them 
Schmeiser (2012), Eaton et al. (2008), Lawless, (2009) and Albornoz et al. (2012), find that 
export expands through gradual entrance, possibly caused by learning. Lawless (2011), 
Morales et al. (2011), Castagnino (2011), Alvarez et al. (2010), Fabling et al. (2011), 
Gullstrand (2011) and Meinen (2012) all find that export experience in other countries or 
markets increases the probability of exporting to a particular country or market. These studies 
define learning variables somewhat differently than we do, and do not include learning effects 
along the extensive and intensive margins as we do. None of these distinguish between 
entering and continuing exporters within the same regression as we do, and all but Gullstrand 
                                                 
75 These results confirm the qualitative results from interviews with Norwegian seafood exporters in Medin and Melchior 
(2002). They found evidence on learning from experience in other countries, but the effect was less important than 
experience within the same country. 
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(2011) and Meinen (2012) concentrate on learning effects for entering firms only. Most of 
these studies also differ from ours in the econometric methods applied. 
4.1.7 Spillovers from other exporters  
Firms’ export experience is knowledge that may spill over to other firms and reduce their  
export costs. Spillover effects are likely to be stronger the larger the number of other 
exporters in the country. Some spillovers, such as information about demand, may be product-
specific, whereas others, such as information about business culture, may be more general. 
We capture these spillover effects with the variables number of other firms, same product; 
and number of other firms, all products. As for learning, we also include corresponding 
effects along the intensive margin. 
We find evidence of positive spillovers along the extensive margin. The number of other 
firms selling the same product in the same country has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of starting to export to the market and on the probability of staying in the market. 
The APEs show that an additional Norwegian firm exporting a product to a country increases 
the probability of a firm exporting the same product to the same country by approximately 1% 
(for entrants as well as for continuing exporters). There is also some evidence of inter-product 
spillovers, but effects are smaller. It should be noted that these revealed spillover effects are 
net of any competition effects, which would tend to reduce the coefficients. The results are in 
line with findings in Medin and Melchior (2002), where interviews with Norwegian seafood 
exporters showed that firms consider it advantageous if there are other Norwegian exporters 
present in a market.   
Regarding spillovers along the intensive margin, we find evidence of intra-product spillovers 
(captured by average export intensity, other firms, same product), but not of interproduct 
spillovers (captured by average export intensity, other firms, all products). We have also 
included the total value of other firms’ export (of the same or all products) as a possible 
123 
 
source of spillovers, but most coefficients are negative and significant. We interpret this as a 
dominating competition effects. 
Summing up, we find strong indications of intra-product spillovers along the extensive margin 
(number of other firms exporting a particular product to the country) as well as the intensive 
margin (their average export value). There is also some evidence of inter-product spillovers 
along the extensive margin (number of other firms exporting any product to the country), but 
not along the intensive margin. We find is no evidence of spillovers from total export value of 
other Norwegian firms to the country. 
One risk is that our spillover variables may capture market attractiveness rather than actual 
spillovers. To control for this, we have included several indications of market attractiveness 
(see section 4.3.1). We also experimented with including country dummies in our regressions. 
The results for the spillover variables remained very similar to those reported in Table 3, 
indicating that they capture actual spillovers. 
Our results are in line with the theory of spillovers presented in Krautheim (2012), which 
predicts spillovers to be a function of the number of other exporters to the country question. 
Most empirical studies consider the impact of concentration of export activity within a region 
or industry in the exporting firm’s home country. Regarding spillovers that affect global 
export costs, results are mixed.
76
 However, evidence regarding spillovers that affect country- 
or market-specific export costs is more clear: Requena Silvente and Castillo Giménez (2007), 
Koenig (2009), and Lawless (2011) find that spillovers affect country-specific export costs; 
while Alvarez et al. (2010),  Koenig et al. (2010) and Fabling et al. (2011) find that spillovers 
affect market-specific sunk export costs. As opposed to our study, these studies focus solely 
on firms entering into different markets, not on firms that continue to export. Koenig et al. 
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 See e.g., Clerides et al. (1998); Bernard and Jensen (2004); Aitken et al., (1997); Barrios et al. (2003); and 
Greenaway et al. (2004). 
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(2010) distinguish between fixed and variable export costs in two separate regressions, and 
find that only the former are affected by spillovers. 
4.2 Alternative explanations  
4.2.1 Internal learning and spillovers 
We have assumed, like most studies of export decisions referred to here, that learning as well 
as spillover effects are external to firms. It may be, however, that learning and (to a lesser 
extent) spillover effects are endogenous. A firm may want to try exporting to a market not 
only because it believes that this market is profitable, but also because it knows that it will 
learn from exporting and therefore takes into account that entry into other markets later will 
become easier (for example by reducing uncertainty). In this case, a firm’s entries across 
markets are not independent. This is discussed in Albornoz et al. (2012), who analyse 
sequential exporting and argue that firms internalise learning effects, especially for the first 
market they enter. We have not modelled the decision to enter into export activity as such, 
since we include only firm-product observations that are positive each year. If learning effects 
are particularly important for the first export decision, the problem of assuming that learning 
effects are external to the firm is not important in our investigation. Furthermore, if learning is 
internalised into the firms’ decision problem, it is not clear whether the resulting 
interdependence would alter our results, since the sequence of entry into new markets could 
well be the same.  
Furthermore, it may be that firms take into account that their export decisions make it more 
likely that also other firms will follow. A firm may, for instance, try to choose countries or 
markets where spillovers are less likely to materialise (in order to avoid that other firms 
benefit from its knowledge) – or markets where spillovers are more likely to materialise (in 
order to benefit from mutual spillover effects). Again it is not clear whether internalised 
spillover effects like would alter the sequence of market entrances.  
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4.2.2 Fixed versus sunk costs 
In section 2 we hypothesised that learning and spillovers impact on fixed and sunk export 
costs, and this is our motivation for distinguishing between effects on entering firms and 
continuing exporters. Other interpretations are also possible. 
Our approach differs from some other contributions in how we interpret the effect of 
interaction variables between learning/spillover variables and lagged export status (i.e. the 
effect for continuing exporters).  If the coefficients for our learning and spillover variables for 
continuing exporters are positive, we interpret this as supporting the hypothesis that learning 
and spillovers reduce fixed, and not sunk costs. 
An alternative interpretation could be that sunk costs are greater for certain types of firms. If 
our learning and spillover variables reflect characteristics of firms rather than actual learning 
and spillovers, and sunk export costs vary according to these characteristics, then positive 
coefficients for continuing exporters can reflect the fact that sunk costs are higher for firms 
with those characteristics. In such cases, persistence, and hence the probability of continuing 
to export, should be higher for the firms with the characteristics in question. Other authors 
(e.g., Bugamelli and Infante, 2003, Máñez et al., 2008 and Gullstrand, 2011), who do not 
distinguish between sunk and fixed export costs, interpret coefficients for interaction variables 
between lagged export status and firm (and possibly country) characteristics this way. 
For example, we include the number of other markets the firm exports to, and we find a 
positive effect for continuing exporters. Using the alternative interpretation, this should 
indicate that firms that export to many markets face greater market-specific sunk export costs. 
We find such an interpretation counterintuitive and therefore choose to interpret the positive 
coefficient as reductions in fixed costs due to learning.  
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A related alternative interpretation is that learning/spillovers impact on continuing exporters’ 
sunk as well as fixed costs, because lower sunk costs make exit and re-entry less costly.
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This is an effect that works in the opposite direction of the effect from increased probability 
of staying in the market due to reduced fixed cost from learning/spillovers. If anything then, 
the impact of learning/spillovers on fixed costs is underestimated in our model. 
4.3 Other independent variables 
Our regressions include a range of other explanatory variables. Here we offer only a short 
description of these, but the regression results are reported in Appendix 3.  
4.3.1 Other variables 
As a proxy for productivity, firm size is often included in studies of sunk export costs, and it 
is generally found to be positively related the probability of exports (see e.g. Roberts and 
Tybout, 1997). Lacking data for productivity, production or capital stock, we use the log of 
the firm’s total export value. The variable is lagged one year and is called size. We further 
correct for the firm’s specific competitive advantage by including variables that reflect the 
firm’s position in the market, the country and for the product relative to Norwegian firms: 
leader market, leader country and leader product. The variables are lagged one year. Note 
that the size and leader variables vary over time in the firm-product-country, firm-country, 
firm-product, and firm dimensions. They may therefore capture differences in exporting 
ability that vary over time. In addition, we include firm dummies to correct for time-invariant 
differences in exporting ability. Consequently, although we lack data for several firm-
characteristics, we believe that we have adequately corrected for differences in the ability to 
export along the different dimensions. 
                                                 
77
 This is not correct if our assumption about full recurrence of the sunk cost after one period of exit holds. In 
that case, a reduction in a firm’s sunk cost due to learning/spillovers will fully depreciate after one period of exit, 
so the probability of staying in the market is not affected. Roberts and Tybout (1997) find that that most of the 
sunk cost must be repaid after one period of exit. 
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We include the variable import adjusted, defined as log of import (from all countries) of 
product v to country j, in order to capture demand and demand differences for each product 
within and between the countries included in the regressions.
78
 We also include changes in the 
country-specific exchange rates, appreciation.  
As suggested by the gravity literature of international trade, we include log of GDP (gdp), log 
of GDP per capita (gdp per capita), and log of distance (distance). 
79
 In addition we include 
three-year moving averages of growth rates in GDP (gdp growth). The governance qualities 
of a country may influence its attractiveness as a market. We include three measures of 
governance indicators: regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Of the 
above-mentioned variables, only leader variables, import adjusted, gdp growth, control of 
corruption and distance prove to be significant and with the expected signs (see Appendix 3 
for discussion). 
4.3.1 Dummy variables 
Ideally, but not possible in our model, we should correct for unobserved heterogeneity by 
including fixed effects on the firm-product-country combination. This would have corrected 
for all time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in all combinations of the three dimensions. 
An alternative approach would be to include dummies on the following combinations of 
variables: firm-product, firm-country, and country-product, in addition to random effects on 
the firm-product-country combination. This, on the other hand, would yield a large number of 
independent variables – prohibitively large for data computational purposes. We therefore 
choose to include dummies along the dimensions where we have few other independent 
variables to account for heterogeneity. 
                                                 
78 In some versions of our regressions we also included total Norwegian exports and Norway’s export share (in the world 
market) of each product. These were included to reflect Norway’s comparative advantages and time-varying supply 
characteristics. Results varied. The results presented here are when product-year dummies were included; these variables 
capture time-varying product-specific effects.  
79
 See Feenstra et al. (2001) for a survey. 
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We include dummies for (i) products, to capture supply and demand side differences across 
products; (ii) product-year, to capture production and demand cycles; (iii) firms, to 
compensate for the lack of data for firm characteristics such as productivity differences; (iv) 
regions; 
80
 (v) EU-countries; (vi) the USA; 
81
 and (vii) countries for which Norway has a free 
trade agreement with.
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Although our analysis includes many standard gravity variables capturing differences between 
countries, a concern in interpreting the results is that persistence in firm-market export may be 
due to unobserved characteristics of countries. We therefore experimented with running a 
regression also including country dummies, but the results were qualitatively almost identical 
to those presented here.  
5 Conclusions  
In this article we have investigated the importance of sunk export costs by examining 
persistence in firms’ export behaviour of firms. Unlike earlier studies, which have focused on 
global or country-specific sunk export costs, we have concentrated on the costs for already-
established exporters of entering a particular market. We find that having exported to a 
particular market the previous period increases the probability of exporting to the same 
market in the current period with more than 180 per cent as compared to not having exported 
to the market. This we interpret as evidence of the existence of market-specific sunk export 
costs.  
Furthermore, we have investigated how market-specific export costs are affected by learning 
and spillovers. We have looked for a wide range of learning spillover effects, intra- and inter-
product as well as intra- and inter-country. These effects may occur along the extensive 
margin as well as along the intensive margin. We also investigate how learning and spillovers 
                                                 
80 Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. 
81 Anti-dumping duties have been imposed on Norwegian exports of salmon in the US market. 
82 Separates dummies are included for the European Economic Area (EEA), and for countries that became EU members in 
2004 and in 2007 (FTAEEA04 and FTAEEA007). Norway had generous free trade agreements with these countries (for 
seafood) that became void when they joined the EU. 
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affect sunk and fixed costs differently, by analysing the decision to enter new markets 
separately from the decision to stay in existing markets. Whereas the probability of starting 
export activities is related to sunk and fixed costs combined, the probability of staying in 
export markets is related to fixed costs only. Several new effects are identified.  
Our evidence indicates that firms learn about exporting to a particular market from their own 
exporting experience in the market in question as well as from own export experience in other 
markets. Learning effects appear to be strongest for presence within one and the same 
country: having exported another product to that country in the past year increases the 
probability of entering the country with a new product this year by 11.1 per cent and the 
probability of continuing to export a particular product to the country by 49.6 per cent. 
Whereas a firm’s presence in the country seems to induce learning, we found no learning 
effects from high export value of other products of the country. Our results further indicate 
that learning effects are present within product groups across countries, but absent between 
countries and products. Learning from own export experience takes place through the 
extensive margin (number of other countries the firm exports to), and not through the 
intensive margin (average export value to other countries). 
We also provide evidence on spillovers from the presence of other Norwegian exporters. As 
opposed to most other studies, which concentrate on spillovers in the home country, we focus 
on spillovers in the destination country. Our results indicate that a greater number of other 
Norwegian exporters in a given country increases the probability of export to that country. We 
find indications of intra-product spillovers along the extensive margin (number of firms 
exporting a particular product to the country) as well as long the intensive margin (their 
average export value). There is also some evidence of inter-product spillovers along the 
extensive margin (number of firms exporting any product to the country), but not along the 
130 
 
intensive margin (their average export value). There is no evidence of spillovers from total 
Norwegian export value to country. 
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Appendix 1 
In section 2.1 we proposed that the profit function π*ivjt(pvjt,vivt) could be represented as 
proportional to sales in a given market, independently of sales of other products in the country 
or of the same product in other countries. With standard CES preferences with elasticity of 
substitution σ>1, firm i’s demand for a variety v sold in country j can be written as: 
A1 1  jjvjivjivj PYpq  
Above, qivj denotes demanded quantity, and pivj denotes the price charged by firm i for product 
v in country j. Demand depends on (potential) country-specific preferences for product v, µvj, 
country j’s income level, Yj,  and an overall price index in country j, Pj, taken as exogenous 
for firm i.  
Assume that firm i produces under constant marginal costs. Marginal costs of supplying 
product v in country j are then given by: 
A2  ivvjivj awc /  
Above, civj denotes firm, product and country-specific marginal costs. These depend on 
variable transportation costs, τvj, marginal production costs, w, and a firm-product specific 
productivity parameter, aiv. Profits for firm i from exporting are given by:  
A3    
j v
ivjivvjivji Cvp ,
*  
Above, π*ivj(pvj,viv ) represents operating profits from exporting good v to country j. It 
depends on product-country characteristics, p, that are exogenous for the firm and firm-
product characteristics, v. The vector C denotes sunk/fixed costs (in this appendix we 
suppress the time dimension so that fixed and sunk costs are treated similarly), which could 
be firm-specific, firm-product specific, firm-country specific and firm-product-country 
specific. This vector therefore captures all sunk/fixed costs discussed in the text, as well as 
others. In the empirical specification in the text we focused on firm-country and firm-product-
country specific sunk/fixed costs. The profit function can now be written:  
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The firm charges a price that is a mark-up, σ/(σ-1), over marginal costs:  
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Operating profits from exporting product v to country j are therefore:  
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Operating profits are therefore proportional to sales. As seen, these profits π*ivj depend on 
variables exogenous to the firm (captured by the vector pvj) and variables that are product and 
firm-specific (captured by the vector viv). Therefore we write the profit equation in the text as 
π*ivj(pvj,viv). 
For a firm with fixed supply, our model requires only minimal adjustments. To illustrate this, 
consider a firm that sells one product only. We simplify by setting w=1 and a=1, so that 
marginal costs are cj=τj .Profits are: 
  
j
jjjjj qqp C  
The corresponding profit-maximization problem is a constrained one, since the sum of exports 
cannot exceed the total quota, Q. The Lagrangian for the maximization problem is: 
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The first-order conditions are 
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As compared to our unconstrained maximization problem, the problem corresponds to adding 
a constant (shadow price of quotas) to the marginal cost. The shadow price in turn depends on 
export costs and income levels in the two countries which are exogenous to the firm. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Independent variable Description 
Market export status  Lagged export status. A dummy equal to 1 if firm i exported product v to country j. It reflects the 
importance of market-specific sunk exporting cost or learning.  
Country export status  A dummy equal to 1 if firm i exported other products to country j last year. Reflects the importance of 
country-specific sunk costs and learning from own experience of exporting other products to country j.  
Number of other countries, 
same product  
Number of other countries (not including country j) firm i exported product v to last year. Reflects 
learning from experience in other countries. 
Number of other countries, all 
products  
Number of other countries (not including country j) firm i exported all products to last year. Reflects 
learning from experience from exporting to other countries. 
Number of other firms, same 
product  
Number of other Norwegian firms (not including firm i) that exported product v to country j the 
previous year. Reflects market-specific spillovers. 
Number of other firms, all 
products  
Number of other Norwegian firms (not including firm i) that exported all products to country j the 
previous year. Reflects country-specific spillovers from exporters.  
Market export value  The firm’s export value of product v to country j the previous year. Reflects additional learning effects 
from being deep in the market, and corresponds to market export status  
Export intensity, same country, 
other products  
The export value of other products (not including product v) from firm i to country j the previous year. 
A learning variable corresponding to country export status. 
Average export intensity, other 
countries, same product  
Export value of product v from firm i to other countries (excluding country j), divided by number of 
other countries, same product. A learning variable corresponding to number of other countries, same 
product. 
Average export intensity, other 
countries, all products  
Export value of all products from firm i to other countries the previous year, divided by number of other 
countries, all products. A learning variable corresponding to number of other countries, all products. 
Average export intensity, other 
firms, same product  
Country value, other firms, same product divided by number of other firms, same product. A spillover 
variable corresponding to number of other firms, same product. 
Average export intensity, other 
firms, all products  
Country value, other firms, all products, divided by number of other firms, all products. A spillover 
variable corresponding to number of other firms, all products. 
Country value, other firms, 
same product  
Export value from other Norwegian firms (excluding firm i) of product v to country j the previous year. 
An additional spillover variable. 
Country value, other firms, all 
products  
Export value from other Norwegian firms (excluding firm i) to country j the previous year. An 
additional spillover variable. 
Leader, market Export value of product v from firm i to country j, divided by Norway's export value of product v to 
country j. Lagged one year.  
Leader, country Export value of all products from firm i country j, divided by Norway’s total export value to country j. 
Lagged one year.  
Leader, product Export value of product v from firm i to all countries, divided by total Norwegian exports of product v. 
Lagged one year. 
Size Log of firm i's export value. A proxy for firm size. Lagged one year. 
Gdp Log of GDP. In 1000 current NOK. 
Gdp per capita  Log of GDP per capita. In 1000 current NOK. 
Growth in gdp  3-year moving averages of growth rates in GDP (fixed UD$). 
Appreciation Growth in the exchange rate between NOK and the local currency. 
Distance Log of distance from Norway to country j. In km. 
Import Log of import of product v in country j. In 1000 current NOK. Missing observations are replaced by 
mean. 
Regulatory quality Perceived quality of a government’s regulatory quality, normally distributed for country ranking.  
Rule of law Perceived quality of rule of law, normally distributed for country ranking. 
Control of corruption Perceived control of corruption, normally distributed for country ranking. 
Dyear Dummy equal to 1 for all years except, 2007. 
Dregion Dummy equal to 1 for all regions, except Africa. 
Dproduct Dummy equal to 1 for all products, except fresh fillets of whitefish. 
Dfirm Dummy equal to 1 for all firms, except one. 
Dyearproduct  Dummy equal to one for all year - product combinations, except fresh fillets of whitefish in 2007. 
DUSA Dummy equal to 1 for USA. 
DEU Dummy equal to 1 for EU member countries. 
DFTA Dummy equal to 1 for countries with which Norway has free trade agreements.  
DEEA Dummy equal to 1 for EFTA countries. 
DFTAEEA04 Dummy for new EU member countries in 2004 with which Norway previously had free trade 
agreements. 
DFTAEEA07 Dummy for new EU member countries in 2007 with which Norway previously had free trade 
agreements. 
Table A2.1 Independent variables 
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Appendix 3 Other explanatory variables 
In the main text we report and discuss results for lagged export status and for learning and 
spillover variables. In this appendix we report and discuss results from the other variables 
included as well as the results for the time independent means of the variables included in the 
WREP model. We also include the estimated ρ and the estimated coefficients for lagged 
export status and lagged export value of the product for reference purposes. The results tables 
are included as Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3 
We include dummies for (i) products, to capture supply and demand side differences across 
products (ii) product-year, to capture cycles on the production and demand side; (iii) firms, to 
compensate for the lack of data for firm characteristics such as productivity differences; (iv) 
regions
83
; (v) EU-countries; (vi) the USA
84
; and (vii) countries for which Norway has a free 
trade agreement with.
85
 
A3.1 Leader 
The estimated coefficients of the three leadership variables, leader market, leader country and 
leader product are all positive and significant. Leaderships in the market, the country and for 
the product (in the previous period) have positive effects on the probability of exporting a 
product to a market. This is as expected. Note that the estimated effects seem to be larger for 
the market, smaller for the country and smallest for leadership in a given product.  
A3.2 Firm size 
The variable firm size (log of the firm’s total export value) is not significant. This contradicts 
with earlier studies, where firm size is found to significantly increase the probability of 
export. This result reflects the inclusion of our dummy variables. Firm dummies reflect firm 
                                                 
83 Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. 
84 Anti-dumping duties have been imposed on Norwegian exports of salmon in the US market. 
85 Separates dummies are included for the European Economic Area (EEA), and for countries that became EU members in 
2004 and in 2007 (FTAEEA04 and FTAEEA007). Norway had generous free trade agreements with these countries (for 
seafood) that became void when they joined the EU. 
136 
 
characteristics, and product-year dummy variables reflect product dynamics. Hence our firm 
size variable reflects only firm size dynamics that can not be attributed to product specific 
dynamics. The results therefore reflect that firm export growth (when we have controlled for 
other variables) mainly occurs through expansion in existing export channels rather than 
through entrance in new markets.  
A3.3 World trade 
We include the variable import which is defined as log of import (from all countries) of 
product v to country j, as explanatory variable. It captures demand and demand differences for 
each product within and between the countries included in the regressions. The coefficient is 
positive and significant. 
A3.4 Exchange rates 
An appreciation of Norwegian kroner relative to the currency of country j has no significant 
effect on the probability of export. Results from other studies are mixed: Bernard and Jensen 
(2004) find a weak effect of the industry specific exchange rate. Campa (2002) finds a 
significant effect of changes in the firm-specific exchange rate, where each firm’s exchange 
rate is calculated according to its export markets. Clerides et al. (1998) also find an effect in 
some cases. Meinen (2012) and Gullstrand (2011) find no effect of country specific exchange 
rates. However, Gullstrand (2011) finds a negative effect of country specific exchange rate 
variation. 
A3.5 Market size and transport costs 
The variable measuring market size, gdp, is not significant. Income level, measured by gdp 
per capita, is insignificant. The fact that market size becomes insignificant is because we also 
include the countries’ total import of the seafood product in question. Furthermore, country 
specific time-invariant averages of this variable are included in the WREP regression. Note 
137 
 
however, that gdp also turns out insignificant in its time invariant average version (see table 
A3.2). Growth of gdp (growth, gdp) has positive and significant coefficients, however. Export 
presence is more prevalent in markets with high growth rates. This may possibly reflect 
positive expectations about profitability in emerging markets. Further, the effect of distance is 
negative and significant, as expected, in the two models. These results correspond to results 
found in the gravity literature of international trade (see Feenstra et al., 2001). Since distance 
is time invariant, its mean is not included among the auxiliary time independent variables in 
the WREP model.  
A3.6 Governance indicators 
The two indicators of good governance (regulatory quality and rule of law) have insignificant 
coefficients in the WREP model (but positive and significant in the other models). The reason 
for this result may be that these indicators are highly persistent across countries over time. 
Their time invariant means have positive, but not significant coefficients in the WREP model. 
control of corruption, is negative and significant in the REP model, but positive and 
significant in the WREP model. The difference between REP model and the WREP model 
can be explained with the fact that time-invariant average of this indicator is included in the 
WREP model. In this case, the economic interpretation is interesting. Control of corruption 
has a negative and significant coefficient in the REP model. Ceteris paribus therefore, 
corruption does not seem to discourage Norwegian seafood exporters. From the Wooldridge 
regressions, however, the time variation for the Control of corruption variable has a positive 
and significant effect. The coefficient of the time-invariant mean is negative and significant. 
Thus, when controlling for time invariant mean and when taking into account initial 
conditions, it seems that corruption deters Norwegian exporters. One potential explanation is 
that unobserved firm-market characteristics that affect firms’ abilities to handle corruption are 
correlated with the initial value of the dependent variable. This interpretation implies that 
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many firm-market combinations have good abilities to handle corruption. When initial 
conditions are controlled for, the isolated effect of corruption is negative (giving a positive 
coefficient for Control of corruption). Again, our results indicate the importance of 
adequately correcting for unobserved heterogeneity.  
A3.7 Trade policy relevant dummy variables.  
The trade policy dummies included in the regressions are generally insignificant. Both the 
USA and EU have imposed trade reducing restrictions on imports of Norwegian seafood. This 
is so in particular for farmed salmon and trout. Still the results are insignificant in the WREP 
model (but we obtain negative and significant results in the REP model). Also, note that the 
signs are the opposite for the countries for which Norway had free trade agreements prior to 
their EU membership.  
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 WREP   REP   
 Coeff.  St. dev Coeff.   St.dev 
market export status  1.124 *** 0.053 1.802 *** 0.053 
market export value  0.017 *** 0.003 0.024 *** 0.004 
leader, market 0.076 *** 0.015 0.250 *** 0.014 
leader, country 0.037 *** 0.006 0.067 *** 0.005 
leader, product 0.009 *** 0.003 0.007 *** 0.003 
Size 0.012  0.015 -0.023  0.015 
appreciation 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Gdp 0.095  0.200 0.109 *** 0.007 
gdp per capita 0.150  0.200 0.010  0.014 
gdp growth 0.012 *** 0.003 0.006 ** 0.002 
regulatory quality 0.008  0.046 0.149 *** 0.027 
rule of law -0.008  0.057 0.069 ** 0.033 
control of corruption 0.113 *** 0.042 -0.123 *** 0.026 
import adjusted 0.043 *** 0.014 0.011 ** 0.005 
EU -0.024  0.106 -0.184 *** 0.036 
USA -0.039  0.057 -0.190 *** 0.073 
FTA -0.055  0.056 -0.003  0.034 
FTAEEA04 0.163  0.115 0.019  0.045 
FTAEEA07 0.161  0.138 0.288 *** 0.062 
distance -0.130 *** 0.023 -0.162 *** 0.025 
Rho 0.047   0.278   
 
Note: *, ** and *** correspond to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Number of observations is 424,512. Value 
variables are in NOK million. Year dummies, product dummies, firm dummies, regional dummies and product-year dummies 
were included in the regressions but are not reported. Random effects are for firm-product-country. The number of firm-
country-product observations is 38,592. Log-likelihood and sigma for WREP are -27 294 and 0.221. Log-likelihood and 
sigma for REP are -31,670 and 0.620.  
  
Table A3.1 Other regression results 
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 Coeff.  St.dev 
market export status  -0.09100  0.06830 
market export status  -0.02230 *** 0.00255 
market export value  -2.77500 *** 0.07830 
country export status, other products.  (1-y) -2.07800 *** 0.07530 
country export status, other products.  y 0.00062  0.00088 
export intensity, same country, other products.  (1-y) -0.00019  0.00093 
export intensity, same country, other products.  y 0.01030 *** 0.00314 
number of other countries, same product.  (1-y) -0.00297  0.00391 
number of other countries, same product.  y. 0.00844 ** 0.00352 
average export intensity, other countries, same product.  (1-y) 0.00550  0.00393 
average export intensity, other countries, same product.  y -4.19700 *** 0.07730 
number of other countries, all products.   (1-y) -4.19800 *** 0.07730 
number of other countries, all products .  y -0.03460 ** 0.01480 
average export intensity, other countries, all products. (1-y) -0.03590 ** 0.01480 
average export intensity, other countries, all products.  y 0.01030 *** 0.00242 
number of other firms, same product.  (1-y) -0.01110 *** 0.00261 
number of other firms, same product.  y 0.03140 *** 0.00684 
average export intensity, other firms, same product.  (1-y) 0.00702  0.00863 
average export intensity, other firms, same product.  y -0.00502 *** 0.00099 
number of other firms, all products. (1-y) -0.00382 *** 0.00106 
number of other firms, all products.  y -0.00141  0.00531 
average export intensity, other firms, all products.  (1-y) -0.01260 * 0.00708 
average export intensity, other firms, all products.  y -0.00104 *** 0.00025 
country value, other firms, same product.  (1-y) 0.00056 * 0.00029 
country value, other firms, same product.  y 0.00010 * 0.00006 
country value, other firms, all products.  (1-y) 0.00017 ** 0.00007 
country value, other firms, all products.  y 0.69100 *** 0.02230 
Note: Distance and USA dummy, which are time-invariant: and firm size, which is captured by firm dummies, are not 
included.  
  
Table A3.2 Coefficients for time-independent means of variables included in the WREP 
regression. Learning and spillover variables. 
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 Coeff.  St.dev 
leader, country -0.01980 ** 0.00861 
leader, product -0.01220 ** 0.00500 
appreciation -0.00001  0.00007 
Gdp -0.06100  0.20000 
gdp per capita -0.16300  0.20000 
growth, GDP  -0.00700  0.00534 
Government indicator Regulatory quality 0.06830  0.05520 
Government indicator Rule of law 0.08600  0.06750 
Government indicator Control of corruption -0.20500 *** 0.05220 
Import adjusted -0.03730 ** 0.01460 
EU -0.07640  0.11100 
FTA 0.07860  0.06650 
FTAEEA04 -0.23000 * 0.12800 
FTAEEA07 0.07120  0.14900 
Note: Distance and USA dummy, which are time-invariant: and firm size, which is captured by firm dummies, are not 
included.  
 
  
Table A3.3 Coefficients for time-independent means of variables included in the WREP 
regression. Other variables. 
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